Quality of concept maps is affected by map building strategies.

Concept-maps are widely used to assess students' conceptual understanding in different subject areas. Conventionally, it is mostly built maps which are assessed. In this study, we explore if "concept-mapping" could be used as a case for constructive alignment of both the process and the outcome of learning. Specifically, we have studied how a simple measure of looking at the order in which concept map elements-concepts (cards, C), links (arrows, A), and linking phrases (phrases, P)- are placed on the working space reveals information about the quality of the final generated map. We report findings from analysis of the concept-mapping process in two separate groups of university students (N = 38 (18 + 20)) who were asked, individually, to build concept maps related to two separate concepts in biology and chemistry respectively. We found that, across both groups, students consistently followed the same order of element placement that they began with and found significant differences in the quality of eventual maps resulting from students' map building strategies. Our results suggest that the quality of students' concept maps depends considerably on the strategy used to build it, and point to the supplementary role that the physical working space of the concept-mapping exercise offers to students' own working memory as a possible explanation for these quality differences.

Recombinant Enaction: Manipulatives Generate New Procedures in the Imagination, by Extending and Recombining Action Spaces.

Manipulation of physical models such as tangrams and tiles is a popular approach to teaching early mathematics concepts. This pedagogical approach is extended by new computational media, where mathematical entities such as equations and vectors can be virtually manipulated. The cognitive and neural mechanisms supporting such manipulation-based learning-particularly how actions generate new internal structures that support problem-solving-are not understood. We develop a model of the way manipulations generate internal traces embedding actions, and how these action-traces recombine during problem-solving. This model is based on a study of two groups of sixth-grade students solving area problems. Before problem-solving, one group manipulated a tangram, the other group answered a descriptive test. Eye-movement trajectories during problem-solving were different between the groups. A second study showed that this difference required the tangram's geometrical structure, just manipulation was not enough. We propose a theoretical model accounting for these results, and discuss its implications.

Design of embodied interfaces for engaging spatial cognition.

Aspects of spatial cognition, specifically spatial skills, are strongly correlated with interest and success in STEM courses and STEM-related professions. Because growth in STEM-related industries is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, it is important to develop evidence-based and theoretically grounded methods and interventions that can help train relevant spatial skills. In this article, we discuss research showing that aspects of spatial cognition are embodied and how these findings and theoretical developments can be used to influence the design of tangible and embodied interfaces (TEIs). TEIs seek to bring interaction with digital content off the screen and into the physical environment. By incorporating physical movement and tangible feedback in digital systems, TEIs can leverage the relationship between the body and spatial cognition to engage, support, or improve spatial skills. We use this knowledge to define a design space for TEIs that engage spatial cognition and illustrate how TEIs that are designed and evaluated from a spatial cognition perspective can expand the design space in ways that contribute to the fields of cognitive science and human computer interaction.

Building Cognition: The Construction of Computational Representations for Scientific Discovery.

Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery (Foldit, EteRNA etc.), are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model-building by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition (DC) analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account.

Factors that affect action possibility judgments: the assumed abilities of other people.

Judging what actions are possible and impossible to complete is a skill that is critical for planning and executing movements in both individual and joint actions contexts. The present experiments explored the ability to adapt action possibility judgments to the assumed characteristics of another person. Participants watched alternating pictures of a person's hand moving at different speeds between targets of different indexes of difficulty (according to Fitts' Law) and judged whether or not it was possible for individuals with different characteristics to maintain movement accuracy at the presented speed. Across four studies, the person in the pictures and the background information about the person were manipulated to determine how and under what conditions participants adapted their judgments. Results revealed that participants adjusted their possibility judgments to the assumed motor capabilities of the individual they were judging. However, these adjustments only occurred when participants were instructed to take the other person into consideration suggesting that the adaption process is a voluntary process. Further, it was observed that the slopes of the regression equations relating movement time and index of difficulty did not differ across conditions. All differences between conditions were in the y-intercept of the regression lines. This pattern of findings suggests that participants formed the action possibility judgments by first simulating their own performance, and then adjusted the "possibility" threshold by adding or subtracting a correction factor to determine what is and is not possible for the other person to perform.

Factors that affect action possibility judgements: recent experience with the action and the current body state.

It has been suggested that action possibility judgements are formed through a covert simulation of the to-be-executed action. We sought to determine whether the motor system (via a common coding mechanism) influences this simulation, by investigating whether action possibility judgements are influenced by experience with the movement task (Experiments 1 and 2) and current body states (Experiment 3). The judgement task in each experiment involved judging whether it was possible for a person's hand to accurately move between two targets at presented speeds. In Experiment 1, participants completed the action judgements before and after executing the movement they were required to judge. Results were that judged movement times after execution were closer to the actual execution time than those prior to execution. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the effects of execution on judgements were not due to motor activation or perceptual task experience-alternative explanations of the execution-mediated judgement effects. Experiment 3 examined how judged movement times were influenced by participants wearing weights. Results revealed that wearing weights increased judged movement times. These results suggest that the simulation underlying the judgement process is connected to the motor system, and that simulations are dynamically generated, taking into account recent experience and current body state.

Activity of human motor system during action observation is modulated by object presence.

Neurons in the monkey mirror neuron system (MNS) become active when actions are observed or executed. Increases in activity are greater when objects are engaged than when the actions are mimed. This modulation occurs even when object manipulation is hidden from view. We examined whether human motor systems are similarly modulated during action observation because such observation-related modulations are potentially mediated by a putative human MNS. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was used to elicit motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of a grasping muscle while participants observed actual or pantomimed grasping movements whose endpoints were sometimes hidden from view. MEP amplitudes were found to be modulated by object presence. Critically, the object-based modulation was found when the participant directly observed object manipulation and when the object manipulation had to be inferred because it was hidden. These findings parallel studies of MNS activity in monkeys and support the hypothesis that the MNS influences motor system activity during action observation. Although the object-based modulation of MEP amplitudes was consistent with the hypotheses, the direction of the modulation was not--MEP amplitudes decreased during action observation in contrast to the increase that has previously been observed. We suggest that the decrease in MEP amplitude on object-present trials resulted from inhibitory mechanisms that were activated to suppress the observation-evoked response codes from generating overt muscle activity.

Building to discover: a common coding model.

I present a case study of scientific discovery, where building two functional and behavioral approximations of neurons, one physical and the other computational, led to conceptual and implementation breakthroughs in a neural engineering laboratory. Such building of external systems that mimic target phenomena, and the use of these external systems to generate novel concepts and control structures, is a standard strategy in the new engineering sciences. I develop a model of the cognitive mechanism that connects such built external systems with internal models, and I examine how new discoveries, and consensus on discoveries, could arise from this external-internal coupling and the building process. The model is based on the emerging framework of common coding, which proposes a shared representation in the brain between the execution, perception, and imagination of movement.