Effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false memory.

Whereas the effects of emotional intensity (the perceived strength of an item's valence or arousal) have long been studied in true- and false-memory research, emotional ambiguity (the uncertainty that attaches to perceived emotional intensity) has only been studied recently. Available evidence suggests that emotional ambiguity has reliable effects on true memory that are distinct from those of emotional intensity. However, those findings are mostly restricted to recall, and the effects of emotional ambiguity on false memory remain unexplored. The current study addressed both limitations by measuring the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity on true and false recognition. In two experiments, we manipulated valence ambiguity and valence intensity (Experiment 1) and arousal ambiguity and arousal intensity (Experiment 2) of Deese/Roediger/McDermott lists. Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted for Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the combined data of the experiments to separate the effects of emotional ambiguity and emotional intensity. Our results showed that both valence ambiguity and arousal ambiguity improved true recognition, and the effects of valence ambiguity remained robust even when controlling for valence intensity, arousal intensity, and arousal ambiguity. More importantly, for both valence and arousal, there was an interaction between ambiguity and intensity in false memory. Specifically, we found that valence ambiguity increased false recognition with positive valence, while arousal ambiguity amplified the effect of arousal intensity on false recognition. Our results are discussed in the context of the emotional ambiguity hypothesis and fuzzy-trace theory.

From association to gist: Some critical tests.

We report the first evidence that the gist mechanism of fuzzy-trace theory and the associative mechanism of activation monitoring theory operate in parallel, in the recall version of the Deese/Roediger/McDermott illusion. In three experiments, we implemented a new methodology that allows their respective empirical indexes, gist strength (GS) and backward associative strength (BAS), to each be manipulated while the other is held constant. In Experiment 1, increasing GS increased false recall of missing words, but increasing BAS did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, however, increasing GS and increasing BAS both increased recall of missing words, and those effects were independent and additive. In all three experiments, GS and BAS affected true recall of list words in qualitatively different ways: (a) Increasing GS always improved true recall, regardless of whether BAS was high or low, but (b) increasing BAS impaired true recall when GS was high and improved true recall when GS was low. To pinpoint the retrieval loci of the two variables' effects, we analyzed the data of all experiments with the dual-retrieval model. Those analyses showed that the variables' respective effects were due to different retrieval processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The recognition effects of attribute ambiguity.

When examining memory effects of semantic attributes, it is common practice to manipulate normed mean (M) ratings of the attributes (i.e., attribute intensity) in learning materials. Meanwhile, the standard deviations (SDs) of attribute ratings (i.e., attribute ambiguity) are usually treated as indexes of measurement error. However, some recent research found that recall accuracy varied as a function of both the intensity and ambiguity of semantic attributes such as valence, categorization, concreteness, and meaningfulness. These findings challenged the traditional interpretation of attribute rating SDs as noise indexes. In the current study, we examined the recognition effects of ambiguity, intensity, and Ambiguity × Intensity interactions for 21 attributes using mega study data for over 5,000 words. Our results showed that attribute ambiguity had reliable recognition effects beyond those of attribute intensity, and that it sometimes explained more unique variance in recognition than attribute intensity. Thus, we concluded that attribute ambiguity is a distinct psychological dimension of semantic attributes, which is processed separately from attribute intensity during encoding. Two theoretical hypotheses had been proposed for the memory effects of attribute ambiguity. We discuss the implications of our findings for the two theoretical hypotheses about how attribute ambiguity influences episodic memory.

The font size effect depends on inter-item relation.

The font size effect refers to the metacognitive illusion that larger fonts lead to higher judgments of learning (JOLs) but not better recall. Prior studies demonstrated robust JOL effects of font size under conditions of intra-item relation (i.e., cue-target relatedness within a word pair), even though intra-item relation is a more diagnostic cue than font size. However, it remains an open question whether the JOL effects of font size persist under conditions of inter-item relation (i.e., relations across items on a single-word list). In the current study, we examined the JOL and recall effects of font size when font size and inter-item relation were factorially manipulated in three JOL-recall experiments. Additionally, to manipulate the salience of inter-item relation, we presented related and unrelated lists in a blocked manner in Experiment 1 but in a mixed manner in Experiments 2 and 3. Our results showed that the JOL effects of font size are moderated or eliminated when inter-item relation is manipulated simultaneously with font size. Moreover, the smaller font led to better recall for related lists but not for unrelated lists across all three experiments. Therefore, our results demonstrate that individual cues may not be integrated with equal weight, and there can be a trade-off between item-specific and relational processing during the JOL process. Additionally, highlighting key information with larger fonts may not be optimal with related items.

