Physician Group Practices Accrued Large Bonuses Under Medicare's Bundled Payment Model, 2018-20.

The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced Model (BPCI-A), a voluntary Alternative Payment Model for Medicare, incentivizes hospitals and physician group practices to reduce spending for patient care episodes below preset target prices. The experience of physician groups in BPCI-A is not well understood. We found that physician groups earned $421 million in incentive payments during BPCI-A's first four performance periods (2018-20). Target prices were positively associated with bonuses, with a mean reconciliation payment of $139 per episode in the lowest decile of target prices and $2,775 in the highest decile. In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, mean bonuses increased from $815 per episode to $2,736 per episode. These findings suggest that further policy changes, such as improving target price accuracy and refining participation rules, will be important as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continues to expand BPCI-A and develop other bundled payment models.

Effect on hospital incentive payments and quality performance of a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme in Belgium.

BACKGROUND: Belgium initiated a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme after a decade of fixed bonus budgets for "quality and safety contracts". This study examined the effect of P4P on hospital incentive payments, performance on quality measures, and the association between changes in quality performance and incentive payments over time. METHODS: The Belgian government provided information on fixed bonus budgets in 2013-2017 and hospital incentive payments as well as hospital performance on quality measures for the P4P programmes in 2018-2020. Descriptive analyses were conducted to map the financial repercussion between the two systems. A difference-in-difference analysis evaluated the association between quality indicator performance and received incentive payments over time. RESULTS: Data from 87 acute-care hospitals were analyzed. In the transition to a P4P programme, 29% of hospitals received lower incentive payments per bed. During the P4P years, quality performance scores increased yearly for 55% of hospitals and decreased yearly for 5% of hospitals. There was a significant larger drop in incentive payments for hospitals that scored above median with the start of the P4P programme. CONCLUSIONS: The transition from fixed bonus budgets for quality efforts to a new incentive payment in a P4P programme has led to more hospitals being financially impacted, although the effect is marginal given the small P4P budget. Quality indicators seem to improve over the years, but this does not correlate with an increase in reward per bed for all hospitals due to the closed nature of the budget.

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review.

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

Primary care providers' preferences for pay-for-performance programs: a discrete choice experiment study in Shandong China.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes are commonly used to incentivize primary healthcare (PHC) providers to improve the quality of care they deliver. However, the effectiveness of P4P schemes can vary depending on their design. In this study, we aimed to investigate the preferences of PHC providers for participating in P4P programs in a city in Shandong province, China. METHOD: We conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) with 882 PHC providers, using six attributes: type of incentive, whom to incentivize, frequency of incentive, size of incentive, the domain of performance measurement, and release of performance results. Mixed logit models and latent class models were used for the statistical analyses. RESULTS: Our results showed that PHC providers had a strong negative preference for fines compared to bonuses (- 1.91; 95%CI - 2.13 to - 1.69) and for annual incentive payments compared to monthly (- 1.37; 95%CI - 1.59 to - 1.14). Providers also showed negative preferences for incentive size of 60% of monthly income, group incentives, and non-release of performance results. On the other hand, an incentive size of 20% of monthly income and including quality of care in performance measures were preferred. We identified four distinct classes of providers with different preferences for P4P schemes. Class 2 and Class 3 valued most of the attributes differently, while Class 1 and Class 4 had a relatively small influence from most attributes. CONCLUSION: P4P schemes that offer bonuses rather than fines, monthly rather than annual payments, incentive size of 20% of monthly income, paid to individuals, including quality of care in performance measures, and release of performance results are likely to be more effective in improving PHC performance. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering preference heterogeneity when designing P4P schemes.

A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations.

