Fearful apes or emotional cooperative breeders?

The "fearful ape hypothesis" is interesting but is currently underspecified. We need more research on whether it is specific to fear, specific to humans (or even cooperative breeders in general), what is included in "fear," and whether these patterns would indeed evolve despite arms races to extract help from audiences. Specifying these will result in a more testable hypothesis.

Greater traditionalism predicts COVID-19 precautionary behaviors across 27 societies.

People vary both in their embrace of their society's traditions, and in their perception of hazards as salient and necessitating a response. Over evolutionary time, traditions have offered avenues for addressing hazards, plausibly resulting in linkages between orientations toward tradition and orientations toward danger. Emerging research documents connections between traditionalism and threat responsivity, including pathogen-avoidance motivations. Additionally, because hazard-mitigating behaviors can conflict with competing priorities, associations between traditionalism and pathogen avoidance may hinge on contextually contingent tradeoffs. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a real-world test of the posited relationship between traditionalism and hazard avoidance. Across 27 societies (N = 7844), we find that, in a majority of countries, individuals' endorsement of tradition positively correlates with their adherence to costly COVID-19-avoidance behaviors; accounting for some of the conflicts that arise between public health precautions and other objectives further strengthens this evidence that traditionalism is associated with greater attention to hazards.

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game.

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

Signaling benefits of partner choice decisions.

When deciding whom to choose for a cooperative interaction, two features of prospective partners are especially relevant: ability to provide benefits, and willingness to provide those benefits. Often, these traits are correlated. But, when ability and willingness are in conflict, people often indicate that they value willingness over ability, even when doing so results in immediate losses. Why would such behavior be favored by natural selection acting at the level of the individual? Across nine experimental studies (seven preregistered) and a mathematical model we explore one way of explaining this costly choice, demonstrating that choosing a willing over an able partner affords one a moral reputation and makes one more likely to be chosen as a cooperation partner. In fact, even people who choose an able over a willing partner for themselves prefer others who choose a willing over an able partner. Crucial to our model, we find that valuing willingness over ability is an honest signal of both higher levels of generosity in an economic game and lower levels of trait Machiavellianism. These findings provide the first extensive exploration of the signaling benefits of partner choice decisions. Furthermore, this work provides one explanation for why we choose those who are willing over those who are able, even at a cost to ourselves: By doing so, we in turn look like good potential partners. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

No effect of 'watching eyes': An attempted replication and extension investigating individual differences.

Some evidence suggests that people behave more cooperatively and generously when observed or in the presence of images of eyes (termed the 'watching eyes' effect). Eye images are thought to trigger feelings of observation, which in turn motivate people to behave more cooperatively to earn a good reputation. However, several recent studies have failed to find evidence of the eyes effect. One possibility is that inconsistent evidence in support of the eyes effect is a product of individual differences in sensitivity or susceptibility to the cue. In fact, some evidence suggests that people who are generally more prosocial are less susceptible to situation-specific reputation-based cues of observation. In this paper, we sought to (1) replicate the eyes effect, (2) replicate the past finding that people who are dispositionally less prosocial are more responsive to observation than people who are more dispositionally more prosocial, and (3) determine if this effect extends to the watching eyes effect. Results from a pre-registered study showed that people did not give more money in a dictator game when decisions were made public or in the presence of eye images, even though participants felt more observed when decisions were public. That is, we failed to replicate the eyes effect and observation effect. An initial, but underpowered, interaction model suggests that egoists give less than prosocials in private, but not public, conditions. This suggests a direction for future research investigating if and how individual differences in prosociality influence observation effects.

The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice.

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis.

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence.

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

The psychological foundations of reputation-based cooperation.

