The Implementation of CDC COVID-19 Recommendations for Testing, Isolation, Quarantine and Movement at Emergency Intake Sites of Unaccompanied Children in the United States, April 1-May 31, 2021.

In March 2021, Emergency Intake Sites (EIS) were created to address capacity shortfalls during a surge of Unaccompanied Children at the Mexico-United States land border. The COVID-19 Zone Plan (ZP) was developed to decrease COVID-19 transmission. COVID-19 cumulative percent (%) positivity was analyzed to evaluate the impact of the ZP, venue type and bed capacity across EIS from April 1-May 31, 2021. Results: Of 11 EIS sites analyzed, 54% implemented the recommended ZP. The overall % positivity was 2.47% (95% CI 2.39-2.55). The % positivity at EIS with the ZP, 1.83% (95% CI 1.71-1.95), was lower than that at EIS without the ZP, 2.83%, ( 95% CI 2.72-2.93), and showed a lower 7-day moving average of % positivity. Conclusion: Results showed a possible effect of the ZP on % positivity when controlling for venue type and bed capacity in a specific EIS group comparison, indicating that all three variables could have had effect on % positivity. They also showed that smaller intake facilities may be recommendable during public health emergencies.

Effect of Predeparture Testing on Postarrival SARS-CoV-2-Positive Test Results Among International Travelers - CDC Traveler-Based Genomic Surveillance Program, Four U.S. Airports, March-September 2022.

Beginning December 6, 2021, all international air passengers boarding flights to the United States were required to show either a negative result from a SARS-CoV-2 viral test taken ≤1 day before departure or proof of recovery from COVID-19 within the preceding 90 days (1). As of June 12, 2022, predeparture testing was no longer mandatory but remained recommended by CDC (2,3). Various modeling studies have estimated that predeparture testing the day before or the day of air travel reduces transmission or importation of SARS-CoV-2 by 31%-76% (4-7). Postarrival SARS-CoV-2 pooled testing data from CDC's Traveler-based Genomic Surveillance program were used to compare SARS-CoV-2 test results among volunteer travelers arriving at four U.S. airports during two 12-week periods: March 20-June 11, 2022, when predeparture testing was required, and June 12-September 3, 2022, when predeparture testing was not required. In a multivariable logistic regression model, pooled nasal swab specimens collected during March 20-June 11 were 52% less likely to be positive for SARS-CoV-2 than were those collected during June 12-September 3, after adjusting for COVID-19 incidence in the flight's country of origin, sample pool size, and collection airport (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 0.48, 95% CI = 0.39-0.58) (p<0.001). These findings support predeparture testing as a tool for reducing travel-associated SARS-CoV-2 transmission and provide important real-world evidence that can guide decisions for future outbreaks and pandemics.

Using spatial and population mobility models to inform outbreak response approaches in the Ebola affected area, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2018-2020.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) 10th known Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak occurred between August 1, 2018 and June 25, 2020, and was the largest EVD outbreak in the country's history. During this outbreak, the DRC Ministry of Health initiated traveller health screening at points of control (POC, locations not on the border) and points of entry (POE) to minimize disease translocation via ground and air travel. We sought to develop a model-based approach that could be applied in future outbreaks to inform decisions for optimizing POC and POE placement, and allocation of resources more broadly, to mitigate the risk of disease translocation associated with ground-level population mobility. We applied a parameter-free mobility model, the radiation model, to estimate likelihood of ground travel between selected origin locations (including Beni, DRC) and surrounding population centres, based on population size and drive-time. We then performed a road network route analysis and included estimated population movement results to calculate the proportionate volume of travellers who would move along each road segment; this reflects the proportion of travellers that could be screened at a POC or POE. For Beni, the road segments estimated to have the highest proportion of travellers that could be screened were part of routes into Uganda and Rwanda. Conversely, road segments that were part of routes to other population centres within the DRC were estimated to have relatively lower proportions. We observed a posteriori that, in many instances, our results aligned with locations that were selected for actual POC or POE placement through more time-consuming methods. This study has demonstrated that mobility models and simple spatial techniques can help identify potential locations for health screening at newly placed POC or existing POE during public health emergencies based on expected movement patterns. Importantly, we have provided methods to estimate the proportionate volume of travellers that POC or POE screening measures would assess based on their location. This is critical information in outbreak situations when timely decisions must be made to implement public health interventions that reach the most individuals across a network.

