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Measuring trichotillomania is essential for understanding and treating it effectively. Using the Situated Assessment Method (SAM2), we developed a psychometric instrument to assess hair pulling in situations where it occurs. In two studies, pullers evaluated their pulling in relevant situations, along with how much they experience factors that potentially influence it (e.g., external triggers, reduction in negative emotion, negative self-thoughts). Individual measures of pulling, averaged across situations, exhibited high test reliability, construct validity, and content validity. Large differences between situations in pulling were observed, along with large individual-situation interactions (with limited evidence distinguishing focused versus automatic pulling subtypes). In linear regressions for individual participants, factors that influence pulling tended to correlate with pulling as predicted, explaining a median 74%-83% of its variance. By identifying factors that predict pulling for each individual across situations, the SAM2 Trichotillomania Assessment Instrument (TAI) offers a rich understanding of an individual's pulling experience, potentially supporting individualized pulling interventions.
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From the perspectives of grounded, situated, and embodied cognition, we have developed a new approach for assessing individual differences. Because this approach is grounded in two dimensions of situatedness-situational experience and the Situated Action Cycle-we refer to it as the Situated Assessment Method (SAM2). Rather than abstracting over situations during assessment of a construct (as in traditional assessment instruments), SAM2 assesses a construct in situations where it occurs, simultaneously measuring factors from the Situated Action Cycle known to influence it. To demonstrate this framework, we developed the SAM2 Habitual Behavior Instrument (SAM2 HBI). Across three studies with a total of 442 participants, the SAM2 HBI produced a robust and replicable pattern of results at both the group and individual levels. Trait-level measures of habitual behavior exhibited large reliable individual differences in the regularity of performing positive versus negative habits. Situational assessments established large effects of situations and large situation by individual interactions. Several sources of evidence demonstrated construct and content validity for SAM2 measures of habitual behavior. At both the group and individual levels, these measures were associated with factors from the Situated Action Cycle known to influence habitual behavior in the literature (consistency, automaticity, immediate reward, long-term reward). Regressions explained approximately 65% of the variance at the group level and a median of approximately 75% at the individual level. SAM2 measures further exhibited well-established interactions with personality measures for self-control and neuroticism. Cognitive-affective processes from the Situated Action Cycle explained nearly all the variance in these interactions. Finally, a composite measure of habitualness established habitual behaviors at both the group and individual levels. Additionally, a composite measure of reward was positively related to the composite measure of habitualness, increasing with self-control and decreasing with neuroticism.
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Individualidad , Trastornos de la Personalidad , Humanos , Cognición , FenotipoRESUMEN
Cross-linguistic differences in concepts have implications for all theories of concepts, not just for grounded ones. Failure to address these implications does not imply the belief that they do not exist. Instead, it reflects a division of labor between researchers who focus on general principles versus cultural variability. Furthermore, core principles of grounded cognition-empirical learning and situated conceptual processing-predict large cultural differences in conceptual systems. If asked, most grounded cognition researchers would anticipate and endorse these differences, as would most researchers from other perspectives. Finally, by incorporating ethnographic and linguistic analysis, grounded cognition researchers can examine how cultural differences manifest themselves in conceptual systems.
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Cognición , Formación de Concepto , Humanos , Lingüística , Antropología Cultural , InvestigadoresRESUMEN
Understanding language semantically related to actions activates the motor cortex. This activation is sensitive to semantic information such as the body part used to perform the action (e.g. arm-/leg-related action words). Additionally, motor movements of the hands/feet can have a causal effect on memory maintenance of action words, suggesting that the involvement of motor systems extends to working memory. This study examined brain correlates of verbal memory load for action-related words using event-related fMRI. Seventeen participants saw either four identical or four different words from the same category (arm-/leg-related action words) then performed a nonmatching-to-sample task. Results show that verbal memory maintenance in the high-load condition produced greater activation in left premotor and supplementary motor cortex, along with posterior-parietal areas, indicating that verbal memory circuits for action-related words include the cortical action system. Somatotopic memory load effects of arm- and leg-related words were observed, but only at more anterior cortical regions than was found in earlier studies employing passive reading tasks. These findings support a neurocomputational model of distributed action-perception circuits (APCs), according to which language understanding is manifest as full ignition of APCs, whereas working memory is realized as reverberant activity receding to multimodal prefrontal and lateral temporal areas.