The big three: Accuracy, organization, and retrieval effects of latent semantic attributes.

Rating norms for semantic attributes (e.g., concreteness, dominance, familiarity, and valence) are widely used in many psychological literatures to study the effects of processing specific types of semantic content. Word and picture norms for many attributes are available for thousands of items, but there is a contamination problem in experimentation. When an attribute's ratings are varied, how the semantic content that people process changes is unclear because ratings of individual attributes are correlated with ratings of so many other attributes. To solve this problem, the psychological space that 20 attributes occupy has been mapped, and factor score norms have been published for the latent attributes that generate that space (emotional valence, age-of-acquisition, and symbolic size). These latent attributes have yet to be manipulated in experimentation, and hence, their effects are unknown. We conducted a series of experiments that focused on whether they affect accuracy, memory organization, and specific retrieval processes. We found that (a) all three latent attributes affected recall accuracy, (b) all three affected memory organization in recall protocols, and (c) all three affected direct verbatim access, rather than reconstruction or familiarity. The memory effects of two of them (valence and age-of-acquisition) were unconditional, but memory effects were only detected for the third at particular levels of the other two. The key implications are that semantic attributes can now be cleanly manipulated, and when they are, they have broad downstream effects on memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Memory effects of semantic attributes: A method of controlling attribute contamination.

Rating norms for semantic attributes (e.g., concreteness, familiarity, valence) are widely used to study the content that people process as they encode meaningful material. Intensity ratings of individual attributes have been manipulated in numerous experiments with a range of memory paradigms, but those manipulations are contaminated by substantial correlations with the intensity ratings of other attributes. A method of controlling such contamination is needed, which requires a determination of how many distinct attributes there are among the large collection of attributes for which published norms are available. Identification of overlapping words in multiple rating projects yielded a data base containing normed values for each word's perceived intensity (M rating) and ambiguity (rating SD) on 20 different attributes. Principal component analyses then revealed that the intensity space was spanned by just three latent semantic attributes, and the ambiguity space was spanned by five. Psychologically, the big three intensity factors (emotional valence, size, age) were highly interpretable, as were the big five ambiguity factors (discrete emotion, emotional valence, age, meaningfulness, and verbatim memory). We provide a data base of intensity and ambiguity factor scores that can be used to conduct uncontaminated studies of the memory effects of the intensity and ambiguity of latent semantic attributes.

How does attribute ambiguity improve memory?

The memory effects of semantic attributes (e.g., concreteness, familiarity, valence) have long been studied by manipulating their average perceived intensities, as quantified in word rating norms. The semantic ambiguity hypothesis specifies that the uncertainty as well as the intensity of semantic attributes is processed when words are encoded. Testing that hypothesis requires a normed measure of ambiguity, so that ambiguity and intensity can be manipulated independently. The standard deviation (SD) of intensity ratings has been used for that purpose, which has produced three characteristic ambiguity effects. Owing to the recency of such research, fundamental questions remain about the validity of this method of measuring ambiguity and about its process-level effects on memory. In a validity experiment, we found that the rating SDs of six semantic attributes (arousal, concreteness, familiarity, meaningfulness, negative valence, positive valence) passed tests of concurrent and predictive validity. In three memory experiments, we found that manipulating rating SDs had a specific effect on retrieval: It influenced subjects' ability to use reconstructive retrieval to recall words. That pattern was predicted by the current theoretical explanation of how ambiguity benefits memory.

Predicting conversion from mild cognitive impairment to Alzheimer's disease with multimodal latent factors.

INTRODUCTION: We studied the ability of latent factor scores to predict conversion from mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to Alzheimer's disease (AD) and investigated whether multimodal factor scores improve predictive power, relative to single-modal factor scores. METHOD: We conducted exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) of the baseline data of MCI subjects in the Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) to generate factor scores for three data modalities: neuropsychological (NP), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Factor scores from single or multiple modalities were entered in logistic regression models to predict MCI to AD conversion for 160 ADNI subjects over a 2-year interval. RESULTS: NP factors attained an area under the curve (AUC) of .80, with a sensitivity of .66 and a specificity of .77. MRI factors reached a comparable level of performance (AUC = .80, sensitivity = .66, specificity = .78), whereas CSF factors produced weaker prediction (AUC = .70, sensitivity = .56, specificity = .79). Combining NP factors with MRI or CSF factors produced better prediction than either MRI or CSF factors alone. Similarly, adding MRI factors to NP or CSF factors produced improvements in prediction relative to NP or CSF factors alone. However, adding CSF factors to either NP or MRI factors produced no improvement in prediction. CONCLUSIONS: Latent factor scores provided good accuracy for predicting MCI to AD conversion. Adding NP or MRI factors to factors from other modalities enhanced predictive power but adding CSF factors did not.