Early Detection of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Variants Using Traveler-based Genomic Surveillance at 4 US Airports, September 2021-January 2022.

We enrolled arriving international air travelers in a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 genomic surveillance program. We used molecular testing of pooled nasal swabs and sequenced positive samples for sublineage. Traveler-based surveillance provided early-warning variant detection, reporting the first US Omicron BA.2 and BA.3 in North America.

Cruise Ship Travel in the Era of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Summary of Outbreaks and a Model of Public Health Interventions.

BACKGROUND: Cruise travel contributed to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission when there were relatively few cases in the United States. By 14 March 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a No Sail Order suspending US cruise operations; the last US passenger ship docked on 16 April. METHODS: We analyzed SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on cruises in US waters or carrying US citizens and used regression models to compare voyage characteristics. We used compartmental models to simulate the potential impact of 4 interventions (screening for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) symptoms; viral testing on 2 days and isolation of positive persons; reduction of passengers by 40%, crew by 20%, and reducing port visits to 1) for 7-day and 14-day voyages. RESULTS: During 19 January to 16 April 2020, 89 voyages on 70 ships had known SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks; 16 ships had recurrent outbreaks. There were 1669 reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections and 29 confirmed deaths. Longer voyages were associated with more cases (adjusted incidence rate ratio, 1.10, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.03-1.17, P < .003). Mathematical models showed that 7-day voyages had about 70% fewer cases than 14-day voyages. On 7-day voyages, the most effective interventions were reducing the number of individuals onboard (43.3% reduction in total infections) and testing passengers and crew (42% reduction in total infections). All four interventions reduced transmission by 80.1%, but no single intervention or combination eliminated transmission. Results were similar for 14-day voyages. CONCLUSIONS: SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on cruises were common during January-April 2020. Despite all interventions modeled, cruise travel still poses a significant SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk.

Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis in U.S.-Bound Immigrants and Refugees.

Rationale: Approximately two-thirds of new cases of tuberculosis (TB) in the United States are among non-U.S.-born persons. Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees has substantially reduced the importation of TB into the United States, but it is unclear to what extent this program prevents the importation of multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB). Objectives: To study the epidemiology of MDR-TB in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees and to evaluate the effect of culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees on reducing the importation of MDR-TB into the United States. Methods: We analyzed data of immigrants and refugees who completed overseas treatment for culture-positive TB during 2015-2019. We also compared mean annual number of MDR-TB cases in non-U.S.-born persons within 1 year of arrival in the United States between 1996-2006 (when overseas screening followed a smear-based algorithm) and 2014-2019 (after full implementation of a culture-based algorithm). Results: Of 3,300 culture-positive TB cases identified by culture-based overseas TB screening in immigrants and refugees during 2015-2019, 122 (3.7%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 3.1-4.1) had MDR-TB, 20 (0.6%; 95% CI, 0.3-0.9) had rifampicin-resistant TB, 382 (11.6%; 95% CI, 10.5-12.7) had isoniazid-resistant TB, and 2,776 (84.1%; 95% CI, 82.9-85.4) had rifampicin- and isoniazid-susceptible TB. None were diagnosed with extensively drug-resistant TB. All 3,300 persons with culture-positive TB completed treatment overseas; of 70 and 11 persons who were treated overseas for MDR-TB and rifampicin-resistant TB, respectively, none were diagnosed with TB disease at postarrival evaluation in the United States. Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees prevented 24.4 MDR-TB cases per year from arriving in the United States, 18.2 cases more than smear-based overseas TB screening. The mean annual number of MDR-TB cases among non-U.S.-born persons within 1 year of arrival in the United States decreased from 34.6 cases in 1996-2006 to 19.5 cases in 2014-2019 (difference of 15.1; P < 0.001). Conclusions: Culture-based overseas TB screening in U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees substantially reduced the importation of MDR-TB into the United States.

