Asunto(s)
Enfermedad de Alzheimer/tratamiento farmacológico , Anticuerpos Monoclonales Humanizados/economía , Presupuestos , Costos de los Medicamentos , Industria Farmacéutica/economía , Cobertura del Seguro/economía , Medicare/economía , Mecanismo de Reembolso/economía , Gobierno Estatal , Anticuerpos Monoclonales Humanizados/uso terapéutico , Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. , Humanos , Cobertura del Seguro/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicaid/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicare/legislación & jurisprudencia , Mecanismo de Reembolso/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Reforma de la Atención de Salud , Oncología Médica , Oncólogos , Humanos , Seguro de SaludAsunto(s)
Comercio/legislación & jurisprudencia , Ahorro de Costo/legislación & jurisprudencia , Costos de los Medicamentos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Política de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicamentos bajo Prescripción/economía , Gobierno Estatal , Canadá , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Regulación Gubernamental , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
The elderly in long-term care (LTC) and their caregiving staff are at elevated risk from COVID-19. Outbreaks in LTC facilities can threaten the health care system. COVID-19 suppression should focus on testing and infection control at LTC facilities. Policies should also be developed to ensure that LTC facilities remain adequately staffed and that infection control protocols are closely followed. Family will not be able to visit LTC facilities, increasing isolation and vulnerability to abuse and neglect. To protect residents and staff, supervision of LTC facilities should remain a priority during the pandemic.
Asunto(s)
Infecciones por Coronavirus/epidemiología , Pandemias , Neumonía Viral/epidemiología , Instituciones Residenciales/organización & administración , Anciano , Envejecimiento , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Abuso de Ancianos/prevención & control , Abuso de Ancianos/psicología , Familia/psicología , Humanos , Control de Infecciones/organización & administración , Instituciones Residenciales/normas , Factores de Riesgo , SARS-CoV-2 , Aislamiento Social/psicologíaAsunto(s)
Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Honorarios Farmacéuticos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Formularios Farmacéuticos como Asunto , Regulación Gubernamental , Medicaid/legislación & jurisprudencia , Gobierno Estatal , Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S. , Aprobación de Drogas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Costos de los Medicamentos , Cobertura del Seguro , Massachusetts , Estados Unidos , United States Food and Drug AdministrationAsunto(s)
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S./legislación & jurisprudencia , Regulación Gubernamental , Reforma de la Atención de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Investigación sobre Servicios de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Mecanismo de Reembolso/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicaid/economía , Medicaid/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicare/economía , Medicare/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , Estados Unidos , United States Dept. of Health and Human ServicesRESUMEN
In recent years, drug manufacturers and private payers have expressed interest in novel pricing models that more closely link a drug's price to its value. Indication-based pricing, outcome-based pricing, drug licenses, and drug mortgages have all been discussed as alternatives to paying strictly for volume. Manufacturers and payers have complained, however, that Medicaid's "best-price rule" inhibits their ability to enter into these new pricing arrangements. This article examines the best-price rule and assesses to what extent, if any, it might frustrate the goal of paying for value. We conclude that the best-price rule is not as serious a problem as it is sometimes made out to be but that it is also not simply a convenient excuse for refusing to try something new. The law here is complex, and moving to a pay-for-value model for drugs will require close coordination among manufacturers, payers, and regulators.
Asunto(s)
Atención a la Salud/economía , Medicamentos bajo Prescripción/economía , Costos de los Medicamentos , Industria Farmacéutica/economía , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Medicaid/economía , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Cobertura del Seguro/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicaid/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , Planes Estatales de Salud , Medicaid/organización & administración , Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act/legislación & jurisprudencia , Gobierno Estatal , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Seguro de Costos Compartidos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Financiación Gubernamental/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act/legislación & jurisprudencia , Política , Reforma de la Atención de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Cobertura del Seguro/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
The debate over how to tame private medical spending tends to pit advocates of government-provided insurance--a single-payer scheme--against those who would prefer to harness market forces to hold down costs. When it is mentioned at all, the possibility of regulating the medical industry as a public utility is brusquely dismissed as anathema to the American regulatory tradition. This dismissiveness, however, rests on a failure to appreciate just how deeply the public utility model shaped health law in the twentieth century-- and how it continues to shape health law today. Closer economic regulation of the medical industry may or may not be prudent, but it is by no means incompatible with our governing institutions and political culture. Indeed, the durability of such regulation suggests that the modern embrace of market-based approaches in the medical industry may be more ephemeral than it seems.