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

Primary healthcare system and provider responses to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION: Existing health system challenges in Afghanistan were amplified by the Taliban's August 2021 government takeover during which the country faced an evolving security situation, border closures, banking interruptions, donor funding disruptions and international staff evacuations. We investigated factors that influenced health sector and health service delivery following the takeover. METHODS: We purposively sampled individuals knowledgeable about Afghanistan's health sector and health professionals working in underserved areas of the country. We identified codes and themes of the data using framework analysis. RESULTS: Factors identified as supporting continued health service delivery following August 2021 include external funding and operational flexibilities, ongoing care provision by local implementers and providers, health worker motivation, flexible contracting out arrangements and improved security. Factors identified as contributing to disruptions include damaged infrastructure, limited supplies, ineffective government implementation efforts and changes in government leadership and policies resulting in new coordination and capacity challenges. There were mixed views on the role pay-for-performance schemes played. Participants also shared concerns about the new working environment. These included loss of qualified health professionals and the associated impact on quality of care, continued dependency on external funding, women's inability to finish their studies or take on any leadership positions, various impacts of the Mahram policy, mental stress, the future of care provision for female patients and widespread economic hardship which impacts nearly every aspect of Afghan life. CONCLUSION: Afghanistan's health sector presents a compelling case of adaptability in the face of crisis. Despite the anticipated and reported total collapse due to the country's power shift, various factors enabled health services to continue in some settings while others acted as barriers. The potential role of these factors should be considered in the context of future service delivery in Afghanistan and other settings at risk of political and societal disruption.

Hepatitis C virus antibody seropositivity is associated with albuminuria but not peripheral artery disease in patients with type 2 diabetes.

Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is prevalent in patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus (DM). We aimed to investigate whether HCV antibody (Ab) seropositivity is associated with diabetic micro- and macro-vascular diseases. In this hospital-based cross-sectional study, we retrospectively collected data from patients who participated in the diabetes pay-for-performance program and underwent HCV Ab screening in the annual comprehensive assessment between January 2021 and March 2022. We examined the relationships of HCV Ab seropositivity with the spot urinary albumin-to-creatinine ratio (UACR) and ankle-brachial index (ABI) in patients aged ≥ 50 years with type 2 DM. A total of 1758 patients were enrolled, and 85 (4.83%) of the enrolled patients had HCV Ab seropositivity. Multivariable regression analyses revealed that albuminuria showed a dose-dependent association with HCV Ab seropositivity (UACR [30-299 mg/g]: odds ratio [OR] = 1.463, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.872‒2.456); UACR [≥ 300 mg/g]: OR = 2.300, 95% CI 1.160‒4.562; P for trend = 0.015) when compared with normal albuminuria (UACR < 30 mg/g). However, the proportion of patients with peripheral arterial disease, defined as an ABI ≤ 0.9, was not significantly different between the groups with and without HCV Ab seropositivity (3.5% vs. 3.9%, P = 0.999). In conclusion, severely increased albuminuria, but not the ABI, showed a significant association with HCV Ab seropositivity in patients aged ≥ 50 years with type 2 DM.

[Pay for performance in public directly managed healthcare centers. Part 1: General framework. SESPAS Report 2024]. / Evaluación del rendimiento y compensación en centros sanitarios de gestión directa. Parte 1: marco general. Informe SESPAS 2024.

Assessing and compensating performance in professional organizations is extremely difficult in direct public management settings of health services. Performance assessment is technically complex and, more so, with multiplicity of principals influencing goal setting. Incentives are a lever to generate directionality and motivation, both structural (for attracting and retaining workers) and specific ones (rewarding performance and directing behavior towards institutional goals). Incentives influence the behavior of workers in various ways, and their effectiveness seams weak and controversial in publicly run health services. To overcome the problems of deciding and evaluating performance, both good governance models and the revitalization of contractual management are required. To improve the effectiveness of incentive models, it is convenient to: 1) widen the conceptual framework of incentives, to incorporate the structural aspects of employment contract and payment; 2) improve the designs from a greater understanding of the determinants of motivation; and 3) broaden the lens to survey the extra-mural factors that alter the behavior of workers, trying to counter them.

Effective interventions for improving routine childhood immunisation in low and middle-income countries: a systematic review of systematic reviews.