Reducing travel-related SARS-CoV-2 transmission with layered mitigation measures: symptom monitoring, quarantine, and testing.

BACKGROUND: Balancing the control of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with the resumption of travel is a global priority. Current recommendations include mitigation measures before, during, and after travel. Pre- and post-travel strategies including symptom monitoring, antigen or nucleic acid amplification testing, and quarantine can be combined in multiple ways considering different trade-offs in feasibility, adherence, effectiveness, cost, and adverse consequences. METHODS: We used a mathematical model to analyze the expected effectiveness of symptom monitoring, testing, and quarantine under different estimates of the infectious period, test-positivity relative to time of infection, and test sensitivity to reduce the risk of transmission from infected travelers during and after travel. RESULTS: If infection occurs 0-7 days prior to travel, immediate isolation following symptom onset prior to or during travel reduces risk of transmission while traveling by 30-35%. Pre-departure testing can further reduce risk, with testing closer to the time of travel being optimal even if test sensitivity is lower than an earlier test. For example, testing on the day of departure can reduce risk while traveling by 44-72%. For transmission risk after travel with infection time up to 7 days prior to arrival at the destination, isolation based on symptom monitoring reduced introduction risk at the destination by 42-56%. A 14-day quarantine after arrival, without symptom monitoring or testing, can reduce post-travel risk by 96-100% on its own. However, a shorter quarantine of 7 days combined with symptom monitoring and a test on day 5-6 after arrival is also effective (97--100%) at reducing introduction risk and is less burdensome, which may improve adherence. CONCLUSIONS: Quarantine is an effective measure to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission risk from travelers and can be enhanced by the addition of symptom monitoring and testing. Optimal test timing depends on the effectiveness of quarantine: with low adherence or no quarantine, optimal test timing is close to the time of arrival; with effective quarantine, testing a few days later optimizes sensitivity to detect those infected immediately before or while traveling. These measures can complement recommendations such as social distancing, using masks, and hand hygiene, to further reduce risk during and after travel.

Modelling airport catchment areas to anticipate the spread of infectious diseases across land and air travel.

Air travel is an increasingly important conduit for the worldwide spread of infectious diseases. However, methods to identify which airports an individual may use to initiate travel, or where an individual may travel to upon arrival at an airport is not well studied. This knowledge gap can be addressed by estimating airport catchment areas: the geographic extent from which the airport derives most of its patronage. While airport catchment areas can provide a simple decision-support tool to help delineate the spatial extent of infectious disease spread at a local scale, observed data for airport catchment areas are rarely made publicly available. Therefore, we evaluated a probabilistic choice behavior model, the Huff model, as a potential methodology to estimate airport catchment areas in the United States in data-limited scenarios. We explored the impact of varying input parameters to the Huff model on estimated airport catchment areas: distance decay exponent, distance cut-off, and measures of airport attractiveness. We compared Huff model catchment area patterns for Miami International Airport (MIA) and Harrisburg International Airport (MDT). We specifically compared our model output to observed data sampled for MDT to align model parameters with an established, observed catchment area. Airport catchment areas derived using the Huff model were highly sensitive to changes in model parameters. We observed that a distance decay exponent of 2 and a distance cut-off of 500 km represented the most realistic spatial extent and heterogeneity of the MIA catchment area. When these parameters were applied to MDT, the Huff model produced similar spatial patterns to the observed MDT catchment area. Finally, our evaluation of airport attractiveness showed that travel volume to the specific international destinations of interest for infectious disease importation risks (i.e., Brazil) had little impact on the predicted choice of airport when compared to all international travel. Our work is a proof of concept for use of the Huff model to estimate airport catchment areas as a generalizable decision-support tool in data-limited scenarios. While our work represents an initial examination of the Huff model as a method to approximate airport catchment areas, an essential next step is to conduct a quantitative calibration and validation of the model based on multiple airports, possibly leveraging local human mobility data such as call detail records or online social network data collected from mobile devices. Ultimately, we demonstrate how the Huff model could be potentially helpful to improve the precision of early warning systems that anticipate infectious disease spread, or to incorporate when local public health decision makers need to identify where to mobilize screening infrastructure or containment strategies at a local level.

