Guilt, shame, and embarrassment: similar or different emotions? A comparison between Italians and Americans.

Introduction: Guilt, shame, and embarrassment represent affective experiences with social implications and diverse self-relevant negative affect. While the distinction between these emotion terms has been extensively investigated, little is known about how they diverge and are related to each other and their crosscultural differences. Methods: Here, we used a community sample (N = 163) comprised of Americans and Italians and a scenario-based measure in which we asked participants to report the intensity of emotions that the story's main character would feel. The elements used to build the scenarios were based on a recent theoretical approach that proposes distinguishing cognitive, somatic, interoceptive, and behavioral ingredients to differentiate between these emotions. We hypothesized that these ingredients might effectively elicit the target emotions and that the main differences across these cultures would be associated with the emotion terms of shame/vergogna. Results: Our findings suggest that these defining elements are effective in evoking experiences of guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Moreover, we found that shame was equally elicited by the Shame and Guilt Scenarios only in the American sample, thus suggesting a proximity between shame and guilt in the American sample compared to the Italian's terms of vergogna and colpa. Discussion: These results suggest important implications for the psychology of moral emotions and highlight the importance of taking into account some cognitive factors, such as the quality of self-evaluation, the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self vs. the sense of perceived responsibility, and the different domains related to self-esteem.

Unhealthy mind in a healthy body: A criticism to eliminativism in psychopathology.

In this article we criticize the thesis "The diseases we treat are diseases of the brain". A first criticism is against the eliminativist perspective and in favor of a perspective that is still reductionist but emergentist and functionalist. In a second part, we try to answer the question "under which conditions can we consider this statement legitimate?". We argue that only those mental disorders whose neural substrate has clearly neuropathological characteristics, i.e., anomalies with respect to the laws of good neural functioning, can be considered "brain diseases." We propose that it is not sufficient to observe a simple difference between the brains of people with psychopathology, that is, with anomalies with respect to the laws of good psychological functioning, and that of people without psychopathology. Indeed, we believe it is a categorical error to postulate a neuropathology starting from a psychopathology. Finally, we summarize some research that shows how purely psychological interventions can reduce or eliminate the differences between the brains of people with or psychopathology and those of people without.

Trusting COVID-19 vaccines as individual and social goal.

Trust in vaccines and in the institutions responsible for their management is a key asset in the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. By means of a structured multi-scales survey based on the socio-cognitive model of trust, this study investigates the interplay of institutional trust, confidence in COVID-19 vaccines, information habits, personal motivations, and background beliefs on the pandemic in determining willingness to vaccinate in a sample of Italian respondents (N = 4096). We observe substantial trust in public institutions and a strong vaccination intention. Theory-driven structural equation analysis revealed what factors act as important predictors of willingness to vaccinate: trust in vaccine manufacturers (which in turn is supported by trust in regulators), collectivist goals, self-perceived knowledgeability, reliance on traditional media for information gathering, and trust in institutional and scientific sources. In contrast, vaccine hesitancy, while confined to a minority, is more prominent in less educated and less affluent respondents. These findings can inform institutional decisions on vaccine communication and vaccination campaigns.

All We Need Is Trust: How the COVID-19 Outbreak Reconfigured Trust in Italian Public Institutions.

The central focus of this research is the fast and crucial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on a crucial psychological, relational, and political construct: trust. We investigate how the consequences of the pandemic, in terms of healthcare, state intervention and impositions, and daily life and habits, have affected trust in public institutions in Italy, at the time when the contagion was rapidly spreading in the country (early March 2020). In this survey, addressed to 4260 Italian citizens, we analyzed and measured such impact, focusing on various aspects of trust. This attention to multiple dimensions of trust constitutes the key conceptual advantage of this research, since trust is a complex and layered construct, with its own internal dynamics. In particular, the analysis focuses on how citizens attribute trust to Public Authorities, in relation to the management of the health crisis: with regard to the measures and guidelines adopted, the purposes pursued, the motivations that determine them, their capacity for involvement, and their effectiveness for the containment of the virus itself. A pandemic creates a bilateral need for trust, both in Public Authorities (they have to rely on citizens' compliance and must try to promote and maintain their trust in order to be effective) and in citizens, since they need to feel that somebody can do something, can (has the power to) protect them, to act at the needed collective level. We are interested to explore how this need for trust affects the attributional process, regarding both attitudes and the corresponding decisions and actions. The most striking result of this survey is the very high level of institutional trust expressed by respondents: 75% of them trust Italian public authorities to be able to deal with the COVID-19 emergency. This is in sharp contrast with the relatively low levels of institutional trust characteristic of Italy, both historically and in recent surveys. Moreover, the survey allowed the discrimination of several potential predictors for trust, thus emphasizing factors that, during this crisis, are exhibiting an anomalous impact on trust.