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Imagen por Resonancia Magnética , Corteza Motora , Encéfalo/diagnóstico por imagen , Encéfalo/fisiología , Mapeo Encefálico , Humanos , Lenguaje , Imagen por Resonancia Magnética/métodos , Memoria a Corto Plazo , Corteza Motora/diagnóstico por imagen , Corteza Motora/fisiologíaRESUMEN
Memories acquired incidentally from exposure to food information in the environment may often become active to later affect food preferences. Because conscious use of these memories is not requested or required, these incidental learning effects constitute a form of indirect memory. In an experiment using a novel food preference paradigm (n = 617), we found that brief incidental exposure to hedonic versus healthy food features indirectly affected food preferences a day later, explaining approximately 10% of the variance in preferences for tasty versus healthy foods. It follows that brief incidental exposure to food information can affect food preferences indirectly for at least a day. When hedonic and health exposure were each compared to a no-exposure baseline, a general effect of hedonic exposure emerged across individuals, whereas health exposure only affected food preferences for high-BMI individuals. This pattern suggests that focusing attention on hedonic food features engages common affective processes across the general population, whereas focusing attention on healthy food features engages eating restraint goals associated with high BMI. Additionally, incidental exposure to food features primarily changed preferences for infrequently consumed foods, having less impact on habitually consumed foods. These findings offer insight into how hedonic information in the obesogenic food environment contributes to unhealthy eating behavior that leads to overweight and obesity. These findings further motivate the development of interventions that counteract the effects of exposure to hedonic food information and that broaden the effects of exposure to healthy food information.
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Preferencias Alimentarias , Alimentos Especializados , Atención , Humanos , Obesidad , GustoRESUMEN
Higher cognitive functions such as linguistic comprehension must ultimately relate to perceptual systems in the brain, though how and why this forms remains unclear. Different brain networks that mediate perception when hearing real-world natural sounds has recently been proposed to respect a taxonomic model of acoustic-semantic categories. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with Chinese/English bilingual listeners, the present study explored whether reception of short spoken phrases, in both Chinese (Mandarin) and English, describing corresponding sound-producing events would engage overlapping brain regions at a semantic category level. The results revealed a double-dissociation of cortical regions that were preferential for representing knowledge of human versus environmental action events, whether conveyed through natural sounds or the corresponding spoken phrases depicted by either language. These findings of cortical hubs exhibiting linguistic-perceptual knowledge links at a semantic category level should help to advance neurocomputational models of the neurodevelopment of language systems.
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The ability to differently perceive and represent entities depending on their perspective is crucial for humans. We report five experiments that investigate how the different perspectives adopted while experiencing entities are reflected in conceptualizations (towards vs. away, near vs. far, beside vs. above, inside vs. outside and vision vs. audition vs. touch). Different groups of participants generated object properties while imagining the same scenario from different perspectives (e.g. entities coming toward them/going away from them while on a highway overpass). If conceptualizations have perspectives, then participants should produce features from a perspective entrenched in memory that reflects typical interactions with objects, independently of their assigned perspective (entrenched perspective). In addition, the perspective adopted in a given experiment should influence the properties generated (situated perspective). Results across the experiments indicate that conceptualizations contain both entrenched and situational perspectives. While entrenched perspectives emerge from canonical actions typically performed with objects, locations and entities, situational perspectives reflect online adaptations to current task contexts. The implications of the interplay between entrenched and situational perspectives for grounded cognition are discussed.
