Changes in self-reported cannabis use in the United States from 1979 to 2022.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Multiple countries are considering revising cannabis policies. This study aimed to measure long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States and compare them with alcohol use. DESIGN AND SETTING: Secondary analysis of United States general population survey data. PARTICIPANTS: The national surveys had a total of 1 641 041 participants across 27 surveys from 1979 to 2022. MEASUREMENTS: Rates of use reported to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health and its predecessors are described, as are trends in days of use reported. Four milepost years are contrasted: 1979 (first available data and end of relatively liberal policies of the 1970s), 1992 (end of 12 years of conservative Reagan-Bush era policies), 2008 (last year before the Justice Department signaled explicit federal non-interference with state-level legalizations) and 2022 (most recent data available). FINDINGS: Reported cannabis use declined to a nadir in 1992, with partial recovery through 2008, and substantial increases since then, particularly for measures of more intensive use. Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4-5 days in the past month, versus 15-16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%). CONCLUSIONS: Long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States parallel corresponding changes in cannabis policy, with declines during periods of greater restriction and growth during periods of policy liberalization. A growing share of cannabis consumers report daily or near daily use, and their numbers now exceed the number of daily and near daily drinkers.

The Baltic and Nordic responses to the first Taliban poppy ban: Implications for Europe & synthetic opioids today.

The 2000-2001 and the 2022-2023 Taliban opium bans were and could be two of the largest ever disruptions to a major illegal drug market. To help understand potential implications of the current ban for Europe, this paper analyzes how opioid markets in seven Baltic and Nordic countries responded to the earlier ban, using literature review, key informant interviews, and secondary data analysis. The seven nations' markets responded in diverse ways, including rebounding with the same drug (heroin in Norway), substitution to a more potent opioid (fentanyl replacing heroin in Estonia), and substitution to one with lower risk of overdose (buprenorphine replacing heroin in Finland). The responses were not instantaneous, but rather evolved, sometimes over several years. This variety suggests that it can be hard to predict how drug markets will respond to disruptions, but two extreme views can be challenged. It would be naive to imagine that drug markets will not adapt to shocks, but also unduly nihilistic to presume that they will always just bounce back with no lasting effects. Substitution to another way of meeting demand is possible, but that does not always negate fully the benefits of disrupting the original market. Nonetheless, there is historical precedent for a European country's opioid market switching to synthetic opioids when heroin supplies were disrupted. Given how much that switch has increased overdose rates in Canada and the United States, that is a serious concern for Europe at present. A period of reduced opioid supply may be a particularly propitious time to expand treatment services (as Norway did in the early 2000s).

Modeling cartel size to inform violence reduction in Mexico.

Estimating stocks and flows is an innovative first step.

America's Opioid Ecosystem: How Leveraging System Interactions Can Help Curb Addiction, Overdose, and Other Harms.

Opioids play an outsized role in America's drug problems, but they also play a critically important role in medicine. Thus, they deserve special attention. Illegally manufactured opioids (such as fentanyl) are involved in a majority of U.S. drug overdoses, but the problems are broader and deeper than drug fatalities. Depending on the drugs involved, there can be myriad physical and mental health consequences associated with having a substance use disorder. And it is not just those using drugs who suffer. Substance use and related behaviors can significantly affect individuals' families, friends, employers, and wider communities. Efforts to address problems related to opioids are insufficient and sometimes contradictory. Researchers provide a nuanced assessment of America's opioid ecosystem, highlighting how leveraging system interactions can reduce addiction, overdose, suffering, and other harms. At the core of the opioid ecosystem are the individuals who use opioids and their families. Researchers also include detail on ten major components of the opioid ecosystem: substance use disorder treatment, harm reduction, medical care, the criminal legal system, illegal supply and supply control, first responders, the child welfare system, income support and homeless services, employment, and education. The primary audience for this study is policymakers, but it should also be useful for foundations looking for opportunities to create change that have often been overlooked. This study can help researchers better consider the full consequences of policy changes and help members of the media identify the dynamics of interactions that deserve more attention.

Changing dynamics of drug overdoses in the United Kingdom: An attempt to replicate the Jalal et al. findings of steady exponential growth.