The body talks: Sensorimotor communication and its brain and kinematic signatures.

Human communication is a traditional topic of research in many disciplines such as psychology, linguistics and philosophy, all of which mainly focused on language, gestures and deictics. However, these do not constitute the sole channels of communication, especially during online social interaction, where instead an additional critical role may be played by sensorimotor communication (SMC). SMC refers here to (often subtle) communicative signals embedded within pragmatic actions - for example, a soccer player carving his body movements in ways that inform a partner about his intention, or to feint an adversary; or the many ways we offer a glass of wine, rudely or politely. SMC is a natural form of communication that does not require any prior convention or any specific code. It amounts to the continuous and flexible exchange of bodily signals, with or without awareness, to enhance coordination success; and it is versatile, as sensorimotor signals can be embedded within every action. SMC is at the center of recent interest in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, human-robot interaction and experimental semiotics; yet, we still lack a coherent and comprehensive synthesis to account for its multifaceted nature. Some fundamental questions remain open, such as which interactive scenarios promote or do not promote SMC, what aspects of social interaction can be properly called communicative and which ones entail a mere transfer of information, and how many forms of SMC exist and what we know (or still don't know) about them from an empirical viewpoint. The present work brings together all these separate strands of research within a unified overarching, multidisciplinary framework for SMC, which combines evidence from kinematic studies of human-human interaction and computational modeling of social exchanges.

Words as social tools: Language, sociality and inner grounding in abstract concepts.

The paper introduces a new perspective on abstract concepts (e.g. "freedom") and their associate words representation, the Words As social Tools (WAT) view. Traditional theories conceptualize language as a way to index referents, a shortcut to access meaning, or a way to access meaning through words associations. WAT goes beyond these theories by identifying additional functions of words and language: words are tools helping us to perform actions and change the state of our social environment, and language is a means to improve our thought abilities, to control our behavior and plays a predictive role, helping us to form categories. Most importantly, WAT proposes that language and sociality - along with interoceptive and metacognitive processes - are key for the grounding of abstract concepts (ACs) that are more complex, variable, and more detached from perceptual and motor experience than concrete concepts (CCs). We highlight four tenets of WAT and discuss each of them in light of recent evidence: a. acquisition: compared to concrete concepts, the acquisition of abstract concepts relies more on social and linguistic inputs; b. brain representation: abstract concepts recruit more linguistic and social brain areas; c. mouth activation: due to the relevance of language for representing them, abstract concepts activate more the oral motor system; d. linguistic variability: abstract concepts are more affected by differences between spoken languages. We discuss evidence supporting these four tenets of WAT, and its advantages and limitations compared to other views on abstract concepts. Finally, we outline a conceptual proposal that specifies how internal models supporting the representation and processing of ACs can be grounded on interoceptive, metacognitive, social, and linguistic experience.

Reconsidering the Differences Between Shame and Guilt.

Although most researchers maintain that shame and guilt are distinct emotions, the debate on their differences is still open. We aim to show that some of the current distinctions between shame and guilt need to be redrawn, and their adaptive and social implications need to be revisited. We suggest the following distinguishing criteria: the kind of self-evaluation involved (inadequacy versus harmfulness); one's focus on the perceived discrepancy between actual and ideal self versus one's focus on the perceived responsibility for one's fault; and consequently the different domains of self-esteem involved. Although these criteria have been in part suggested or alluded to in the relevant literature, we use and integrate them with each other in a novel way. This allows to better distinguish between shame and guilt, as well as to account for their possible coexistence or the shift from one emotion to the other.

