Efficacy of facemasks in preventing transmission of COVID-19 in non-healthcare settings: A scoping review.

Background: During the COVID-19 pandemic, an abundance of literature relating to the efficacy of face masks on reducing transmission of COVID-19 in non-healthcare settings emerged. Aim/objective: The aim of this scoping review was to allow the identification of: types of evidence conducted in this area; knowledge gaps and common concepts relating to mask efficacy in non-healthcare settings. Methods: A comprehensive literature search was conducted in PubMed, CINAHL, MEDLINE, Embase and the Irish Management Institute bibliographic database on December 15th, 2021. All types of face masks were included. Of 722 records, 16 were included after full text screening. Findings/results: Themes from an adapted model of Howard et al. framework were used to group results and identify common concepts. The grouped thematic results were then applied to the socio-ecological model. This illustrated the multifactorial elements determining the efficacy of masks themselves while also illustrating how other factors such as individual behaviours, social interactions, settings and national policy can influence the degree of the protective effect. Discussion: The findings from this scoping review indicate that an abundance of experimental literature is available indicating that masks are effective at preventing COVID-19 transmission but their degree of efficacy is impacted by external factors. This review highlights that the quality of the evidence available is low.

A methodological approach to intra-action reviews - application and adaptation of existing global guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic response in Ireland, 2021.

Many countries were under-prepared for the arrival of an emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic. An intra-action review allows countries, systems and services to reflect on their preparedness and response to date, and revise their policies and approaches as needed. We describe the approach to undertaking an intra-action review of Ireland's Health Protection COVID-19 response during 2021. A project team within National Health Protection developed a project plan, identified key stakeholders, trained facilitators and designed workshop programmes, employing integrated collaborative web tools. Multidisciplinary representatives participated in three half-day, independently facilitated workshops on challenges and solutions within specific response areas: communication, governance and cross-cutting themes such as staff well-being. An all-stakeholder survey sought further in-depth detail. Participants reviewed the ongoing pandemic response in terms of good practice and challenges and recommended implementable solutions. We customised our mixed-methods approach using existing ECDC/WHO guidance, producing consensus recommendations during Ireland's fourth wave of COVID-19, with particular focus on pathways to implementation. Our adaptations may help others in formulating and customising methodological approaches. During an emergency, identifying and reflecting on good practices to retain, and areas for strengthening, with a clear action plan of implementing recommendations, will enhance preparedness now, and for future emergencies.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 arising from international flights arriving in Ireland in December 2020: a descriptive analysis using national surveillance data.

OBJECTIVES: There is limited evidence on the risk of in-flight transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This study estimated the extent of in-flight SARS-CoV-2 transmission on international flights arriving in Ireland during December 2020. STUDY DESIGN: This was a cross-sectional analysis. METHODS: National surveillance data identified all notified cases of COVID-19 who were infectious while travelling on international flights to Ireland during December 2020. Close contacts of cases were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and the results were collated to estimate the pooled secondary attack rate across all flights. Laboratory and epidemiological data were obtained from the Health Service Executive Covid Care Tracker, a national database of COVID-19 cases in Ireland. RESULTS: A total of 165 infectious cases of COVID-19 were identified on 134 incoming flights; 40.0% were symptomatic on board. There were 2099 flight close contacts identified, of whom 40.9% had results of a SARS-CoV-2 polymerase chain reaction test within 14 days of arrival. The pooled secondary attack rate for these contacts was 7.0% and was higher among those on flights of ≥5-hour duration (P = 0.008). More than half (59.1%) of close contacts had no SARS-CoV-2 test result recorded; the reasons included incorrect or absent contact details (26.5%) and no response when contacted (17.8%). CONCLUSIONS: In this national study investigating transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from international flights arriving into Ireland, the pooled secondary attack rate was 7.0%. International travel is likely to have contributed to the third wave of SARS-CoV-2 infections in Ireland in early 2021. Application of non-pharmaceutical interventions remains central to mitigating the risk of in-flight transmission.

In-flight transmission of wild-type SARS-CoV-2 and the outbreak potential of imported clusters of COVID-19: a review of published evidence.

International air travel has been highlighted as a concern since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with respect to importation of cases. We summarise the available evidence for in-flight transmission of wild type SARS-CoV-2 during 2020, and for imported COVID-19 clusters to cause outbreaks. This paper provides a data baseline prior to the emergence of new mutations causing SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, whose characteristics may increase the potential risk of in-flight transmission and imported outbreaks. The evidence on in-flight transmission of wild-type SARS-CoV-2 is limited, and is described in a small number of published reports. Most of the available evidence pertains to the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, during a period without non-pharmaceutical interventions such as distancing and in-flight mask wearing. There is considerable potential for outbreaks of COVID-19 from imported cases or clusters when public health guidance around quarantine of travellers and self-isolation of cases is not adhered to. Risks can be mitigated by measures such as: avoiding non-essential travel, targeted testing and quarantine of travellers from high incidence regions or regions of concern, managed quarantine processes, and protocols for rapid investigation and control of transmission from a possible variant of concern. Measures should be dynamically assessed and proportionate to the level of risk.