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Americans Aboard the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship.

BACKGROUND: The Diamond Princess cruise ship was the site of a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Of 437 Americans and their travel companions on the ship, 114 (26%) tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). METHODS: We interviewed 229 American passengers and crew after disembarkation following a ship-based quarantine to identify risk factors for infection and characterize transmission onboard the ship. RESULTS: The attack rate for passengers in single-person cabins or without infected cabinmates was 18% (58/329), compared with 63% (27/43) for those sharing a cabin with an asymptomatic infected cabinmate, and 81% (25/31) for those with a symptomatic infected cabinmate. Whole genome sequences from specimens from passengers who shared cabins clustered together. Of 66 SARS-CoV-2-positive American travelers with complete symptom information, 14 (21%) were asymptomatic while on the ship. Among SARS-CoV-2-positive Americans, 10 (9%) required intensive care, of whom 7 were ≥70 years. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings highlight the high risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission on cruise ships. High rates of SARS-CoV-2 positivity in cabinmates of individuals with asymptomatic infections suggest that triage by symptom status in shared quarters is insufficient to halt transmission. A high rate of intensive care unit admission among older individuals complicates the prospect of future cruise travel during the pandemic, given typical cruise passenger demographics. The magnitude and severe outcomes of this outbreak were major factors contributing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's decision to halt cruise ship travel in US waters in March 2020.

An immunization program for US-bound refugees: Development, challenges, and opportunities 2012-present.

BACKGROUND: US-bound refugees undergo required health assessments overseas to identify and treat communicable diseases of public health significance-such as pulmonary tuberculosis-before migration. Immunizations are not required, leaving refugees at risk for vaccine-preventable diseases. In response, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the US Department of State developed and co-funded a global immunization program for US-bound refugees, implemented in 2012 in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration. METHODS: We describe the Vaccination Program for US-bound Refugees, including vaccination schedule development, program implementation and procedures, and responses to challenges. We estimate 2019 immunization coverage rates using the number of age-eligible refugees who received ≥1 dose of measles-containing vaccine during overseas health assessment, and calculated hepatitis B infection prevalence using hepatitis B surface antigen testing results. We report descriptive data on adverse events following immunization. RESULTS: By September 2019, the program was active in >80 countries on five continents. Nearly 320,000 examined refugees had ≥1 documented vaccine doses since program inception. During federal fiscal year 2019, 95% of arriving refugees had ≥1 documented measles-containing vaccine. The program's immunization schedule included eleven vaccines preventing fourteen diseases. In 2015-2019, only two vaccine preventable disease-associated refugee group travel cancellations occurred, compared to 2-8 cancellations annually prior to program initiation. To maintain uniform standards, dedicated staff and program-specific protocols for vaccination and monitoring were introduced. CONCLUSIONS: An overseas immunization program was successfully implemented for US-bound refugees. Due to reductions in refugee movement cancellation, lower cost of immunization overseas, and likely reductions in vaccine preventable disease-associated morbidity, we anticipate significant cost savings. Although maintaining uniform standards across diverse settings is challenging, solutions such as introduction of dedicated staff, protocol development, and ongoing technical support have ensured program cohesion, continuity, and advancement. Lessons learned can benefit similar programs implemented in the migration setting.

Cost effectiveness analysis of implementing tuberculosis screening among applicants for non-immigrant U.S. work visas.