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Cognición/fisiología , Formación de Concepto/fisiología , Imaginación/fisiología , Reconocimiento en Psicología/fisiología , Adulto , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , MemoriaRESUMEN
According to the grounded perspective, cognition emerges from the interaction of classic cognitive processes with the modalities, the body, and the environment. Rather than being an autonomous impenetrable module, cognition incorporates these other domains intrinsically into its operation. The Situated Action Cycle offers one way of understanding how the modalities, the body, and the environment become integrated to ground cognition. Seven challenges and opportunities are raised for this perspective: (1) How does cognition emerge from the Situated Action Cycle and in turn support it? (2) How can we move beyond simply equating embodiment with action, additionally establishing how embodiment arises in the autonomic, neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive, and integumentary systems? (3) How can we better understand the mechanisms underlying multimodal simulation, its functions across the Situated Action Cycle, and its integration with other representational systems? (4) How can we develop and assess theoretical accounts of symbolic processing from the grounded perspective (perhaps using the construct of simulators)? (5) How can we move beyond the simplistic distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, instead addressing how concepts about the external and internal worlds pattern to support the Situated Action Cycle? (6) How do individual differences emerge from different populations of situational memories as the Situated Action Cycle manifests itself differently across individuals? (7) How can constructs from grounded cognition provide insight into the replication and generalization crises, perhaps from a quantum perspective on mechanisms (as exemplified by simulators).
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From the perspective of constructivist theories, emotion results from learning assemblies of relevant perceptual, cognitive, interoceptive, and motor processes in specific situations. Across emotional experiences over time, learned assemblies of processes accumulate in memory that later underlie emotional experiences in similar situations. A neuroimaging experiment guided participants to experience (and thus learn) situated forms of emotion, and then assessed whether participants tended to experience situated forms of the emotion later. During the initial learning phase, some participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving physical harm, whereas other participants immersed themselves in vividly imagined fear and anger experiences involving negative social evaluation. In the subsequent testing phase, both learning groups experienced fear and anger while their neural activity was assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A variety of results indicated that the physical and social learning groups incidentally learned different situated forms of a given emotion. Consistent with constructivist theories, these findings suggest that learning plays a central role in emotion, with emotion adapted to the situations in which it is experienced.
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Emociones , Aprendizaje , Adulto , Ira , Cognición , Miedo , Femenino , Humanos , Memoria , Persona de Mediana Edad , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
Studies of the classic exteroceptive sensory systems (e.g., vision, touch) consistently demonstrate that vividly imagining a sensory experience of the world-simulating it-is associated with increased activity in the corresponding primary sensory cortex. We hypothesized, analogously, that simulating internal bodily sensations would be associated with increased neural activity in primary interoceptive cortex. An immersive, language-based mental imagery paradigm was used to test this hypothesis (e.g., imagine your heart pounding during a roller coaster ride, your face drenched in sweat during a workout). During two neuroimaging experiments, participants listened to vividly described situations and imagined "being there" in each scenario. In Study 1, we observed significantly heightened activity in primary interoceptive cortex (of dorsal posterior insula) during imagined experiences involving vivid internal sensations. This effect was specific to interoceptive simulation: It was not observed during a separate affect focus condition in Study 1 nor during an independent Study 2 that did not involve detailed simulation of internal sensations (instead involving simulation of other sensory experiences). These findings underscore the large-scale predictive architecture of the brain and reveal that words can be powerful drivers of bodily experiences.
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Mapeo Encefálico/métodos , Corteza Cerebral/fisiología , Imaginación/fisiología , Interocepción/fisiología , Percepción del Habla/fisiología , Adulto , Imagen Eco-Planar , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
Robinson and colleagues (2018) make important first steps in highlighting the shortcomings of laboratory studies of human eating behaviour, and providing some general suggestions to increase methodological and reporting quality. In this commentary, we present additional important theoretical considerations and practical suggestions. First, we discuss the role of situational cues in eating behaviour and highlight the implications for designing ecologically valid laboratory experiments. Next, we discuss food intake in laboratory settings in the context of the distinction between implicit and explicit measures used widely in social psychology, and provide practical recommendations to keep intake a relatively implicit measure. Finally, we recognise that designing optimal experiments requires significant resources so we present a practical procedure to recruit the smallest informative sample via Bayesian sequential hypothesis testing.
