'We never thought this would be considered drug trafficking': International finance rules, policy space and Uruguay's regulation of recreational cannabis.

ABSTRACTFollowing landmark legislation in 2013, Uruguay became the first country to regulate the legal production, distribution and sale of recreational cannabis. While broader debates anticipated the significance of the UN drug conventions, the extent to which Uruguay's drug treaty obligations shaped regulation is unclear and the relevance of finance norms has been neglected. Drawing on institutionalist and governance theories, this study explores how international drug and finance regulations limited Uruguay's policy space to implement cannabis regulation, and how this was perceived by policy actors. Policy documents and 43 semi-structured interviews were thematically analysed. The analysis demonstrates how Uruguay's drug treaty obligations were less directly constraining to policy space compared to international finance norms, including the US Patriot Act, anti-money laundering standards and financial inclusion practices. Such norms exerted powerful influence over Uruguay's ability to implement aspects of cannabis supply that interact with broader financial systems, allowing banks to terminate business relationships with clients deemed as high risks for money laundering. The Uruguayan case suggests that financial regulations at diverse levels are likely to constrain policy space in other contexts where the market-based policies of cannabis regulation raise tensions with a narrowly constructed risk management principle in approaches to financial supply.

Norms, rules and policy tools: understanding Article 5.3 as an instrument of tobacco control governance.

INTRODUCTION: Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, elaborated via its implementation guidelines, can be understood as a policy instrument comprising norms, rules and policy tools designed to shape practices of policy making and minimise tobacco industry interference. METHODS: This qualitative research is based on in-depth interviews with officials from diverse government sectors and non-governmental organisations across countries (Ethiopia, India, Uganda) that have adopted measures to implement Article 5.3. RESULTS: The data highlight varied perceptions and knowledge of Article 5.3 norms between health and non-health sectors. Health officials typically link its core norm of a fundamental conflict between public health and industry interests to the governance norm of protecting public health policies from industry interference. While officials in sectors beyond health broadly endorsed this core norm, they exhibited more limited awareness of Article 5.3 and its model of governance. The results examine how rules to implement Article 5.3 have been codified, but identify the absence of policy tools necessary to operationalise rules and norms. This limitation, alongside restricted awareness beyond health departments, suggests that political commitments to implement Article 5.3 will have limited impact on practices of stakeholder consultation and policy engagement with the tobacco industry. CONCLUSION: Conceptualising Article 5.3 as a policy instrument helps to explain how its rules and policy tools interact with each other and with broader governance processes. This framework has the potential to enhance understanding of Article 5.3 and help identify opportunities and constraints in its implementation.

Advancing whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control: Article 5.3 and the challenge of policy coordination in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda.

INTRODUCTION: Despite an extensive evidence base on the diverse economic, environmental and social benefits of tobacco control, difficulties in establishing coordinated national approaches remain a defining challenge for Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) implementation. Minimising tobacco industry interference is seen as key to effective coordination, and this paper analyses implementation of Article 5.3 guidelines, exploring implications for whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda. METHODS: Based on 131 semistructured interviews with government officials and other key stakeholders, we explore barriers and facilitators for promoting: (1) horizontal coordination across health and other policy spheres, and (2) vertical coordination across national and subnational governments on Article 5.3 implementation. RESULTS: Our analysis identifies common barriers to coordination across diverse geographical contexts and varying approaches to implementation. They highlight broadly shared experiences of limited understanding and engagement beyond health agencies; restricted responsibility and uncertainty amid conflicting mandates; tensions with wider governance practices and norms; limited capacity and authority of coordination mechanisms; and obstacles to vertical coordination across local, state and national governments. Interview data also indicate important opportunities to advance coordination across sectors and government levels, with Article 5.3 measures capable of informing changes in practices, building support in other sectors, allowing for 'bottom-up' innovation and being shaped by engagement with civil society. CONCLUSION: Supporting effective implementation of Article 5.3 is key to advancing multisectoral approaches to FCTC implementation and tobacco control's contributions to global health and sustainable development.

Challenges of conflict of interest, coordination and collaboration in small island contexts: towards effective tobacco control governance in UK Overseas Territories.