Humans care about having a positive reputation, which may prompt them to help in scenarios where the return benefits are not obvious. Various game-theoretical models support the hypothesis that concern for reputation may stabilize cooperation beyond kin, pairs or small groups. However, such models are not explicit about the underlying psychological mechanisms that support reputation-based cooperation. These models therefore cannot account for the apparent rarity of reputation-based cooperation in other species. Here, we identify the cognitive mechanisms that may support reputation-based cooperation in the absence of language. We argue that a large working memory enhances the ability to delay gratification, to understand others' mental states (which allows for perspective-taking and attribution of intentions) and to create and follow norms, which are key building blocks for increasingly complex reputation-based cooperation. We review the existing evidence for the appearance of these processes during human ontogeny as well as their presence in non-human apes and other vertebrates. Based on this review, we predict that most non-human species are cognitively constrained to show only simple forms of reputation-based cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Reciprocity creates a stake in one's partner, or why you should cooperate even when anonymous.

Why do we care so much for friends, even making sacrifices for them they cannot repay or never know about? When organisms engage in reciprocity, they have a stake in their partner's survival and wellbeing so the reciprocal relationship can persist. This stake (aka fitness interdependence) makes organisms willing to help beyond the existing reciprocal arrangement (e.g. anonymously). I demonstrate this with two mathematical models in which organisms play a prisoner's dilemma, and where helping keeps their partner alive and well. Both models shows that reciprocity creates a stake in partners' welfare: those who help a cooperative partner--even when anonymous--do better than those who do not, because they keep that cooperative partner in good enough condition to continue the reciprocal relationship. 'Machiavellian' cooperators, who defect when anonymous, do worse because their partners become incapacitated. This work highlights the fact that reciprocity and stake are not separate evolutionary processes, but are inherently linked.

Feelings of obligation are valuations of signaling-mediated social payoffs.

We extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the long-run social consequences of a decision are sufficiently costly, obligation motivates the actor to forgo potential immediate benefits in favor of long-term social interests. Thus, obligation psychology balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision. This perspective can predict when and why obligation will be experienced.

The effects of social vs. asocial threats on group cooperation and manipulation of perceived threats.

Individuals benefit from maintaining the well-being of their social groups and helping their groups to survive threats such as intergroup competition, harsh environments and epidemics. Correspondingly, much research shows that groups cooperate more when competing against other groups. However, 'social' threats (i.e. outgroups) should elicit stronger cooperation than 'asocial' threats (e.g. environments, diseases) because (a) social losses involve a competitor's gain and (b) a strong cooperative reaction to defend the group may deter future outgroup threats. We tested this prediction in a multiround public goods game where groups faced periodic risks of failure (i.e. loss of earnings) which could be overcome by sufficient cooperation. This threat of failure was framed as either a social threat (intergroup competition) or an asocial threat (harsh environment). We find that cooperation was higher in response to social threats than asocial threats. We also examined participants' willingness to manipulate apparent threats to the group: participants raised the perceived threat level similarly for social and asocial threats, but high-ranking participants increased the appearance of social threats more than low-ranking participants did. These results show that people treat social threats differently than asocial threats, and support previous work on leaders' willingness to manipulate perceived threats.

Measuring delay discounting in a crowdsourced sample: An exploratory study.

Delay discounting is a measure of preferences for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Discounting has been assessed in many ways; these methods have variably and inconsistently involved measures of different lengths (single vs. multiple items), forced-choice methods, self-report methods, online and laboratory assessments, monetary and non-monetary compensation. The majority of these studies have been conducted in laboratory settings. However, over the past 20 years, behavioral data collection has increasingly shifted online. Usually, these experiments involve completing short tasks for small amounts of money, and are thus qualitatively different than experiments in the lab, which are typically more involved and in a strongly controlled environment. The present study aimed to determine how to best measure future discounting in a crowdsourced sample using three discounting measures (a single shot measure, the 27-item Kirby Monetary Choice Questionnaire, and a one-time Matching Task). We examined associations of these measures with theoretically related variables, and assessed influence of payment on responding. Results indicated that correlations between the discounting tasks and conceptually related measures were smaller than in prior laboratory experiments. Moreover, our results suggest providing monetary compensation may attenuate correlations between discounting measures and related variables. These findings suggest that incentivizing discounting measures changes the nature of measurement in these tasks.

