A stare like yours: Naturalistic social gaze interactions reveal robust neuronal representations.

In this issue of Neuron, Dal Monte, Fan, and colleagues (Dal Monte et al., 2022) show that rhesus monkeys have a widely distributed and robust neuronal representation of social gaze: looking at others and where others are looking.

Frontal neurons driving competitive behaviour and ecology of social groups.

Competitive interactions have a vital role in the ecology of most animal species1-3 and powerfully influence the behaviour of groups4,5. To succeed, individuals must exert effort based on not only the resources available but also the social rank and behaviour of other group members2,6,7. The single-cellular mechanisms that precisely drive competitive interactions or the behaviour of social groups, however, remain poorly understood. Here we developed a naturalistic group paradigm in which large cohorts of mice competitively foraged for food as we wirelessly tracked neuronal activities across thousands of unique interactions. By following the collective behaviour of the groups, we found neurons in the anterior cingulate that adaptively represented the social rank of the animals in relation to others. Although social rank was closely behaviourally linked to success, these cells disambiguated the relative rank of the mice from their competitive behaviour, and incorporated information about the resources available, the environment, and past success of the mice to influence their decisions. Using multiclass models, we show how these neurons tracked other individuals within the group and accurately predicted upcoming success. Using neuromodulation techniques, we also show how the neurons conditionally influenced competitive effort-increasing the effort of the animals only when they were more dominant to their groupmates and decreasing it when they were subordinate-effects that were not observed in other frontal lobe areas. Together, these findings reveal cingulate neurons that serve to adaptively drive competitive interactions and a putative process that could intermediate the social and economic behaviour of groups.

Neuronal Circuits for Social Decision-Making and Their Clinical Implications.

Social living facilitates individual access to rewards, cognitive resources, and objects that would not be otherwise accessible. There are, however, some drawbacks to social living, particularly when competing for scarce resources. Furthermore, variability in our ability to make social decisions can be associated with neuropsychiatric disorders. The neuronal mechanisms underlying social decision-making are beginning to be understood. The momentum to study this phenomenon has been partially carried over by the study of economic decision-making. Yet, because of the similarities between these different types of decision-making, it is unclear what is a social decision. Here, we propose a definition of social decision-making as choices taken in a context where one or more conspecifics are involved in the decision or the consequences of it. Social decisions can be conceptualized as complex economic decisions since they are based on the subjective preferences between different goods. During social decisions, individuals choose based on their internal value estimate of the different alternatives. These are complex decisions given that conspecifics beliefs or actions could modify the subject's internal valuations at every choice. Here, we first review recent developments in our collective understanding of the neuronal mechanisms and circuits of social decision-making in primates. We then review literature characterizing populations with neuropsychiatric disorders showing deficits in social decision-making and the underlying neuronal circuitries associated with these deficits.

Social agent identity cells in the prefrontal cortex of interacting groups of primates.

The ability to interact effectively within social groups is essential to primate and human behavior. Yet understanding the neural processes that underlie the interactive behavior of groups or by which neurons solve the basic problem of coding for multiple agents has remained a challenge. By tracking the interindividual dynamics of groups of three interacting rhesus macaques, we discover detailed representations of the groups' behavior by neurons in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, reflecting not only the other agents' identities but also their specific interactions, social context, actions, and outcomes. We show how these cells collectively represent the interaction between specific group members and their reciprocation, retaliation, and past behaviors. We also show how they influence the animals' own upcoming decisions and their ability to form beneficial agent-specific interactions. Together, these findings reveal prefrontal neurons that code for the agency identity of others and a cellular mechanism that could support the interactive behavior of social groups.

Nonhuman Primates Satisfy Utility Maximization in Compliance with the Continuity Axiom of Expected Utility Theory.

Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the first axiomatic theory of risky choice, describes choices as a utility maximization process: decision makers assign a subjective value (utility) to each choice option and choose the one with the highest utility. The continuity axiom, central to Expected Utility Theory and its modifications, is a necessary and sufficient condition for the definition of numerical utilities. The axiom requires decision makers to be indifferent between a gamble and a specific probabilistic combination of a more preferred and a less preferred gamble. While previous studies demonstrated that monkeys choose according to combinations of objective reward magnitude and probability, a concept-driven experimental approach for assessing the axiomatically defined conditions for maximizing utility by animals is missing. We experimentally tested the continuity axiom for a broad class of gamble types in 4 male rhesus macaque monkeys, showing that their choice behavior complied with the existence of a numerical utility measure as defined by the economic theory. We used the numerical quantity specified in the continuity axiom to characterize subjective preferences in a magnitude-probability space. This mapping highlighted a trade-off relation between reward magnitudes and probabilities, compatible with the existence of a utility function underlying subjective value computation. These results support the existence of a numerical utility function able to describe choices, allowing for the investigation of the neuronal substrates responsible for coding such rigorously defined quantity.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT A common assumption of several economic choice theories is that decisions result from the comparison of subjectively assigned values (utilities). This study demonstrated the compliance of monkey behavior with the continuity axiom of Expected Utility Theory, implying a subjective magnitude-probability trade-off relation, which supports the existence of numerical utility directly linked to the theoretical economic framework. We determined a numerical utility measure able to describe choices, which can serve as a correlate for the neuronal activity in the quest for brain structures and mechanisms guiding decisions.

Single-neuronal predictions of others' beliefs in humans.

Human social behaviour crucially depends on our ability to reason about others. This capacity for theory of mind has a vital role in social cognition because it enables us not only to form a detailed understanding of the hidden thoughts and beliefs of other individuals but also to understand that they may differ from our own1-3. Although a number of areas in the human brain have been linked to social reasoning4,5 and its disruption across a variety of psychosocial disorders6-8, the basic cellular mechanisms that underlie human theory of mind remain undefined. Here, using recordings from single cells in the human dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, we identify neurons that reliably encode information about others' beliefs across richly varying scenarios and that distinguish self- from other-belief-related representations. By further following their encoding dynamics, we show how these cells represent the contents of the others' beliefs and accurately predict whether they are true or false. We also show how they track inferred beliefs from another's specific perspective and how their activities relate to behavioural performance. Together, these findings reveal a detailed cellular process in the human dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for representing another's beliefs and identify candidate neurons that could support theory of mind.

Monkeys Show Theory of Mind.

Hayashi et al. (2020) provide evidence that Japanese macaques show theory of mind abilities in an anticipatory-looking variant of the canonical false belief task. This study paves the way to investigate the neuronal basis of social cognition in non-human primates.

Primate Amygdala Neurons Simulate Decision Processes of Social Partners.

By observing their social partners, primates learn about reward values of objects. Here, we show that monkeys' amygdala neurons derive object values from observation and use these values to simulate a partner monkey's decision process. While monkeys alternated making reward-based choices, amygdala neurons encoded object-specific values learned from observation. Dynamic activities converted these values to representations of the recorded monkey's own choices. Surprisingly, the same activity patterns unfolded spontaneously before partner's choices in separate neurons, as if these neurons simulated the partner's decision-making. These "simulation neurons" encoded signatures of mutual-inhibitory decision computation, including value comparisons and value-to-choice conversions, resulting in accurate predictions of partner's choices. Population decoding identified differential contributions of amygdala subnuclei. Biophysical modeling of amygdala circuits showed that simulation neurons emerge naturally from convergence between object-value neurons and self-other neurons. By simulating decision computations during observation, these neurons could allow primates to reconstruct their social partners' mental states.

Performance error-related activity in monkey striatum during social interactions.

