Dispositional mindfulness moderates the links between potentially morally injurious event exposure and symptoms of anxiety and depression but not suicidal ideation.

Exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIEs) is a pervasive threat for military service members and may be associated with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation. However, coping mechanisms, such as mindfulness, may ameliorate symptoms and improve recovery. Two studies were conducted to test dispositional mindfulness as a moderator of the links between PMIEs, as assessed using the Moral Injury Events Scale (i.e., total score and Self-Transgression, Other-Transgression, and Betrayal subscale scores), and symptoms of anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation among different samples of active-duty soldiers in garrison. In Sample 1 (N = 310), mindfulness buffered the links between PMIE exposure and symptoms of both anxiety, ∆R2 = .02, and depression, ∆R2 = .03. In Sample 2 (N = 669), mindfulness moderated the link between the MIES Betrayal subscale and anxiety symptoms, ∆R2 = .01. The results suggest that dispositional mindfulness may be a protective factor against some of the negative impacts of PMIE exposure. Further implications are discussed.

Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences.

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value-assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well-namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research.

Sense of Personal Control Intensifies Moral Judgments of Others' Actions.

Recent research in moral psychology has highlighted how the current internal states of observers can influence their moral judgments of others' actions. In this article, we argue that an important internal state that serves such a function is the sense of control one has over one's own actions. Across four studies, we show that an individual's own current sense of control is positively associated with the intensity of moral judgments of the actions of others. We also show that this effect extends not only to judgments of rightness and wrongness (Study 1), but also to assignments of reward and punishment (Study 2). Finally, we demonstrate that this effect is based on the current experience of control by showing a moderation of the effect via motivational states (promotion; prevention) that either lead one to incorporate or disregard internal states when making judgments (Study 3) and by subtly manipulating participants' sense of control (Study 4).

Eager feelings and vigilant reasons: Regulatory focus differences in judging moral wrongs.

For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action's concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of nonprocreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge such scenarios as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across 7 studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive feelings) versus vigilant (deliberative reasons) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs. By examining both boundary conditions and possible underlying mechanisms for regulatory focus differences in moral judgment intensity, we expand our understanding of the differences between promotion and prevention regarding how proscriptive judgments are processed, while integrating these differences with existing theories in moral psychology.

Distress from Motivational Dis-integration: When Fundamental Motives Are Too Weak or Too Strong.

Past research has shown that satisfying different kinds of fundamental motives contributes to well-being. More recently, advances in motivational theory have shown that z is also tied to the integration of different motives. In other words, well-being depends not only on maximizing effectiveness in satisfying specific motives, but also on ensuring that motives work together such that no individual motive is too weak or too strong. In this chapter, we review existing research to show that specific forms of psychological distress can be linked to specific types of motivational imbalance or dis-integration. Such disintegration can arise from either excessive weakness of a specific motive or the excessive strength and/or dominance of a specific motive, thereby inhibiting other motives. Possible neural correlates and avenues of intervention are discussed.

Microinterventions targeting regulatory focus and regulatory fit selectively reduce dysphoric and anxious mood.

Depression and generalized anxiety, separately and as comorbid states, continue to represent a significant public health challenge. Current cognitive-behavioral treatments are clearly beneficial but there remains a need for continued development of complementary interventions. This manuscript presents two proof-of-concept studies, in analog samples, of "microinterventions" derived from regulatory focus and regulatory fit theories and targeting dysphoric and anxious symptoms. In Study 1, participants with varying levels of dysphoric and/or anxious mood were exposed to a brief intervention either to increase or to reduce engagement in personal goal pursuit, under the hypothesis that dysphoria indicates under-engagement of the promotion system whereas anxiety indicates over-engagement of the prevention system. In Study 2, participants with varying levels of dysphoric and/or anxious mood received brief training in counterfactual thinking, under the hypothesis that inducing individuals in a state of promotion failure to generate subtractive counterfactuals for past failures (a non-fit) will lessen their dejection/depression-related symptoms, whereas inducing individuals in a state of prevention failure to generate additive counterfactuals for past failures (a non-fit) will lessen their agitation/anxiety-related symptoms. In both studies, we observed discriminant patterns of reduction in distress consistent with the hypothesized links between dysfunctional states of the two motivational systems and dysphoric versus anxious symptoms.