BACKGROUND: While persons who receive immigrant and refugee visas are screened for active tuberculosis before admission into the United States, nonimmigrant visa applicants (NIVs) are not routinely screened and may enter the United States with infectious tuberculosis. OBJECTIVES: We evaluated the costs and benefits of expanding pre-departure tuberculosis screening requirements to a subset of NIVs who arrive from a moderate (Mexico) or high (India) incidence tuberculosis country with temporary work visas. METHODS: We developed a decision tree model to evaluate the program costs and estimate the numbers of active tuberculosis cases that may be diagnosed in the United States in two scenarios: 1) "Screening": screening and treatment for tuberculosis among NIVs in their home country with recommended U.S. follow-up for NIVs at elevated risk of active tuberculosis; and, 2) "No Screening" in their home country so that cases would be diagnosed passively and treatment occurs after entry into the United States. Costs were assessed from multiple perspectives, including multinational and U.S.-only perspectives. RESULTS: Under "Screening" versus "No Screening", an estimated 179 active tuberculosis cases and 119 hospitalizations would be averted in the United States annually via predeparture treatment. From the U.S.-only perspective, this program would result in annual net cost savings of about $3.75 million. However, rom the multinational perspective, the screening program would cost $151,388 per U.S. case averted for Indian NIVs and $221,088 per U.S. case averted for Mexican NIVs. CONCLUSION: From the U.S.-only perspective, the screening program would result in substantial cost savings in the form of reduced treatment and hospitalization costs. NIVs would incur increased pre-departure screening and treatment costs.

Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17-September 13, 2020.

In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Prevalence, Seroprevalence, and Exposure among Evacuees from Wuhan, China, 2020.

To determine prevalence of, seroprevalence of, and potential exposure to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among a cohort of evacuees returning to the United States from Wuhan, China, in January 2020, we conducted a cross-sectional study of quarantined evacuees from 1 repatriation flight. Overall, 193 of 195 evacuees completed exposure surveys and submitted upper respiratory or serum specimens or both at arrival in the United States. Nearly all evacuees had taken preventive measures to limit potential exposure while in Wuhan, and none had detectable SARS-CoV-2 in upper respiratory tract specimens, suggesting the absence of asymptomatic respiratory shedding among this group at the time of testing. Evidence of antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 was detected in 1 evacuee, who reported experiencing no symptoms or high-risk exposures in the previous 2 months. These findings demonstrated that this group of evacuees posed a low risk of introducing SARS-CoV-2 to the United States.

Tuberculosis among Newly Arrived Immigrants and Refugees in the United States.

Rationale: U.S. health departments routinely conduct post-arrival evaluation of immigrants and refugees at risk for tuberculosis (TB), but this important intervention has not been thoroughly studied.Objectives: To assess outcomes of the post-arrival evaluation intervention.Methods: We categorized at-risk immigrants and refugees as having had recent completion of treatment for pulmonary TB disease overseas (including in Mexico and Canada); as having suspected TB disease (chest radiograph/clinical symptoms suggestive of TB) but negative culture results overseas; or as having latent TB infection (LTBI) diagnosed overseas. Among 2.1 million U.S.-bound immigrants and refugees screened for TB overseas during 2013-2016, 90,737 were identified as at risk for TB. We analyzed a national data set of these at-risk immigrants and refugees and calculated rates of TB disease for those who completed post-arrival evaluation.Results: Among 4,225 persons with recent completion of treatment for pulmonary TB disease overseas, 3,005 (71.1%) completed post-arrival evaluation within 1 year of arrival; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 22 (732 cases/100,000 persons), including 4 sputum culture-positive cases (133 cases/100,000 persons), 13 sputum culture-negative cases (433 cases/100,000 persons), and 5 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (166 cases/100,000 persons). Among 55,938 with suspected TB disease but negative culture results overseas, 37,089 (66.3%) completed post-arrival evaluation; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 597 (1,610 cases/100,000 persons), including 262 sputum culture-positive cases (706 cases/100,000 persons), 281 sputum culture-negative cases (758 cases/100,000 persons), and 54 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (146 cases/100,000 persons). Among 30,574 with LTBI diagnosed overseas, 18,466 (60.4%) completed post-arrival evaluation; of these, TB disease was diagnosed in 48 (260 cases/100,000 persons), including 11 sputum culture-positive cases (60 cases/100,000 persons), 22 sputum culture-negative cases (119 cases/100,000 persons), and 15 cases with no reported sputum-culture results (81 cases/100,000 persons). Of 21,714 persons for whom treatment for LTBI was recommended at post-arrival evaluation, 14,977 (69.0%) initiated treatment and 8,695 (40.0%) completed treatment.Conclusions: Post-arrival evaluation of at-risk immigrants and refugees can be highly effective. To optimize the yield and impact of this intervention, strategies are needed to improve completion rates of post-arrival evaluation and treatment for LTBI.