A large national outbreak of COVID-19 linked to air travel, Ireland, summer 2020.

An outbreak of 59 cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) originated with 13 cases linked by a 7 h, 17% occupancy flight into Ireland, summer 2020. The flight-associated attack rate was 9.8-17.8%. Spread to 46 non-flight cases occurred country-wide. Asymptomatic/pre-symptomatic transmission in-flight from a point source is implicated by 99% homology across the virus genome in five cases travelling from three different continents. Restriction of movement on arrival and robust contact tracing can limit propagation post-flight.

Preparedness and management of global public health threats at points of entry in Ireland and the EU in the context of a potential Brexit.

Health security in the European Union (EU) aims to protect citizens from serious threats to health such as biological agents and infectious disease outbreaks- whether natural, intentional or accidental. Threats may include established infections, emerging diseases or chemical and radiological agents. Co-ordinated international efforts attempt to minimize risks and mitigate the spread of infectious disease across borders.We review the current situation (March 2019) with respect to detection and management of serious human health threats across Irish borders- and what may change for Ireland if/when the United Kingdom (UK) withdraws from the EU (Brexit).Specifically, this paper reviews international legislation covering health threats, and its national transposition; and EU legislation and processes, especially the relevant European Decision No. 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross border threats to health with repeal of Decision No 2119/98/EC. We enumerate European surveillance systems and agencies which relate to port health security; we consider consortia and academic arrangements within the EU framework and established collaboration with the World Health Organization. We describe current Health Services Executive port health structures in Ireland which address preparedness and management of human health threats at points of entry. We appraise risks which Brexit could bring, reviewing literature on shared concerns about these risks, and we evaluate post-Brexit challenges for the EU, and potential opportunities to remain within current structures in shared health threat preparedness and response.It is imperative that the UK, Ireland and the EU work together to mitigate these risks using some agreed joint coordination mechanisms for a robust, harmonised approach to global public health threats at points of entry.

Planning and preparing for public health threats at airports.

The ever-increasing speed and scope of human mobility by international air travel has led to a global transport network for infectious diseases with the potential to introduce pathogens into non-endemic areas, and to facilitate rapid spread of novel or mutated zoonotic agents.Robust national emergency preparedness is vital to mitigate the transmission of infectious diseases agents domestically and to prevent onward spread to other countries. Given the complex range of stakeholders who respond to an infectious disease threat being transmitted through air travel, it is important that protocols be tested and practised extensively in advance of a real emergency. Simulation exercises include the identification of possible scenarios based on the probability of hazards and the vulnerability of populations as a basis for planning, and provide a useful measure of preparedness efforts and capabilities.In October 2016, a live simulation exercise was conducted at a major airport in Ireland incorporating a public health threat for the first time, with the notification of a possible case of MERS-CoV aboard an aircraft plus an undercarriage fire. Strengths of the response to the communicable disease threat included appropriate public health risk assessment, case management, passenger information gathering, notification to relevant parties, and communication to passengers and multiple agencies.Lessons learned include:o Exercise planning should not be overly ambitious. In testing too many facets of emergency response, the public health response could be deprioritised.o The practical implementation of communication protocols in a real-time exercise of this scope proved challenging. These protocols should continue to be checked and tested by desk-top exercises to ensure that all staff concerned are familiar with them, especially in the context of staff turn-over.o The roles and responsibilities of the various agencies must be clear to avoid role confusion.o Equipment and infrastructure capacities must be considered and in place in advance of an actual incident or test, for example whether or not cell phone signals require boosting during a major event.Importantly, exercises bring together individuals representing organisations with different roles and perspectives allowing identification of capabilities and limitations, and problem solving about how to address the gaps and overlaps in a low-threat collaborative setting.

Self-rated health and quality of life in adults attending regional disability services in Ireland.

BACKGROUND: There is limited background information on self-rated health in people with disability in Ireland. This paper examines self-rated health scores and dimensions of functioning in people attending disability services and compares scores to the general population in Ireland, which has not been done before. METHODS: Face-to-face interviews were carried out with 247 adults with intellectual disability and 180 with physical or sensory disability attending regional residential, day activity, or training disability centres in the East Coast Area of Ireland. EuroQol ED-5Q was used to assess five dimensions of functioning and quality of life, supplemented by questions taken from the national population study on general health, mental health, and quality of life. RESULTS: Clients with intellectual disability scored their quality of life significantly higher than the adult general population. They scored their mental health significantly lower compared with clients with physical/sensory disability. Compared to clients with intellectual disability, and to the general population, clients with physical or sensory disability scored their quality of life significantly lower. They had more problems in all EuroQol ED-5Q dimensions (mobility; self-care; being able to carry out one's usual activities; pain; and anxiety) than both the general population and clients with intellectual disability. CONCLUSION: These results give an insight into self-rated health and quality of life of regional disability services attendees. Findings provide an indicator of health needs and provide a baseline to measure the impact of interventions. Further elucidation of the relationship between functional impairment and quality of life in those with disability is needed. Factors affecting self-rating of health in people with intellectual disabilities need further exploration.