Deep distortion.

Conventional false memories recount events that either did not happen (item errors) or that happened in a different context (source errors). Fuzzy-trace theory predicts deeper anomalies that lie behind conventional false memories. These deep distortions are structural irregularities in the ways that specific recountings are related to each other or to some objective standard (e.g., the 0 and 1 limits of probability). I discuss five deep distortions for which substantial data have accumulated: overdistribution, non-additivity, conjunction illusions, non-compensation, and super-overdistribution. Together, these phenomena violate the disjunction and additivity axioms of probability, as well as the law of the excluded middle. The theoretical problem they pose is to explain how valid representations of our experience produce memory regularities that violate our experience in the most fundamental ways.

A fundamental asymmetry in human memory: Old ≠ not-new and new ≠ not-old.

In recognition memory, anything that is objectively new is necessarily not-old, and anything that is objectively old is necessarily not-new. Therefore, judging whether a test item is new is logically equivalent to judging whether it is old, and conversely. Nevertheless, a series of 10 experiments showed that old? and new? judgments did not produce equivalent recognition accuracy. In Experiments 1-4, wherein subjects made old? or new? judgments about test items, new? judgments yielded more accurate performance for old items than old? judgments did, and old? judgments yielded more accurate performance for new items than new? judgments did. This same violation of logical equivalence was observed in Experiments 5-10, wherein subjects made similar? judgments as well as old? and new? ones. In short, old? and new? judgments displayed consistent Judgment × Item crossovers, rather than equivalence. Response latencies were used to test the hypothesis that Judgment × Item crossovers were due to certain judgment-item combinations provoking more deliberate, thorough retrieval than other combinations. There was no support for that hypothesis, but the data were consistent with an earlier theory, which posits that latency depends on the extent to which judgments or items slant retrieval toward accessing verbatim traces. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Factor analyses of the ADNI neuropsychological battery: An examination of diagnostic and longitudinal invariance.

OBJECTIVE: In the Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI), cognitive function was tracked across multiple years by a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. In this study, we examined the latent structure of the ADNI battery and evaluated the invariance of that structure among diagnostic groups and over time. METHOD: We used exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses to investigate the invariance of the ADNI battery's latent factor structure among three diagnostic groups (healthy controls, patients with mild cognitive impairment, patients with Alzheimer's disease) over a 2-year interval (baseline, 6 months, 12 months, 24 months). RESULTS: The results revealed a five-factor structure for the ADNI battery (memory, visuospatial processing, attention, language, executive function). This structure displayed configural invariance but not weak, strong, or strict invariance across the three diagnostic groups. Longitudinally, configural, weak, strong, and strict invariance were all established within each diagnostic group, except that strict invariance was rejected in healthy controls. CONCLUSIONS: The ADNI battery assesses the same cognitive abilities in the three diagnostic groups, but test scores do not calibrate to these abilities equally in the respective groups, making certain statistics (e.g., factor scores) noncomparable between groups. Within each group, the latent structure and the numerical relations between individual tests and underlying factors remained invariant over 2 years, suggesting that this battery is a reliable tool for tracking longitudinal changes in specific cognitive abilities within individual diagnostic groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Deep memory distortions.

Deep distortions are a new family of memory biases that comprise one of the two basic varieties of false memory. The first and older variety, surface distortions, are specific item or source memories that are erroneous because the events did not happen. The new variety, deep distortions, are emergent properties of multiple specific memories. They are relations among such memories that are false because they violate objective logical rules that real-world events must obey. I discuss four deep distortions for which substantial data have accumulated: overdistribution, super-overdistribution, non-additivity, and impossible conjunctions. These phenomena violate four axioms of classical probability (numerical bound, universal event, additivity, and countable additivity) and two rules that follow from them (empty set and monotonicity). Their psychological significance lies in four facts about them: (a) They demonstrate that although events in the real world are compensatory, our memories of them are not; (b) they establish that we persistently over remember experience; (c) they reveal that surface distortions are by-products of deep distortions; and (d) they pose the theoretical conundrum of how the structure of memory could so thoroughly misrepresent the objective structure of the events we are remembering.