OBJECTIVE: An umbrella review providing a comprehensive synthesis of the interventions that are effective in providing routine immunisation outcomes for children in low and middle-income countries (L&MICs). DESIGN: A systematic review of systematic reviews, or an umbrella review. DATA SOURCES: We comprehensively searched 11 academic databases and 23 grey literature sources. The search was adopted from an evidence gap map on routine child immunisation sector in L&MICs, which was done on 5 May 2020. We updated the search in October 2021. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA: We included systematic reviews assessing the effectiveness of any intervention on routine childhood immunisation outcomes in L&MICs. DATA EXTRACTION AND SYNTHESIS: Search results were screened by two reviewers independently applying predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Data were extracted by two researchers independently. The Specialist Unit for Review Evidence checklist was used to assess review quality. A mixed-methods synthesis was employed focusing on meta-analytical and narrative elements to accommodate both the quantitative and qualitative information available from the included reviews. RESULTS: 62 systematic reviews are included in this umbrella review. We find caregiver-oriented interventions have large positive and statistically significant effects, especially those focusing on short-term sensitisation and education campaigns as well as written messages to caregivers. For health system-oriented interventions the evidence base is thin and derived from narrative synthesis suggesting positive effects for home visits, mixed effects for pay-for-performance schemes and inconclusive effects for contracting out services to non-governmental providers. For all other interventions under this category, the evidence is either limited or not available. For community-oriented interventions, a recent high-quality mixed-methods review suggests positive but small effects. Overall, the evidence base is highly heterogenous in terms of scope, intervention types and outcomes. CONCLUSION: Interventions oriented towards caregivers and communities are effective in improving routine child immunisation outcomes. The evidence base on health system-oriented interventions is scant not allowing us to reach firm conclusions, except for home visits. Large evidence gaps exist and need to be addressed. For example, more high-quality evidence is needed for specific caregiver-oriented interventions (eg, monetary incentives) as well as health system-oriented (eg, health workers and data systems) and community-oriented interventions. We also need to better understand complementarity of different intervention types.

Missed opportunities in hospital quality measurement during the COVID-19 pandemic: a retrospective investigation of US hospitals' CMS Star Ratings and 30-day mortality during the early pandemic.

OBJECTIVES: In the USA and UK, pandemic-era outcome data have been excluded from hospital rankings and pay-for-performance programmes. We assessed the relationship between US hospitals' pre-pandemic Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Overall Hospital Star ratings and early pandemic 30-day mortality among both patients with COVID and non-COVID to understand whether pre-existing structures, processes and outcomes related to quality enabled greater pandemic resiliency. DESIGN AND DATA SOURCE: A retrospective, claim-based data study using the 100% Inpatient Standard Analytic File and Medicare Beneficiary Summary File including all US Medicare Fee-for-Service inpatient encounters from 1 April 2020 to 30 November 2020 linked with the CMS Hospital Star Ratings using six-digit CMS provider IDs. OUTCOME MEASURE: The outcome was risk-adjusted 30-day mortality. We used multivariate logistic regression adjusting for age, sex, Elixhauser mortality index, US Census Region, month, hospital-specific January 2020 CMS Star rating (1-5 stars), COVID diagnosis (U07.1) and COVID diagnosis×CMS Star Rating interaction. RESULTS: We included 4 473 390 Medicare encounters from 2533 hospitals, with 92 896 (28.2%) mortalities among COVID-19 encounters and 387 029 (9.3%) mortalities among non-COVID encounters. There was significantly greater odds of mortality as CMS Star Ratings decreased, with 18% (95% CI 15% to 22%; p<0.0001), 33% (95% CI 30% to 37%; p<0.0001), 38% (95% CI 34% to 42%; p<0.0001) and 60% (95% CI 55% to 66%; p<0.0001), greater odds of COVID mortality comparing 4-star, 3-star, 2-star and 1-star hospitals (respectively) to 5-star hospitals. Among non-COVID encounters, there were 17% (95% CI 16% to 19%; p<0.0001), 24% (95% CI 23% to 26%; p<0.0001), 32% (95% CI 30% to 33%; p<0.0001) and 40% (95% CI 38% to 42%; p<0.0001) greater odds of mortality at 4-star, 3-star, 2-star and 1-star hospitals (respectively) as compared with 5-star hospitals. CONCLUSION: Our results support a need to further understand how quality outcomes were maintained during the pandemic. Valuable insights can be gained by including the reporting of risk-adjusted pandemic era hospital quality outcomes for high and low performing hospitals.

Association of Economic Policies With Hypertension Management and Control: A Systematic Review.

