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1.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law ; 49(1): 60-65, 2021 Mar.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33234540

RESUMEN

Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) is believed to be a degenerative brain disease characterized by repetitive brain trauma resulting in a specific pattern of neuropathological changes, which some have linked to functional disturbance and aggression. The diagnosis has gained greater public attention after these same neuropathological changes were discovered in multiple deceased National Football League (NFL) players, many of whom had exhibited signs of aggression, impulsivity, and poor executive functioning, according to a widely publicized study. When an NFL player convicted of murder was found to have the neuropathological changes associated with CTE following his suicide, the New York Times editorial section asked whether CTE was a defense for murder. This idea raises an interesting legal and philosophical question about whether an individual's criminal actions can be determined by something outside their control, such as past head trauma. To begin to attempt an answer, this article reviews what is currently known about the neurobiology of traumatic brain injury, CTE, and morality. By looking at how U.S. criminal law courts have handled cases of dementia and traumatic brain injury in the past, we can better understand how to consider this postmortem diagnosis in its forensic context.


Asunto(s)
Encefalopatía Traumática Crónica/diagnóstico , Encefalopatía Traumática Crónica/psicología , Competencia Mental/legislación & jurisprudencia , Autopsia , Humanos , Defensa por Insania , Principios Morales , Corteza Prefrontal/patología , Estados Unidos/epidemiología
3.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law ; 34(1): 103-4, 2006.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16585243

RESUMEN

On August 6, 2005, newspapers and other media outlets reported that Daryl Atkins had been determined by a Virginia jury not to be retarded and therefore was mentally competent to receive the death penalty. A judge immediately scheduled his execution for December. Atkins, of course, is the convicted murderer whose case three years earlier had led the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling, to declare that mentally retarded offenders are constitutionally exempt from the death penalty. While a bitter irony for Atkins, his family, and supporters, the Virginia jury's finding suggests that the practical effects of the Supreme Court's decision are less dramatic than many had anticipated. It shows that mere labels need not be determinative and that judges and juries as well as mental health experts called to assist them in capital cases can continue to work toward an individualized brand of justice.


Asunto(s)
Pena de Muerte , Competencia Mental/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Masculino , Personas con Discapacidades Mentales , Decisiones de la Corte Suprema , Virginia
4.
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law ; 34(1): 130; author reply 130-1, 2006.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-16585255
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