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Ingestión de Alimentos , Conducta Alimentaria , Teorema de Bayes , Señales (Psicología) , Humanos , SugestiónRESUMEN
From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows. Over time, frequent patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of conceptual processing. As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations. In this framework, the concrete versus abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with two other distinctions becoming important instead: (i) external versus internal situational elements, (ii) situational elements versus situational integrations. Whereas concepts for situational elements originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal. We propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide relatively incomplete and distorted accounts.This article is part of the theme issue 'Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain'.
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Comunicación , Formación de Concepto , Relaciones Interpersonales , Humanos , Terminología como AsuntoRESUMEN
Recent use of voxel-wise modeling in cognitive neuroscience suggests that semantic maps tile the cortex. Although this impressive research establishes distributed cortical areas active during the conceptual processing that underlies semantics, it tells us little about the nature of this processing. While mapping concepts between Marr's computational and implementation levels to support neural encoding and decoding, this approach ignores Marr's algorithmic level, central for understanding the mechanisms that implement cognition, in general, and conceptual processing, in particular. Following decades of research in cognitive science and neuroscience, what do we know so far about the representation and processing mechanisms that implement conceptual abilities? Most basically, much is known about the mechanisms associated with: (1) feature and frame representations, (2) grounded, abstract, and linguistic representations, (3) knowledge-based inference, (4) concept composition, and (5) conceptual flexibility. Rather than explaining these fundamental representation and processing mechanisms, semantic tiles simply provide a trace of their activity over a relatively short time period within a specific learning context. Establishing the mechanisms that implement conceptual processing in the brain will require more than mapping it to cortical (and sub-cortical) activity, with process models from cognitive science likely to play central roles in specifying the intervening mechanisms. More generally, neuroscience will not achieve its basic goals until it establishes algorithmic-level mechanisms that contribute essential explanations to how the brain works, going beyond simply establishing the brain areas that respond to various task conditions.
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Mapeo Encefálico , Corteza Cerebral/fisiología , Formación de Concepto/fisiología , Semántica , Algoritmos , Comprensión , Humanos , Aprendizaje , Modelos NeurológicosRESUMEN
We propose that the domain general process of categorization contributes to the perception of stress. When a situation contains features associated with stressful experiences, it is categorized as stressful. From the perspective of situated cognition, the features used to categorize experiences as stressful are the features typically true of stressful situations. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to evaluate the perceived stress of 572 imagined situations, and to also evaluate each situation for how much it possessed 19 features potentially associated with stressful situations and their processing (e.g., self-threat, familiarity, visual imagery, outcome certainty). Following variable reduction through factor analysis, a core set of 8 features associated with stressful situations-expectation violation, self-threat, coping efficacy, bodily experience, arousal, negative valence, positive valence, and perseveration-all loaded on a single Core Stress Features factor. In a multilevel model, this factor and an Imagery factor explained 88% of the variance in judgments of perceived stress, with significant random effects reflecting differences in how individual participants categorized stress. These results support the hypothesis that people categorize situations as stressful to the extent that typical features of stressful situations are present. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to establish a comprehensive set of features that predicts perceived stress.