Emotional ambiguity and memory.

The emotional ambiguity hypothesis introduced the principle that uncertainty about items' valence determines how emotional content affects memory and other psychological processes. It was formulated to explain why correlations between the perceived valence and arousal of memory items range from weak to unreliable, but it also makes novel predictions. Although data are consistent with those predictions, the hypothesis does not provide a process model of how valence ambiguity causes the valence-arousal relation to fluctuate. We tested 2 such models-a quantitative one, which assumes that increasing ambiguity lowers the reliability of valence judgments, and a categorical/quantitative one, which assumes that increasing ambiguity restricts the range of valence judgments. These models predict different mathematical relations between measures of ambiguity and intensity for valence and other semantic attributes (e.g., arousal, concreteness, familiarity, imagery, meaningfulness). In Experiments 1-3, tests of those predictions favored the categorical/quantitative model-showing that ambiguity is an inverted-U function for valence and other attributes. Experiments 4 and 5 were designed to investigate whether the memory effects of valence ambiguity are similar to the known effects of valence intensity. In both experiments, recall improved when ambiguity was increased, as well as when intensity was increased. A mathematical model revealed that increases in ambiguity produced large increases in items' familiarity, whereas increases in intensity produced smaller increases in both recollection and familiarity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Norms for emotion-false memory lists.

False memory has been a flourishing research area for decades, and recently there has been considerable interest in how emotional content affects it. Literature reviews have noted a lack of normed materials that vary in emotional valence and arousal as a factor that contributes to the mixed findings on emotion-false memory effects. We report a pool of normed materials of this sort, the Cornell/Cortland Emotional Lists (CEL). This is a Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) type list pool in which words' mean valence and arousal ratings are factorially manipulated across 32 lists. These lists' levels of mean backward associative strength (MBAS) are all high enough to induce significant levels of false memory. The lists were normed by administering them to 228 subjects at three different universities, all of whom responded to recall and recognition tests for the lists. The norming data revealed that false recall and false recognition were higher for negative lists than for positive lists, whereas true recall and true recognition were higher for positive lists than for negative lists. In addition, high arousal strengthened the valence effects on both true and false recall. These results indicate that the CEL lists are useful tozols for emotion-false memory research.

From association to gist.

We removed a key uncertainty in the Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) illusion. The mean backward associative strength (MBAS) of DRM lists is the best-known predictor of this illusion, but it is confounded with semantic relations between lists and critical distractors. Thus, it is unclear whether associative relations, semantic relations, or both foment the illusion. In Experiment 1, we developed a tool for investigating this question-a normed pool of materials in which subjects rated the gist strength of 120 DRM lists that varied widely in MBAS. This produced a mean gist strength (MGS) statistic for each list, which allowed MGS and MBAS to be manipulated factorially. In Experiment 2, we conducted the first MGS (high vs. low) × MBAS (high vs. low) factorial study of the DRM illusion. To measure how MGS and MBAS affect underlying retrieval processes, we implemented a conjoint recognition design. For raw memory performance, MGS affected both true and false recognition of critical distractors, and it affected both true and false recognition of list words. MBAS did not affect true or false recognition of list words or true recognition of critical distractors. With false recognition of critical distractors, it had a reliable effect in one condition when MGS was low, but it had no effect in another condition. At the level of retrieval processes, increasing MGS increased the familiarity of critical distractors' semantic content, and it also increased the familiarity of list words' semantic content. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Verbatim editing: A general model of recollection rejection.

Recollection rejection is traditionally defined as using verbatim traces of old items' presentations to reject new similar test cues, in old/new recognition (e.g., rejecting that couch is old by retrieving verbatim traces of sofa's presentation). We broaden this conceptualization to include (a) old as well as new similar test cues, (b) using verbatim traces for acceptance as well as rejection, and (c) using illusory verbatim traces of unpresented items (phantom recollection) as well as actual verbatim traces (true recollection). The expanded model describes how true recollection and phantom recollection generate memory decisions by creating matches and mismatches between comparisons of test cues to the content of retrieved verbatim traces versus comparisons of test cues to the content of test questions. This model generates a series of predictions about verbatim editing. Some are intuitive, such as the prection that performance will be more accurate for old cues than for new similar ones. Others are counterintuitive and conflict with an alternative model, such as correct rejections are easier than hits and that correct rejection rates will be more stable over time than hit rates. Meta-analyses of a corpus of conjoint recognition data sets provided support for the model's predictions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Recollection is fast and slow.