BACKGROUND: Jalal et al. discovered that between 1979 and 2020 total rates and counts of fatal drug overdoses in the United States exhibited exponential growth at a very steady rate even though deaths from individual drugs did not. That is a startling result because it means that the different drugs are in effect "taking turns", with one growing faster just as another drug's death rate growth ebbs. That raises the question of whether this steadiness in the all-drug death rates is in some sense just a coincidence peculiar to the United States or whether it might reflect some more general phenomenon and so manifest in other countries. METHODS: We fit the same model used by Jalal et al. to data on drug-related death rates for the countries of the United Kingdom. RESULTS: The main finding is largely a failure to replicate the United States result. Simple graphical display of the trends and a number of statistical measures show that the growth in the United Kingdom was not only slower than in the United States, it was also less steady, with the exception of Northern Ireland. CONCLUSIONS: Steady exponential growth in the all-drugs mortality rate may be a phenomenon specific to certain contexts. It remains an open question whether the explanation of steady exponential growth in the United States and Northern Ireland relates to demand and supply mechanisms, to social and political conditions, or to coincidence.

When prohibition works: Comparing fireworks and cannabis regulations, markets, and harms.

BACKGROUND: Nations wrestle with whether to prohibit products that can harm consumers and third parties but whose prohibition creates illegal markets. For example, cannabis is banned in most of the world, but supply for non-medical use has been legalized in Uruguay, Canada, and much of the United States and possession restrictions have been liberalized in other countries. Likewise, supply and possession of fireworks have been subject to varying degrees of prohibition in multiple countries, with those bans prompting significant evasion. METHODS: Current and past history of fireworks regulations, sales, and harms are reviewed and contrasted with those for cannabis. The focus is on the United States, but literature from other countries is incorporated when possible and appropriate. This extends the insightful literature comparing drugs to other vices (such as gambling and prostitution) by comparing a drug to a risky pleasure that is not seen as a vice but which has been subject to prohibition. RESULTS: There are many parallels between fireworks and cannabis in legal approaches, harms to "users", harms to others, and other externalities. In the U.S. the timing of prohibitions were similar, with prohibitions on fireworks being imposed a little later and repealed a little sooner. Internationally, the countries that are strictest with fireworks are not always those that are strictest with drugs. By some measures, harms are of roughly similar magnitude. During the last years of U.S. cannabis prohibition, there were about 10 emergency department (ED) events per million dollars spent on both fireworks and illegal cannabis, but fireworks generated very roughly three times as many ED events per hour of use/enjoyment. There are also differences, e.g., punishments were less harsh for violating fireworks prohibitions, fireworks consumption is heavily concentrated in just a few days or weeks per year, and illegal distribution is primarily of diverted legal products, not of illegally produced materials. CONCLUSIONS: The absence of hysteria over fireworks problems and policies suggests that societies can address complex tradeoffs involving risky pleasures without excessive acrimony or divisiveness when that product or activity is not construed as a vice. However, the conflicted and time-varying history of fireworks bans also show that difficulty balancing freedoms and pleasure with harms to users and others is not restricted to drugs or other vices. Use-related harms fell when fireworks were banned and rose when those bans were repealed, so fireworks prohibitions can be seen as "working" from a public health perspective, but not well enough for bans to be employed in all times or places.

How much illegally manufactured fentanyl could the U.S. be consuming?

The spread of illegally manufactured opioids, including fentanyl, has brought unprecedented levels of drug overdose deaths in North America. In some markets, illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) is essentially displacing heroin, not just being used to adulterate it. It is not possible at this time to provide an accurate point estimate of the amount of IMF consumed in the United States. Yet for various purposes (e.g. assessing changes in production levels and the appropriate role for various supply reduction efforts), it is important to have a sense of scale. This article provides guidance through two thought experiments that provide a hypothetical upper bound on U.S. consumption. The first considers a scenario in which IMF replaces heroin in all illegal opioid markets. The second starts with the number of individuals with an opioid use disorder and considers what total consumption would be if IMF was the only opioid they consumed. Both calculations suggest it is unlikely that the annual consumption of IMF in 2021 could have been more than single digit pure metric tons. For comparison, the most recent best estimates of the amount of cocaine and heroin consumed in the U.S. are 145 and 47 pure metric tons, respectively. The article also raises questions about the limitations of using traditional equianalgesic morphine equivalent dose conversions to estimate the total market consumption of IMF.