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Adaptación Psicológica , Aprendizaje por Asociación , Juicio , Estrés Psicológico/psicología , Adolescente , Adulto , Nivel de Alerta , Emociones , Femenino , Humanos , Individualidad , Masculino , Encuestas y Cuestionarios , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
A brief mindfulness intervention diminished bias in favor of one's in-group and against one's out-group. In the linguistic intergroup bias (LIB), individuals expect in-group members to behave positively, and out-group members to behave negatively. Consequently, individuals choose abstract language beset with character inferences to describe these expected behaviors, and in contrast, choose concrete, objective language to describe unexpected behaviors. Eighty-four participants received either mindful attention instructions (observe their thoughts as fleeting mental states) or immersion instructions (become absorbed in the vivid details of thoughts). After instruction, participants viewed visual depictions of an imagined in-group or out-group member's positive or negative behavior, selecting the best linguistic description from a set of four descriptions that varied in abstractness. Immersion groups demonstrated a robust LIB. Mindful attention groups, however, exhibited a markedly tempered LIB, suggesting that even a brief mindfulness-related instruction can implicitly reduce the propensity to perpetuate stereotypical thinking through language. These results contribute to understanding the mechanisms that facilitate unprejudiced thinking.
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We propose that a core eating network and its modulations account for much of what is currently known about the neural activity underlying a wide range of eating phenomena in humans (excluding homeostasis and related phenomena). The core eating network is closely adapted from a network that Kaye, Fudge, and Paulus (2009) proposed to explain the neurocircuitry of eating, including a ventral reward pathway and a dorsal control pathway. In a review across multiple literatures that focuses on experiments using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), we first show that neural responses to food cues, such as food pictures, utilize the same core eating network as eating. Consistent with the theoretical perspective of grounded cognition, food cues activate eating simulations that produce reward predictions about a perceived food and potentially motivate its consumption. Reviewing additional literatures, we then illustrate how various factors modulate the core eating network, increasing and/or decreasing activity in subsets of its neural areas. These modulating factors include food significance (palatability, hunger), body mass index (BMI, overweight/obesity), eating disorders (anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, binge eating), and various eating goals (losing weight, hedonic pleasure, healthy living). By viewing all these phenomena as modulating a core eating network, it becomes possible to understand how they are related to one another within this common theoretical framework. Finally, we discuss future directions for better establishing the core eating network, its modulations, and their implications for behavior.
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Conducta Alimentaria/fisiología , Trastornos de Alimentación y de la Ingestión de Alimentos/fisiopatología , Alimentos , Red Nerviosa/fisiología , Recompensa , Animales , HumanosRESUMEN
The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing.
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Encéfalo , Cognición , Teoría Psicológica , Humanos , LingüísticaRESUMEN
In response to Casasanto, Brookshire, and Ivry (2015), we address four points: First, we engaged in conceptual replications of Brookshire, Casasanto, and Ivry (2010), not direct replications. Second, we did not question the validity of Brookshire et al.'s (2010) results, nor the similar findings of other researchers, but instead explained divergent findings within an integrated theoretical framework. Third, challenges to the construct of automaticity, including ours, were widespread, long before Brookshire et al.'s (2010) article. Fourth, the planned comparisons that we reported tested our theoretical claims and offered strong evidence for them.
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Ruminative thoughts about a stressful event can seem subjectively real, as if the imagined event were happening in the moment. One possibility is that this subjective realism results from simulating the self as engaged in the stressful event (immersion). If so, then the process of decentering--disengaging the self from the event--should reduce the subjective realism associated with immersion, and therefore perceived stressfulness. To assess this account of decentering, we taught non-meditators a strategy for disengaging from imagined events, simply viewing these events as transient mental states (mindful attention). In a subsequent neuroimaging session, participants imagined stressful and non-stressful events, while either immersing themselves or adopting mindful attention. In conjunction analyses, mindful attention down-regulated the processing of stressful events relative to baseline, whereas immersion up-regulated their processing. In direct contrasts between mindful attention and immersion, mindful attention showed greater activity in brain areas associated with perspective shifting and effortful attention, whereas immersion showed greater activity in areas associated with self-processing and visceral states. These results suggest that mindful attention produces decentering by disengaging embodied senses of self from imagined situations so that affect does not develop.