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This paper offers a general approach to ethics before considering its implications for the question of how to respond to religious preferences in healthcare, especially those of patients and healthcare workers. The first section outlines the two main components of the approach: (1) demoralizing, that is, seeking to avoid moral terminology in the discussion of reasons for action; (2) welfarism, the view that our ultimate reasons are grounded solely in the well-being of individuals. Section 2 elucidates the notion of religious preferences and describes the history and importance of their protection by human rights legislation. The following section defends the 'Preference Principle', according to which there is a reason to satisfy any preference (in so far as that satisfaction advances well-being). Section 4 discusses the implications of this principle for religious preferences in healthcare, again seeking to bring out the special social and political importance of respect, and respect for such preferences in particular. The paper ends with a brief description of how to approach such problems from the perspective of a demoralized welfarism.
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Atención a la Salud , Religión y Medicina , Humanos , Derechos Humanos , Principios MoralesRESUMEN
This article examines the emerging possibility of "brain-state transitioning," in which one brain state is prompted through manipulating the dynamics of the active brain. The technique, still in its infancy, is intended to provide the basis for novel treatments for brain-based disorders. Although a detailed literature exists covering topics around brain-machine interfaces, where targets of brain-based activity include artificial limbs, hardware, and software, there is less concentration on the brain itself as a target for instrumental intervention. This article examines some of the science behind brain-state transitioning, before extending beyond current possibilities in order to explore philosophical and ethical questions about how transitions could be seen to impact on assessment of responsibility and personal identity. It concludes with some thoughts on how best to pursue this nascent approach while accounting for the philosophical and ethical issues.
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Interfaces Cerebro-Computador , Autoimagen , Humanos , Principios Morales , EncéfaloRESUMEN
The growing use of social robots in times of isolation refocuses ethical concerns for Human-Robot Interaction and its implications for social, emotional, and moral life. In this article we raise a virtue-ethics-based concern regarding deployment of social robots relying on deep learning AI and ask whether they may be endowed with ethical virtue, enabling us to speak of "virtuous robotic AI systems". In answering this question, we argue that AI systems cannot genuinely be virtuous but can only behave in a virtuous way. To that end, we start from the philosophical understanding of the nature of virtue in the Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition, which we take to imply the ability to perform (1) the right actions (2) with the right feelings and (3) in the right way. We discuss each of the three requirements and conclude that AI is unable to satisfy any of them. Furthermore, we relate our claims to current research in machine ethics, technology ethics, and Human-Robot Interaction, discussing various implications, such as the possibility to develop Autonomous Artificial Moral Agents in a virtue ethics framework.
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This paper discusses J.S. Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures, and suggests that recent neuroscientific evidence counts against it.
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This paper is a discussion of the duty of doctors to do what is best for their patients. What is required by this duty is shown to depend on the circumstances, including any financial constraints on the doctor. The duty to do the best is a duty of benevolence, and this virtue itself has to be understood as bounded by other virtues, including justice and professional responsibility. An Aristotelian account of medical benevolence is developed, and the issues of supererogation and individual judgement are discussed within this framework. The paper ends with the claim that the patient-centred conception of benevolence defended in the paper is in line with consequentialist and deontological ethical traditions.
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Beneficencia , Teoría Ética , Obligaciones Morales , Atención Dirigida al Paciente/ética , Relaciones Médico-Paciente/ética , Virtudes , Análisis Ético , Humanos , Confianza , Reino UnidoAsunto(s)
Teoría Ética , Ética , Ingeniería Genética , Investigación Genética , Terapia Genética , Genética , Organismos Modificados Genéticamente , Argumento Refutable , Derechos del Animal , Animales , Animales Modificados Genéticamente , Biotecnología , Asesoramiento Genético , Pruebas Genéticas , Variación Genética , Células Germinativas , Humanos , Calidad de Vida , Responsabilidad Social , Valores Sociales , VirtudesRESUMEN
A discussion of some issues from Grant Gillett's book Reasonable Care. At the metaethical level, Gillett's views about the origin, scope and bindingness of morality are outlined and criticised. Against him it is argued that (a) moral capacity does not follow from linguistic abilitiy, (b) things can matter to non-concept-users and (c) universalisability arguments fail to show that immorality is irrational. At the first order level, Gillett's arguments against surrogacy and euthanasia are answered.
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Discusiones Bioéticas , Bioética , Ética , Eutanasia Activa , Eutanasia , Principios Morales , Derechos del Animal , Animales , Coerción , Comunicación , Empatía , Análisis Ético , Eutanasia Activa Voluntaria , Eutanasia Pasiva , Femenino , Libertad , Humanos , Países Bajos , Autonomía Personal , Relaciones Médico-Paciente , Médicos , Estrés Psicológico , Madres Sustitutas , Cuidado Terminal , Reino Unido , Argumento RefutableAsunto(s)
Atención a la Salud , Economía , Asignación de Recursos para la Atención de Salud , Selección de Paciente , Personas con Discapacidades Mentales , Calidad de Vida , Años de Vida Ajustados por Calidad de Vida , Asignación de Recursos , Humanos , Prejuicio , Deseabilidad Social , Reino UnidoRESUMEN
KIE: The author supports the right of persons to terminate their lives when it would be in their "best interests" to do so. He considers cases in which persons are unable to kill themselves and request euthanasia or have requested it beforehand in a living will. Crisp rejects relatives, friends, and most physicians as the agents to carry out the request because of the emotional trauma to the agents and the damage to the image of physicians as savers of lives. He proposes that the practice of euthanasia be part of "telostrics," an area of medical specialization in the care of the terminally ill, and that these "telostricians" should perform voluntary euthanasia.^ieng