We implemented a new approach to measuring the relative speeds of different cognitive processes, one that extends multinomial models of memory and reasoning from discrete decisions to latencies. We applied it to the dual-process prediction that familiarity is faster than recollection. Relative to prior work on this prediction, the advantages of the new approach are that it jointly measures specific retrieval processes and their latencies, provides separate sets of latency-retrieval parameters for list items and related distractors, and supplies latency parameters for bias processes as well as retrieval processes. Six experiments were conducted using a design (conjoint recognition) in which subjects make traditional old/new decisions about probes, plus two other types of decisions (New but similar to old items? Old or new but similar to old items?). The relative speeds of context recollection, target recollection, familiarity, and bias processes were measured for old list items and for related distractors. Four patterns emerged in all experiments: (a) The speed of recollection did not differ from the speed of familiarity for list items. (b) The speed ordering was context recollection > target recollection = familiarity for related distractors. (c) Bias processes were slower than recollection and familiarity for both list items and related distractors. (d) Bias processes were faster in conditions in which list items were to be accepted than in conditions in which they were to be rejected. Overall, the results suggest that the relative speeds of different retrieval and bias processes are emergent properties of the efficiency of different retrieval cues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The semantics of emotion in false memory.

The emotional valence of target information has been a centerpiece of recent false memory research, but in most experiments, it has been confounded with emotional arousal. We sought to clarify the results of such research by identifying a shared mathematical relation between valence and arousal ratings in commonly administered normed materials. That relation was then used to (a) decide whether arousal as well as valence influences false memory when they are confounded and to (b) determine whether semantic properties that are known to affect false memory covary with valence and arousal ratings. In Study 1, we identified a quadratic relation between valence and arousal ratings of words and pictures that has 2 key properties: Arousal increases more rapidly as function of negative valence than positive valence, and hence, a given level of negative valence is more arousing than the same level of positive valence. This quadratic function predicts that if arousal as well as valence affects false memory when they are confounded, false memory data must have certain fine-grained properties. In Study 2, those properties were absent from norming data for the Cornell-Cortland Emotional Word Lists, indicating that valence but not arousal affects false memory in those norms. In Study 3, we tested fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of that pattern: that valence ratings are positively related to semantic properties that are known to increase false memory, but arousal ratings are not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Developmental reversals in false memory: Development is complementary, not compensatory.

We report the 1st example of a true complementarity effect in memory development-a situation in which memory for the same event simultaneously becomes more and less accurate between early childhood and adulthood. We investigated this paradoxical effect because fuzzy-trace theory predicts that it can occur in paradigms that produce developmental reversals in false memory, which are circumstances in which adults are more likely than children to remember new events as old. The complementarity prediction is this: If subjects separately judge whether those same events are new but similar to old ones, adults will be more accurate than children, even though adults are less accurate when they judge whether the items are old. We report 4 experiments in which children (6- and 10-year-olds), adolescents (14-year-olds), and adults encoded the modal developmental reversal materials: Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists. Then, they responded to memory tests on which half the subjects judged whether test items were old and half judged whether the same items were new-similar. The paradoxical complementarity effect was detected in all experiments: The tendency to falsely remember new-similar items as being old increased with development, but so did the tendency to correctly remember them as being new-similar. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Emotional-Ambiguity Hypothesis: A Large-Scale Test.

Valence and arousal are core dimensions of emotion, but the relation between them has eluded scientific consensus. The emotional-ambiguity hypothesis is the first new model of this relation to appear in some years. It introduces the novel principle that the relation between valence and arousal is controlled by a variable that is not traditionally measured: the uncertainty of perceived valence. A comprehensive evaluation of this principle was conducted using publicly available emotional word and emotional picture databases. There was compelling support for the hypothesis in both types of databases and for both positive and negative valence: The strength of the relation between perceived arousal and perceived positivity or negativity decreased linearly as valence perceptions became more ambiguous. These results explain some puzzling facts about the valence-arousal relation that figure prominently in literature reviews, and they provide a solution to the problem of how to remove arousal confounds from valence effects.