Importance: Economic policies have the potential to impact management and control of hypertension. Objectives: To review the evidence on the association between economic policies and hypertension management and control among adults with hypertension in the US. Evidence Review: A search was carried out of PubMed/MEDLINE, Cochrane Library, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, EconLit, Sociological Abstracts, and Scopus from January 1, 2000, through November 1, 2023. Included were randomized clinical trials, difference-in-differences, and interrupted time series studies that evaluated the association of economic policies with hypertension management. Economic policies were grouped into 3 categories: insurance coverage expansion such as Medicaid expansion, cost sharing in health care such as increased drug copayments, and financial incentives for quality such as pay-for-performance. Antihypertensive treatment was measured as taking antihypertensive medications or medication adherence among those who have a hypertension diagnosis; and hypertension control, measured as blood pressure (BP) lower than  140/90 mm Hg or a reduction in BP. Evidence was extracted and synthesized through dual review of titles, abstracts, full-text articles, study quality, and policy effects. Findings: In total, 31 articles were included. None of the studies examined economic policies outside of the health care system. Of these, 16 (52%) assessed policies for insurance coverage expansion, 8 (26%) evaluated policies related to patient cost sharing for prescription drugs, and 7 (22%) evaluated financial incentive programs for improving health care quality. Of the 16 studies that evaluated coverage expansion policies, all but 1 found that policies such as Medicare Part D and Medicaid expansion were associated with significant improvement in antihypertensive treatment and BP control. Among the 8 studies that examined patient cost sharing, 4 found that measures such as prior authorization and increased copayments were associated with decreased adherence to antihypertensive medication. Finally, all 7 studies evaluating financial incentives aimed at improving quality found that they were associated with improved antihypertensive treatment and BP control. Overall, most studies had a moderate or low risk of bias in their policy evaluation. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this systematic review suggest that economic policies aimed at expanding insurance coverage or improving health care quality successfully improved medication use and BP control among US adults with hypertension. Future research is needed to investigate the potential effects of non-health care economic policies on hypertension control.

New CMS Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Value Pathway After Total Knee and Hip Arthroplasty: Preparing for Mandatory Reporting.

This article discusses the implementation of a new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Value Pathway (MVPs) applicable to elective total hip and total knee arthroplasty as created by Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) - the Improving Care for Lower Extremity Joint Repair MVP (MVP ID: G0058). We describe specific quality measures, surgeon-hospital collaborations, future developments with Quality Payment Program, and how lessons from early implementation will empower clinicians to participate in the refining of this MVP. The CMS has designed MVPs as a subset of measures relevant to a specialty or medical condition, in an effort to reduce the burden of reporting and improve assessment of care quality. Physicians and payors must be mindful of detrimental effects these measures in their current form may have on surgeons, institutions, and patients, including disincentivizing care for sicker or more vulnerable populations, and increased administrative costs. Early voluntary participation is crucial to gain valuable experience for the orthopedic community and in an effort to work alongside CMS to maximize care while minimizing cost for patients and burden for providers.

Diagnostic stewardship to improve patient outcomes and healthcare-associated infection (HAI) metrics.

Diagnostic stewardship seeks to improve ordering, collection, performance, and reporting of tests. Test results play an important role in reportable HAIs. The inclusion of HAIs in public reporting and pay for performance programs has highlighted the value of diagnostic stewardship as part of infection prevention initiatives. Inappropriate testing should be discouraged, and approaches that seek to alter testing solely to impact a reportable metric should be avoided. HAI definitions should be further adapted to new testing technologies, with focus on actionable and clinically relevant test results that will improve patient care.

Financial incentives for integrated care: A scoping review and lessons for evidence-based design.

BACKGROUND: In response to the increasing prevalence of people with chronic conditions, healthcare systems restructure to integrate care across providers. However, many systems fail to achieve the desired outcomes. One likely explanation is lack of financial incentives for integrating care. OBJECTIVES: We aim to identify financial incentives used to promote integrated care across different types of providers for patients with common chronic conditions and assess the evidence on (cost-)effectiveness and the facilitators/barriers to their implementation. METHODS: This scoping review identifies studies published before December 2021, and includes 33 studies from the United States and the Netherlands. RESULTS: We identify four types of financial incentives: shared savings, bundled payments, pay for performance, and pay for coordination. Substantial heterogeneity in the (cost-)effectiveness of these incentives exists. Key implementation barriers are a lack of infrastructure (e.g., electronic medical records, communication channels, and clinical guidelines). To facilitate integration, financial incentives should be easy to communicate and implement, and require additional financial support, IT support, training, and guidelines. CONCLUSIONS: All four types of financial incentives may promote integrated care but not in all contexts. Shared savings appears to be the most promising incentive type for promoting (cost-)effective care integration with the largest number of favourable studies allowing causal interpretations. The limited evidence pool makes it hard to draw firm conclusions that are transferable across contexts.

