RESUMEN
From January 2004 through June 2008, surveillance of dead wild birds in Hong Kong, People's Republic of China, periodically detected highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (H5N1) in individual birds from different species. During this period, no viruses of subtype H5N1 were detected in poultry on farms and in markets in Hong Kong despite intensive surveillance. Thus, these findings in wild birds demonstrate the potential for wild birds to disseminate HPAI viruses (H5N1) to areas otherwise free from the viruses. Genetic and antigenic characterization of 47 HPAI (H5N1) viruses isolated from dead wild birds in Hong Kong showed that these isolates belonged to 2 antigenically distinct virus groups: clades 2.3.4 and 2.3.2. Although research has shown that clade 2.3.4 viruses are established in poultry in Asia, the emergence of clade 2.3.2 viruses in nonpasserine birds from Hong Kong, Japan, and Russia raises the possibility that this virus lineage may have become established in wild birds.
Asunto(s)
Animales Salvajes/virología , Enfermedades de las Aves , Aves/virología , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/clasificación , Gripe Aviar , Animales , Enfermedades de las Aves/epidemiología , Enfermedades de las Aves/virología , Pruebas de Inhibición de Hemaglutinación , Hong Kong/epidemiología , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/genética , Subtipo H5N1 del Virus de la Influenza A/aislamiento & purificación , Gripe Aviar/epidemiología , Gripe Aviar/virología , Datos de Secuencia Molecular , Filogenia , Reacción en Cadena de la Polimerasa , Análisis de Secuencia de ADNRESUMEN
Vaccination of chickens with a commercially available killed H5N2 vaccine was being evaluated as an additional tool to enhanced biosecurity measures and intensive surveillance for control of highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 disease in Hong Kong in 2002. In December 2002 to January 2003, there were outbreaks of H5N1 disease in waterfowl in two recreational parks, wild water birds, several poultry markets and five chicken farms. In addition to quarantine, depopulation of the affected sheds and increased biosecurity, vaccination of the unaffected sheds and surrounding unvaccinated farms was undertaken on three farms. In at least two farms, infection spread to the recently vaccinated sheds with low rates of H5N1 mortality in sheds when the chickens were between 9 and 18 days post-vaccination. However, after 18 days post-vaccination no more deaths from H5N1 avian influenza occurred and intensive monitoring by virus culture on these farms showed no evidence of asymptomatic shedding of the virus. This provides evidence that H5 vaccine can interrupt virus transmission in a field setting.