Rating the comparative efficacy of state-level cannabis policies on recreational cannabis markets in the United States.

BACKGROUND: Cannabis policy is developing faster than empirical evidence about policy effects. With a panel of experts in substance use policy development and research, we identified key cannabis policies and their provisions enacted by U.S. states; rated their theoretical efficacy in a restrictive form for reducing problematic use and impaired driving in the context of a recreational cannabis market as judged by experts; and rated the strength of evidence for each policy. METHODS: Using a modified Delphi approach, 9 panelists rated the comparative efficacy of 18 state cannabis policies for reducing youth use of cannabis, excessive cannabis use among the general population, and cannabis-impaired driving. Each outcome was rated separately using a Likert scale, and panelists also rated the strength of evidence supporting each efficacy rating. Investigators provided descriptions of each policy so that the nine panelists had similar conceptions of each policy. RESULTS: State monopoly (state owns all production, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail operations) was rated as the most effective policy for all three outcome areas. Restrictions on retail physical availability, taxes, retail price restrictions, and retail operations restrictions were also highly rated for all three outcomes. Policies regulating cannabis businesses and products were judged more effective than policies targeting consumer use and behavior. Panelists reported there was little or no direct evidence from the cannabis policy literature for most of the included policies. CONCLUSION: These ratings can facilitate research as well as policy-making decisions. A relatively small number of policies were judged to be highly effective across all three domains, indicating that for the most part adult excessive use, youth use, and impaired driving can all be reduced with the same set of policies; these policies tended to target the behaviors of businesses rather than consumers. The low levels of direct evidence available to inform policy ratings, as reported by the policy panelists, makes clear the need for ongoing and sustained cannabis policy research.

Rapid changes in illegally manufactured fentanyl products and prices in the United States.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Synthetic opioids, mostly illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF), were mentioned in 60% of United States (US) drug overdose deaths in 2020, with dramatic variation across states that mirrors variation in IMF supply. However, little is known about IMF markets in the United States and how they are changing. Researchers have previously used data from undercover cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine purchases and seizures to examine how their use and related harms respond to changes in price and availability. This analysis used US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data to address two questions: (i) "To what extent does IMF supply vary over time and geography?" and (ii) "What has happened to the purity-adjusted price of IMF?" METHODS: We developed descriptive statistics and visualizations using data from 66 713 observations mentioning IMF and/or heroin from the DEA's System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE; now STARLIMS) from 2013 to 2021. Price regressions were estimated with city-level fixed effects examining IMF-only powder observations with purity and price information at the low-to-medium wholesale level (>1 g to ≤100 g; n = 964). RESULTS: From 2013 to 2021, the share of heroin and/or IMF observations mentioning IMF grew from near zero to more than two-thirds. The share of heroin observations also containing IMF grew from <1% to ~40%. There is important geographic variation: in California, most IMF seizures involved counterfeit tablets, whereas New York and Massachusetts largely involved powder formulation. The median price per pure gram of IMF powder sold at the >10 to ≤100 g level fell by more than 50% from 2016 to 2021; regression analyses suggested an average annual decline of 17% (P < 0.001). However, this price decline appears to have been driven by observations from the Northeast. CONCLUSIONS: Since 2013, the illegally manufactured fentanyl problem in the United States has become more deadly and more diverse.

How much demand for money laundering services does drug selling create? Identifying the key parameters.

BACKGROUND: The illegal drug trade is often, and plausibly, asserted to be the largest illegal market, globally and in many individual countries. It is also claimed that a large share of its revenues is laundered, though there are no estimates of that volume. We provide rough estimates of that proportion and its primary determinants. METHODS AND DATA: This paper presents a model of a multi-tiered drug distribution network that is parameterized with data based on one typical, well-studied case, namely British Colombia's market for illegal opioids, supplemented by a corresponding economic interpretation of what determines the share of drug trade revenues that need to be laundered. Sensitivity with respect to key parameters is analyzed. FINDINGS: We suggest that less than half and perhaps no more than a quarter of revenues from established drug markets need laundering. Key parameters governing this proportion include the price mark-up across distribution levels, transaction volumes at each market level, and the capacity of market participants to spend cash on daily living expenses. CONCLUSION: This model permits estimation of the scale of money laundering associated with a particular drug market. It suggests that there are limits on money laundering controls as a way of reducing drug supply - although money laundering investigations may still be an effective way to identify and investigate high-level drug traffickers.