INTRODUCTION: The UK Overseas Territories (UKOTs) are semi-autonomous jurisdictions that face distinctive challenges in implementing tobacco control and protecting policy from industry influence. They are not eligible to become independent parties of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), although they can apply for treaty extension under the UK's ratification. This study explores the relevance of the FCTC-particularly Article 5.3-for tobacco control governance across a sample of UKOTs. METHODS: From March to May 2019, we interviewed 32 stakeholders across four territories (Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, St Helena) at diverse stages in implementing key FCTC measures. Thematic qualitative analysis explored awareness and perceptions in relation to tobacco control. RESULTS: Interviewees' accounts highlight the complexity of protecting health policy from industry influence in a context where the 'tobacco industry' covers a diverse range of actors. Despite not being formally covered by the FCTC, several health officials spoke about the strategic value of invoking Article 5.3 in the context of tensions with economic priorities. Nevertheless, effective tobacco control governance is complicated by territories' reliance on local businesses-including tourism-and close social connections that occasionally blur the lines between private and public spheres. CONCLUSIONS: The UKOTs share many characteristics with other small island jurisdictions, creating distinctive challenges for advancing tobacco control and protecting policy from industry interference. Despite their complex status in relation to WHO and its architecture, these territories benefit from the norms embedded in the FCTC and the systems that support its implementation.

Institutional tensions, corporate social responsibility and district-level governance of tobacco industry interference: analysing challenges in local implementation of Article 5.3 measures in Karnataka, India.

INTRODUCTION: Accelerating progress on tobacco control will require Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to be systematically integrated into policies and practices of sectors beyond health at diverse government levels. However, no study has explored implementation challenges of Article 5.3 within multilevel systems such as India, where political decisions on tobacco control occur at diverse government levels, which may constrain action at local level. METHODS: Based on 33 semi-structured interviews with diverse government and civil society stakeholders across four districts in Karnataka, India (Mysore, Mangalore, Bengaluru (rural) and Udupi), this study examines challenges to implement Article 5.3 arising from competing agendas and policies of different actors at multiple levels. RESULTS: Our analysis reveals generally low levels of awareness of Article 5.3 and its guideline recommendations, even among those directly involved in tobacco control at district level. Efforts to implement Article 5.3 were also challenged by competing views on the appropriate terms of engagement with industry actors. Scope to reconcile tensions across competing health, agriculture and commercial agendas was further constrained by the policies and practices of the national Tobacco Board, thereby undermining local implementation of Article 5.3. The most challenging aspect of Article 5.3 implementation was the difficulties in restricting engagement by government officials and departments with tobacco industry corporate social responsibility initiatives given national requirements for such activities among major corporations. CONCLUSIONS: Promoting effective implementation of Article 5.3 in Karnataka will require policymakers to work across policy silos and reconcile tensions across India's national health and economic priorities.

A Public Health Framework for Legalized Retail Marijuana Based on the US Experience: Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry.

Rachel Barry and Stanton Glantz argue that a public health framework that prioritizes public health over business interests should be used by US states and countries that legalize retail marijuana.

Waiting for the opportune moment: the tobacco industry and marijuana legalization.

CONTEXT: In 2012, Washington State and Colorado legalized the recreational use of marijuana, and Uruguay, beginning in 2014, will become the first country to legalize the sale and distribution of marijuana. The challenge facing policymakers and public health advocates is reducing the harms of an ineffective, costly, and discriminatory "war on drugs" while preventing another public health catastrophe similar to tobacco use, which kills 6 million people worldwide each year. METHODS: Between May and December 2013, using the standard snowball research technique, we searched the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library of previously secret tobacco industry documents (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu). FINDINGS: Since at least the 1970s, tobacco companies have been interested in marijuana and marijuana legalization as both a potential and a rival product. As public opinion shifted and governments began relaxing laws pertaining to marijuana criminalization, the tobacco companies modified their corporate planning strategies to prepare for future consumer demand. CONCLUSIONS: Policymakers and public health advocates must be aware that the tobacco industry or comparable multinational organizations (eg, food and beverage industries) are prepared to enter the marijuana market with the intention of increasing its already widespread use. In order to prevent domination of the market by companies seeking to maximize market size and profits, policymakers should learn from their successes and failures in regulating tobacco.