Judging Political Hearts and Minds: How Political Dynamics Drive Social Judgments.

We investigated how judgments of political messengers depend upon what would benefit one's preferred candidate. In Study 1a, participants were asked to evaluate the warmth and competence of the writer of a pro- or anti-Obama political message for the 2012 presidential election (Obama/warm; Romney/competent). When judging the messages, warmth was emphasized by Democrats and competence by Republicans. Study 1b replicated these effects for messages about Romney as well. Study 2 examined the 2004 presidential election where perceptions of the party candidates' warmth and competence reversed (Bush/warm; Kerry/competent). There competence was emphasized by Democrats and warmth by Republicans. Study 3 showed that varying the warmth and competence of each party's prospective candidates for the 2016 election influences whether warmth or competence is emphasized by Democrats or Republicans. Thus, differences between Republicans and Democrats in emphasizing warmth or competence reflect a dynamic motivated cognition that is tailored to benefit their preferred candidate.

Truth, control, and value motivations: the "what," "how," and "why" of approach and avoidance.

The hedonic principle-the desire to approach pleasure and avoid pain-is frequently presumed to be the fundamental principle upon which motivation is built. In the past few decades, researchers have enriched our understanding of how approaching pleasure and avoiding pain differ from each other. However, more recent empirical and theoretical work delineating the principles of motivation in humans and non-human animals has shown that not only can approach/avoidance motivations themselves be further distinguished into promotion approach/avoidance and prevention approach/avoidance, but that approaching pleasure and avoiding pain requires the functioning of additional distinct motivations-the motivation to establish what is real (truth) and the motivation to manage what happens (control). Considering these additional motivations in the context of moral psychology and animal welfare science suggests that these less-examined motives may themselves be fundamental to a comprehensive understanding of motivation, with major implications for the study of the "what," "how," and "why" of human and non-human approach and avoidance behavior.

Repeating the past: prevention focus motivates repetition, even for unethical decisions.

Prevention-focused individuals are motivated to maintain the status quo. Given this, we predicted that individuals with a strong prevention focus, either as a chronic predisposition or situationally induced, would treat their initial decision on how to behave on a first task as the status quo and would thus be motivated to repeat that decision on a subsequent task-even for decisions that were ethically questionable. Results from five studies supported this prediction in multiple ethical domains: whether or not to overstate performance (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b), whether or not to disclose disadvantageous facts (Study 3), and whether or not to pledge a donation (Study 4). The prevention-repetition effect was observed both when the initial and subsequent decisions were in the same domain (Studies 1-3) and when they were in different domains (Study 4). Alternative accounts for this effect, such as justification for the initial decision and preference for consistency, were ruled out (Study 2b).

Locomotion concerns with moral usefulness: When liberals endorse binding moral foundations.

Moral Foundations Theory has provided a framework for understanding the endorsement of different moral beliefs. Our research investigated whether there are other reasons to endorse moral foundations in addition to epistemic concerns; specifically, the perceived social usefulness of moral foundations. In Study 1, we demonstrate that those showing stronger locomotion concerns for controlling movement tend toward a higher endorsement of binding foundations, and that this effect is stronger among political liberals who otherwise do not typically endorse these foundations. In Study 2, we show that priming participants with assessment concerns (emphasizing truth) rather than locomotion concerns (emphasizing control) reduces the response variance among liberals and also removes the association between locomotion and the binding foundations. In Study 3, we directly ask participants to focus on moral truth versus moral usefulness, with moral truth replicating the Study 2 effect of assessment priming, and moral usefulness replicating the effect of locomotion priming.

Morality and its relation to political ideology: the role of promotion and prevention concerns.

Our research investigated whether promotion concerns with advancement and prevention concerns with security related to moral beliefs and political ideology. Study 1 found that chronic prevention and promotion focus had opposite relations to binding foundation endorsement (as measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire), that is, positive for prevention and negative for promotion, and opposite relations to political ideology, that is, more conservative for prevention and more liberal for promotion, and the relation between focus and political ideology was partially mediated by binding foundation endorsement. Study 2 showed that promotion and prevention, even as situationally induced states, can contribute to differences in binding foundation endorsement, with prevention producing stronger endorsement (compared with a control) and promotion producing weaker endorsement.