The International Cannabis Toolkit (iCannToolkit): a multidisciplinary expert consensus on minimum standards for measuring cannabis use.

BACKGROUND: The lack of an agreed international minimum approach to measuring cannabis use hinders the integration of multidisciplinary evidence on the psychosocial, neurocognitive, clinical and public health consequences of cannabis use. METHODS: A group of 25 international expert cannabis researchers convened to discuss a multidisciplinary framework for minimum standards to measure cannabis use globally in diverse settings. RESULTS: The expert-based consensus agreed upon a three-layered hierarchical framework. Each layer-universal measures, detailed self-report and biological measures-reflected different research priorities and minimum standards, costs and ease of implementation. Additional work is needed to develop valid and precise assessments. CONCLUSIONS: Consistent use of the proposed framework across research, public health, clinical practice and medical settings would facilitate harmonisation of international evidence on cannabis consumption, related harms and approaches to their mitigation.

Community perspectives on supervised consumption sites: Insights from four U.S. counties deeply affected by opioids.

BACKGROUND: To address the overdose crisis in the United States, expert groups have been nearly unanimous in calls for increasing access to evidence-based treatment and overdose reversal drugs. In some places there have also been calls for implementing supervised consumption sites (SCSs). Some cities-primarily in coastal urban areas-have explored the feasibility and acceptability of introducing them. However, the perspectives of community stakeholders from more inland and rural areas that have also been hard hit by opioids are largely missing from the literature. METHODS: To examine community attitudes about implementing SCSs for people who use opioids (PWUO) in areas with acute opioid problems, the research team conducted in-depth interviews and focus groups in four counties: Ashtabula and Cuyahoga Counties in Ohio, and Carroll and Hillsborough Counties in New Hampshire, two states with high rates of opioid overdose. Participants were policy, treatment, and criminal justice professionals, frontline harm reduction and service providers, and PWUO. RESULTS: Key informants noted benefits to SCSs, but also perceived potential drawbacks such as that they may enable opioid use, and potential practical barriers, including lack of desire among PWUO to travel to an SCS after purchasing opioids and fear of arrest. Key informants generally believed their communities likely would not currently accept SCSs due to cultural, resource, and practical barriers. They viewed publication of evidence on SCSs and community education as essential for fostering acceptance. CONCLUSIONS: Despite cultural and other barriers, implementation of SCSs may be more feasible in urban communities with existing (and perhaps more long-standing) harm reduction programs, greater treatment resources, and adequate transportation, particularly if there is strong evidence to support them.

Heroin use cannot be measured adequately with a general population survey.

BACKGROUND: Globally, heroin and other opioids account for more than half of deaths and years-of-life-lost due to drug use and comprise one of the four major markets for illegal drugs. Having sound estimates of the number of problematic heroin users is fundamental to formulating sound health and criminal justice policies. Researchers and policymakers rely heavily upon general population surveys (GPS), such as the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), to estimate heroin use, without confronting their limitations. GPS-based estimates are also ubiquitous for cocaine and methamphetamine, so insights pertaining to GPS for estimating heroin use are also relevant for those drug markets. ANALYSIS: Four sources of potential errors in NSDUH are assessed: selective non-response, small sample size, sampling frame omissions and under-reporting. An alternative estimate drawing on a variety of sources including a survey of adult male arrestees is presented and explained. Other approaches to prevalence estimation are discussed. FINDINGS: Under-reporting and selective non-response in NSDUH are likely to lead to substantial underestimation. Small sample size leads to imprecise estimates and erratic year-to-year fluctuations. The alternative estimate provides credible evidence that NSDUH underestimates the number of frequent heroin users by at least three-quarters and perhaps much more. IMPLICATIONS: GPS, even those as strong as NSDUH, are doomed by their nature to estimate poorly a rare and stigmatized behavior concentrated in a hard-to-track population. Although many European nations avoid reliance upon these surveys, many others follow the US model. Better estimation requires models that draw upon a variety of data sources, including GPS, to provide credible estimates. Recent methodological developments in selected countries can provide guidance. Journals should require researchers to critically assess the soundness of GPS estimates for any stigmatized drug-related behaviors with low prevalence rates.