The challenge of abstract concepts.

concepts ("freedom") differ from concrete ones ("cat"), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable, and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor, and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favor of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts. (PsycINFO Database Record

In search of a principled theory of the 'value' of knowledge.

A theory of the Value/Utility of information and knowledge (K) is not really there. This would require a theory of the centrality of Goals in minds, and of the role of K relative to Goals and their dynamics. K value is a notion relative to Goal value. Inf/K is precisely a resource, a means and the value of means depends on the value of their possible functions and uses. The claim of this paper is that Ks have a Value and Utility, they can be more or less 'precious'; they have a cost and imply some risks; they can be not only useful but negative and dangerous. We also examine the 'quality' of this resource: its reliability; and its crucial role in goal processing: activating goals, abandoning, choosing, planning, formulating intentions, decide to act. 'Relevance theory', Information theory, Epistemic Utility theory, etc. are not enough for providing a theory of the Value/Utility of K. And also truthfulness is not 'the' Value of K. Even true information can be noxious for the subject.

For a science of layered mechanisms: beyond laws, statistics, and correlations.

Two general claims are made in this work. First, we need several different layers of "theory," in particular for understanding human behavior. These layers should concern: the cognitive (mental) representations and mechanisms; the neural underlying processes; the evolutionary history and adaptive functions of our cognition and behaviors; the emergent and complex social structures and dynamics, their relation and feedbacks on individual minds and behaviors, and the relationship between internal regulating goals and the external functions/roles of our conduct; the historical and cultural mechanisms shaping our minds and behaviors; the developmental paths. Second, we do not just need "predictions" and "laws" but also "explanations"; that is, we need to identify the mechanisms producing (here-and-now, or diachronically) a given phenomenon. "Laws" are not enough; they are simply descriptive and predictive; we need the "why" and "how." Correlations are not enough (and they are frequently misleading). We need computational models of the processes postulated in our theories.

Ascribing minds.

In this paper, I explain how we just "ascribe" "attribute" to social actors--in a fast and automatic way and without complex reasoning--mental representations on the basis of "scripts," "roles," role-signs, tool use and functions, categories and prejudices, and several heuristics; or by default. How scripts and roles must be filled in with the actors' mental attitudes. How social interaction systematically requires assumptions about the other's mind. How sometimes in the subject those mental attitudes are not only unconscious but actually implicit; just potential or tacit (non-activated), or just the non-intended or non-understood function of his behavior/role. However, what really matters is that we assume that those beliefs and goals are there, and we act "as if" it were so. I finally claim that this mechanism of mind ascription while reading the behavior or the signs of the roles and scripts is the basis of a fundamental form of communication: Behavioral Implicit Communication.

Thinking as the control of imagination: a conceptual framework for goal-directed systems.

This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line re-enactment of anticipatory mechanisms used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.

The symbol detachment problem.

In situated and embodied approaches it is commonly assumed that the dynamics of sensorimotor engagement between an adaptive agent and its environment are crucial in understanding natural cognition. This perspective permits to address the symbol grounding problem, since the aboutness of any mental state arising during agent-environment engagement is guaranteed by their continuous coupling. However, cognitive agents are also able to formulate representations that are detached from the current state of affairs, such as expectations and goals. Moreover, they can act on their representations before--or instead of--acting directly on the environment, for example building the plan of a bridge and not directly the bridge. On the basis of representations, actions such as planning, remembering or imagining are possible that are disengaged from the current sensorimotor cycle, and often functional to future-oriented conducts. A new problem thus has to be acknowledged, the symbol detachment problem: how and why do situated agents develop representations that are detached from their current sensorimotor interaction, but nevertheless preserve grounding and aboutness? How do cognitive agents progressively acquire a range of capabilities permitting them to deal not only with the current situation but also with alternative, in particular future states of affairs? How do they develop the capability of acting on their representations instead of acting directly on the world? In a theoretical and developmental perspective, we propose that anticipation plays a crucial role in the detachment process: anticipatory representations, originally detached from the sensorimotor cycle for the sake of action control, are successively exapted for bootstrapping increasingly complex cognitive capabilities.