State-dependent risk-taking.

Who takes risks, and when? The relative state model proposes two non-independent selection pressures governing risk-taking: need-based and ability-based. The need-based account suggests that actors take risks when they cannot reach target states with low-risk options (consistent with risk-sensitivity theory). The ability-based account suggests that actors engage in risk-taking when they possess traits or abilities that increase the expected value of risk-taking (by increasing the probability of success, enhancing payoffs for success or buffering against failure). Adaptive risk-taking involves integrating both considerations. Risk-takers compute the expected value of risk-taking based on their state-the interaction of embodied capital relative to one's situation, to the same individual in other circumstances or to other individuals. We provide mathematical support for this dual pathway model, and show that it can predict who will take the most risks and when (e.g. when risk-taking will be performed by those in good, poor, intermediate or extreme state only). Results confirm and elaborate on the initial verbal model of state-dependent risk-taking: selection favours agents who calibrate risk-taking based on implicit computations of condition and/or competitive (dis)advantage, which in turn drives patterned individual differences in risk-taking behaviour.

Why Hate the Good Guy? Antisocial Punishment of High Cooperators Is Greater When People Compete To Be Chosen.

When choosing social partners, people prefer good cooperators (all else being equal). Given this preference, people wishing to be chosen can either increase their own cooperation to become more desirable or suppress others' cooperation to make them less desirable. Previous research shows that very cooperative people sometimes get punished ("antisocial punishment") or criticized ("do-gooder derogation") in many cultures. Here, we used a public-goods game with punishment to test whether antisocial punishment is used as a means of competing to be chosen by suppressing others' cooperation. As predicted, there was more antisocial punishment when participants were competing to be chosen for a subsequent cooperative task (a trust game) than without a subsequent task. This difference in antisocial punishment cannot be explained by differences in contributions, moralistic punishment, or confusion. This suggests that antisocial punishment is a social strategy that low cooperators use to avoid looking bad when high cooperators escalate cooperation.

High voice pitch mitigates the aversiveness of antisocial cues in men's speech.

Speech contains both explicit social information in semantic content and implicit cues to social behaviour and mate quality in voice pitch. Voice pitch has been demonstrated to have pervasive effects on social perceptions, but few studies have examined these perceptions in the context of meaningful speech. Here, we examined whether male voice pitch interacted with socially relevant cues in speech to influence listeners' perceptions of trustworthiness and attractiveness. We artificially manipulated men's voices to be higher and lower in pitch when speaking words that were either prosocial or antisocial in nature. In Study 1, we found that listeners perceived lower-pitched voices as more trustworthy and attractive in the context of prosocial words than in the context of antisocial words. In Study 2, we found evidence that suggests this effect was driven by stronger preferences for higher-pitched voices in the context of antisocial cues, as voice pitch preferences were not significantly different in the context of prosocial cues. These findings suggest that higher male voice pitch may ameliorate the negative effects of antisocial speech content and that listeners may be particularly avoidant of those who express multiple cues to antisociality across modalities.

Correction to 'Radical framing effects in the ultimatum game: the impact of explicit culturally transmitted frames on economic decision-making'.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1098/rsos.170543.].

Broadening the role of "self-interest" in folk-economic beliefs.

We extend Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) model of folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) by suggesting FEBs serve self-interest (broadly defined), which includes indirect benefits such as creating alliances, advancing self-beneficial ideologies, and signaling one's traits. By expanding the definition of self-interest, the model can predict who will hold what FEBs, which FEBs will propagate, when they will change, why, and in which direction.

Attractiveness biases are the tip of the iceberg in biological markets.

Physical attractiveness affects how one gets treated, but it is just a single component of one's overall "market value." One's treatment depends on other markers of market value, including social status, competence, warmth, and any other cues of one's ability or willingness to confer benefits on partners. To completely understand biased treatment, we must also incorporate these other factors.