Monitoring our performance is fundamental to motor control while monitoring other's performance is fundamental to social coordination. The striatum is hypothesized to play a role in action selection, action initiation, and action parsing, but we know little of its role in performance monitoring. Furthermore, the striatum contains neurons that respond to own and other's actions. Therefore, we asked if striatal neurons signal own and conspecific's performance errors. Two macaque monkeys sitting across a touch-sensitive table in plain view of each other took turns performing a simple motor task to obtain juice rewards while we recorded single striatal neurons from one monkey at a time. Both monkeys made more errors after individually making an error but made fewer errors after a conspecific error. Thus, monkeys' behavior was influenced by their own and their conspecific's past behavior. A population of striatal neurons responded to own and conspecific's performance errors independently of a negative reward prediction error signal. Overall, these data suggest that monkeys are influenced by social errors and that striatal neurons signal performance errors. These signals might be important for social coordination, observational learning and adjusting to an ever-changing social landscape.

A neuronal reward inequity signal in primate striatum.

Primates are social animals, and their survival depends on social interactions with others. Especially important for social interactions and welfare is the observation of rewards obtained by other individuals and the comparison with own reward. The fundamental social decision variable for the comparison process is reward inequity, defined by an asymmetric reward distribution among individuals. An important brain structure for coding reward inequity may be the striatum, a component of the basal ganglia involved in goal-directed behavior. Two rhesus monkeys were seated opposite each other and contacted a touch-sensitive table placed between them to obtain specific magnitudes of reward that were equally or unequally distributed among them. Response times in one of the animals demonstrated differential behavioral sensitivity to reward inequity. A group of neurons in the striatum showed distinct signals reflecting disadvantageous and advantageous reward inequity. These neuronal signals occurred irrespective of, or in conjunction with, own reward coding. These data demonstrate that striatal neurons of macaque monkeys sense the differences between other's and own reward. The neuronal activities are likely to contribute crucial reward information to neuronal mechanisms involved in social interactions.

The role of the striatum in social behavior.

Where and how does the brain code reward during social behavior? Almost all elements of the brain's reward circuit are modulated during social behavior. The striatum in particular is activated by rewards in social situations. However, its role in social behavior is still poorly understood. Here, we attempt to review its participation in social behaviors of different species ranging from voles to humans. Human fMRI experiments show that the striatum is reliably active in relation to others' rewards, to reward inequity and also while learning about social agents. Social contact and rearing conditions have long-lasting effects on behavior, striatal anatomy and physiology in rodents and primates. The striatum also plays a critical role in pair-bond formation and maintenance in monogamous voles. We review recent findings from single neuron recordings showing that the striatum contains cells that link own reward to self or others' actions. These signals might be used to solve the agency-credit assignment problem: the question of whose action was responsible for the reward. Activity in the striatum has been hypothesized to integrate actions with rewards. The picture that emerges from this review is that the striatum is a general-purpose subcortical region capable of integrating social information into coding of social action and reward.

Activity of striatal neurons reflects social action and own reward.

Social interactions provide agents with the opportunity to earn higher benefits than when acting alone and contribute to evolutionary stable strategies. A basic requirement for engaging in beneficial social interactions is to recognize the actor whose movement results in reward. Despite the recent interest in the neural basis of social interactions, the neurophysiological mechanisms identifying the actor in social reward situations are unknown. A brain structure well suited for exploring this issue is the striatum, which plays a role in movement, reward, and goal-directed behavior. In humans, the striatum is involved in social processes related to reward inequity, donations to charity, and observational learning. We studied the neurophysiology of social action for reward in rhesus monkeys performing a reward-giving task. The behavioral data showed that the animals distinguished between their own and the conspecific's reward and knew which individual acted. Striatal neurons coded primarily own reward but rarely other's reward. Importantly, the activations occurred preferentially, and in approximately similar fractions, when either the own or the conspecific's action was followed by own reward. Other striatal neurons showed social action coding without reward. Some of the social action coding disappeared when the conspecific's role was simulated by a computer, confirming a social rather than observational relationship. These findings demonstrate a role of striatal neurons in identifying the social actor and own reward in a social setting. These processes may provide basic building blocks underlying the brain's function in social interactions.