Ambivalence in decision making: An eye tracking study.

An intuition of ambivalence in cognition is particularly strong for complex decisions, for which the merits and demerits of different options are roughly equal but hard to compare. We examined information search in an experimental paradigm which tasked participants with an ambivalent question, while monitoring attentional dynamics concerning the information relevant to each option in different Areas of Interest (AOIs). We developed two dynamical models for describing eye tracking curves, for each response separately. The models incorporated a drift mechanism towards the various options, as in standard drift diffusion theory. In addition, they included a mechanism for intrinsic oscillation, which competed with the drift process and undermined eventual stabilization of the dynamics. The two models varied in the range of drift processes postulated. Higher support was observed for the simpler model, which only included drifts from an uncertainty state to either of two certainty states. In addition, model parameters could be weakly related to the eventual decision, complementing our knowledge of the way eye tracking structure relates to decision (notably the gaze cascade effect).

Context effects in similarity judgments.

Tversky's (1977) famous demonstration of a diagnosticity effect indicates that the similarity between the same two stimuli depends on the presence of contextual stimuli. In a forced choice task, the similarity between a target and a choice, appears to depend on the other choices. Specifically, introducing a distractor grouped with one of the options would reduce preference for the grouped option. However, the diagnosticity effect has been difficult to replicate, casting doubt on its robustness and our understanding of contextual effects in similarity generally. We propose that the apparent brittleness of the diagnosticity effect is because it is in competition with an opposite attraction effect. Even though in both the similarity and decision-making literatures there are indications for such a competition, we provide the first direct experimental demonstration of how an attraction effect can give way to a diagnosticity one, as a distractor option is manipulated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Information overload for (bounded) rational agents.

Bayesian inference offers an optimal means of processing environmental information and so an advantage in natural selection. We consider the apparent, recent trend in increasing dysfunctional disagreement in, for example, political debate. This is puzzling because Bayesian inference benefits from powerful convergence theorems, precluding dysfunctional disagreement. Information overload is a plausible factor limiting the applicability of full Bayesian inference, but what is the link with dysfunctional disagreement? Individuals striving to be Bayesian-rational, but challenged by information overload, might simplify by using Bayesian networks or the separation of questions into knowledge partitions, the latter formalized with quantum probability theory. We demonstrate the massive simplification afforded by either approach, but also show how they contribute to dysfunctional disagreement.

The triangle inequality constraint in similarity judgments.

Since Tversky's (1977) seminal investigation, the triangle inequality, along with symmetry and minimality, have had a central role in investigations of the fundamental constraints on human similarity judgments. The meaning of minimality and symmetry in similarity judgments has been straightforward, but this is not the case for the triangle inequality. Expressed in terms of dissimilarities, and assuming a simple, linear function between dissimilarities and distances, the triangle inequality constraint implies that human behaviour should be consistent with Dissimilarity (A,B) + Dissimilarity (B,C) ≥ Dissimilarity (A,C), where A, B, and C are any three stimuli. We show how we can translate this constraint into one for similarities, using Shepard's (1987) generalization law, and so derive the multiplicative triangle inequality for similarities, Sim(A,C)≥Sim(A,B)⋅Sim(B,C) where 0≤Sim(x,y)≤1. Can humans violate the multiplicative triangle inequality? An empirical demonstration shows that they can.

An investigation of a quantum probability model for the constructive effect of affective evaluation.

The idea that choices can have a constructive effect has received a great deal of empirical support. The act of choosing appears to influence subsequent preferences for the options available. Recent research has proposed a cognitive model based on quantum probability (QP), which suggests that whether or not a participant provides an affective evaluation for a positively or negatively valenced stimulus can also be constructive and so, for example, influence the affective evaluation of a second oppositely valenced stimulus. However, there are some outstanding methodological questions in relation to this previous research. This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to resolve these questions. Experiment 1, using a binary response format, provides partial support for the interaction predicted by the QP model; and Experiment 2, which controls for the length of time participants have to respond, fully supports the QP model. Finally, Experiment 3 sought to determine whether the key effect can generalize beyond affective judgements about visual stimuli. Using judgements about the trustworthiness of well-known people, the predictions of the QP model were confirmed. Together, these three experiments provide further support for the QP model of the constructive effect of simple evaluations.