Public Health Responses to COVID-19 Outbreaks on Cruise Ships - Worldwide, February-March 2020.

An estimated 30 million passengers are transported on 272 cruise ships worldwide each year* (1). Cruise ships bring diverse populations into proximity for many days, facilitating transmission of respiratory illness (2). SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and has since spread worldwide to at least 187 countries and territories. Widespread COVID-19 transmission on cruise ships has been reported as well (3). Passengers on certain cruise ship voyages might be aged ≥65 years, which places them at greater risk for severe consequences of SARS-CoV-2 infection (4). During February-March 2020, COVID-19 outbreaks associated with three cruise ship voyages have caused more than 800 laboratory-confirmed cases among passengers and crew, including 10 deaths. Transmission occurred across multiple voyages of several ships. This report describes public health responses to COVID-19 outbreaks on these ships. COVID-19 on cruise ships poses a risk for rapid spread of disease, causing outbreaks in a vulnerable population, and aggressive efforts are required to contain spread. All persons should defer all cruise travel worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Check and Report Ebola (CARE+) Program to Monitor Travelers for Ebola After Arrival to the United States, 2014-2016.

The 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa influenced how public health officials considered migration and emerging infectious diseases. Responding to the public's concerns, the US government introduced enhanced entry screening and post-arrival monitoring by public health authorities to reduce the risk of importation and domestic transmission of Ebola while continuing to allow travel from West Africa. This case study describes a new initiative, the Check and Report Ebola (CARE+) program that engaged travelers arriving to the United States from countries with Ebola outbreaks. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention employed CARE ambassadors, who quickly communicated with incoming travelers and gave them practical resources to boost their participation in monitoring for Ebola. The program aimed to increase travelers' knowledge of Ebola symptoms and how to seek medical care safely, increase travelers' awareness of monitoring requirements, reduce barriers to monitoring, and increase trust in the US public health system. This program could be adapted for use in future outbreaks that involve the potential importation of disease and require the education and active engagement of travelers to participate in post-arrival monitoring.

Immigrant and Refugee Health: A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Perspective on Protecting the Health and Health Security of Individuals and Communities During Planned Migrations.

Migration and forced displacement are at record levels in today's geopolitical environment; ensuring the health of migrating populations and the health security of asylum and receiving countries is critically important. Overseas screening, treatment, and vaccination during planned migration to the United States represents one successful model. These strategies have improved tuberculosis detection and treatment, reducing rates in the United States; decreased transmission and importation of vaccine-preventable diseases; prevented morbidity and mortality from parasitic diseases among refugees; and saved health costs. We describe the work of CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine and partners in developing and implementing these strategies.

Expanding travel medicine in the 21st century to address the health needs of the world's migrants.

HIGHLIGHT: The body of knowledge needed to effectively practice travel medicine has expanded since the 1990s, as migrants begin to comprise an increasing proportion of the world's population. We describe the unique needs of migrants and provide resources available to migration health practitioners. As the number of the world's migrants grows, collaboration across disciplines is key to achieving high-quality migration health practices.