The mechanics of risk adjustment and incentives for coding intensity in Medicare.

OBJECTIVE: To study diagnosis coding intensity across Medicare programs, and to examine the impacts of changes in the risk model adopted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for 2024. DATA SOURCES AND STUDY SETTING: Claims and encounter data from the CMS data warehouse for Traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries and Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollees. STUDY DESIGN: We created cohorts of MA enrollees, TM beneficiaries attributed to Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), and TM non-ACO beneficiaries. Using the 2019 Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) software from CMS, we computed HCC prevalence and scores from base records, then computed incremental prevalence and scores from health risk assessments (HRA) and chart review (CR) records. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: We used CMS's 2019 random 20% sample of individuals and their 2018 diagnosis history, retaining those with 12 months of Parts A/B/D coverage in 2018. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Measured health risks for MA and TM ACO individuals were comparable in base records for propensity-score matched cohorts, while TM non-ACO beneficiaries had lower risk. Incremental health risk due to diagnoses in HRA records increased across coverage cohorts in line with incentives to maximize risk scores: +0.9% for TM non-ACO, +1.2% for TM ACO, and + 3.6% for MA. Including HRA and CR records, the MA risk scores increased by 9.8% in the matched cohort. We identify the HCC groups with the greatest sensitivity to these sources of coding intensity among MA enrollees, comparing those groups to the new model's areas of targeted change. CONCLUSIONS: Consistent with previous literature, we find increased health risk in MA associated with HRA and CR records. We also demonstrate the meaningful impacts of HRAs on health risk measurement for TM coverage cohorts. CMS's model changes have the potential to reduce coding intensity, but they do not target the full scope of hierarchies sensitive to coding intensity.

Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing And 30-Day Mortality At Hospitals Caring For High Proportions Of Black Adults.

The care of Black adults is highly concentrated at a limited set of US hospitals that often have limited resources. In 2011, the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program began financially penalizing or rewarding hospitals based on thirty-day mortality rates for target conditions (myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia). Because the VBP Program has disproportionately penalized resource-constrained hospitals caring for high proportions of Black adults since its implementation in 2011, clinicians, health system leaders, and policy makers have worried that the program may unintentionally be widening racial disparities in health outcomes. Using Medicare claims for beneficiaries ages sixty-five and older who were hospitalized for three target conditions at 2,908 US hospitals participating in the VBP Program, we found that thirty-day mortality rates were consistently higher for two of three conditions at hospitals with high proportions of Black adults compared with other hospitals. There was no evidence of a differential change in thirty-day mortality among all Medicare beneficiaries with targeted conditions at high-proportion Black hospitals versus other hospitals seven years after the implementation of the VBP Program. However, gaps in mortality between these sites did widen in the subgroup of Black adults with pneumonia. These findings highlight that important concerns remain about the regressive nature and equity implications of national pay-for-performance programs.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program.

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.

The Updated Global Malnutrition Composite Score Clinical Quality Measure: Its Relevance to Improving Inpatient Clinical Outcomes and Health Equity.

Quality improvement has existed in health care for centuries with a dramatic transformation over time, largely motivated by the academic health quality movement. Throughout this evolution, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have been at the forefront of the development and provision of quality measures for health care in a variety of settings, including acute care. Quality initiatives aid in the evaluation of patient care to encourage quality improvement efforts, determine pay-for-performance rates, and help patients and consumers evaluate their care providers. The addition of the Global Malnutrition Composite Score as an electronic Clinical Quality Measure in 2022 highlights the key role nutrition plays in outcomes and quality of hospitalized patients. With this, credentialed nutrition and dietetics practitioners lie front and center for the development of quality improvement processes to help promote high quality standards of nutrition care, improve length of stay, and reduce health care costs and readmissions while addressing malnutrition, health equity, and nutrition care as a human right. As the Global Malnutrition Composite Score steward, it is the obligation of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics and the Commission on Dietetic Registration to promote the measure and support credentialed nutrition and dietetics practitioners in advocating for the implementation of this measure. Therefore, the purpose of this practice update is to provide necessary information to credentialed nutrition and dietetics practitioners and other health care leaders related to the history and implementation of the Global Malnutrition Composite Score, along with relevant updates to the measure and practice implications.