The typical and atypical developing mind: a common model.

We present a theory of atypical development based on a developmental theory of the typical mind integrating developmental, cognitive, and psychometric theory and research. The paper comprises three parts. First, it outlines the theory of typical development. The theory postulates central cognitive mechanisms, such as relational integration, executive and inferential processes, and domain-specific processes underlying different environmental relations, such as visuospatial or quantitative relations. Cognitive development advances in cycles satisfying developmental priorities in mastering these systems, such as executive control from 2-6 years, inferential control from 7-11 years, and truth control from 12-18 years. Second, we discuss atypical development, showing how each neurodevelopmental disorder emerges from deficiencies in one or more of the processes comprising the architecture of the mind. Deficiencies in relational integration mechanisms, together with deficiencies in social understanding, yield autism spectrum disorder. Deficiencies in executive processes yield attention-deficit and hyperactivity disorder. Deficiencies in symbolic representation yield specialized learning difficulties, such as dyslexia and dyscalculia. Finally, we discuss clinical and educational implications, suggesting the importance of early diagnosis of malfunctioning in each of these dimensions and specific programs for their remediation.

Is intelligence of preterm children different from full-term children? Commentary on Rapuc et al. (2023).

Rapuc et al. (Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 2023) found that Full-Scale IQ of preterm children is significantly lower than full-term children. Also, although the structure of intelligence appeared to involve the same clusters of cognitive ability, relations between abilities were stronger in preterm children, implying that abilities are more differentiated in full-term than in preterm children. This commentary examined if these findings hold when different modelling methods are used. Instead of the network analysis used in the target article (Rapuc et al., 2023), I used confirmatory factor analysis and special forms of structural equation modelling designed to capture interactions between processes and their differentiation from general cognitive ability. I found, in line with the target article, that premature children scored lower overall in cognitive ability, and that cognitive processes are more strongly related in preterm than in full-term children. However, in contrast to the target article, specific abilities tended to differentiate with increasing general ability in preterm rather than in full-term children. In full-term children, increases in specific abilities were commensurate with increases in general ability. These differences may reflect slower development in preterm children and stronger dependence on executive processes dominating in preschool. Clinical implications are discussed.

Developmental and multiple languages-of-thought.

We agree with the target article that assuming language-of-thought (LoT) is useful for the development of cognitive and developmental theories. We note that the target article is weak in its assumptions about development of LoT and possible existence of multiple LoTs. In response to these weaknesses, we outline several developmental principles for LoT development, showing how a developmental theory of LoT springs from probabilistic LoT. We suggest a system 1.5 of reasoning allowing interchange between Bayesian and logical rules as it fits purposes or domain.

Cognitive and personality predictors of school performance from preschool to secondary school: An overarching model.

In this article, existing research investigating how school performance relates to cognitive, self-awareness, language, and personality processes is reviewed. We outline the architecture of the mind, involving a general factor, g, that underlies distinct mental processes (i.e., executive, reasoning, language, cognizance, and personality processes). From preschool to adolescence, g shifts from executive to reasoning and cognizance processes; personality also changes, consolidating in adolescence. There are three major trends in the existing literature: (a) All processes are highly predictive of school achievement if measured alone, each accounting for ∼20% of its variance; (b) when measured together, cognitive processes (executive functions and representational awareness in preschool and fluid intelligence after late primary school) dominate as predictors (over ∼50%), drastically absorbing self-concepts and personality dispositions that drop to ∼3%-5%; and (c) predictive power changes according to the processes forming g at successive levels: attention control and representational awareness in preschool (∼85%); fluid intelligence, language, and working memory in primary school (∼53%); fluid intelligence, language, self-evaluation, and school-specific self-concepts in secondary school (∼70%). Stability and plasticity of personality emerge as predictors in secondary school. A theory of educational priorities is proposed, arguing that (a) executive and awareness processes; (b) information management; and (c) reasoning, self-evaluation, and flexibility in knowledge building must dominate in preschool, primary, and secondary school, respectively. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Changing priorities in the development of cognitive competence and school learning: A general theory.

This paper summarizes a theory of cognitive development and elaborates on its educational implications. The theory postulates that development occurs in cycles along multiple fronts. Cognitive competence in each cycle comprises a different profile of executive, inferential, and awareness processes, reflecting changes in developmental priorities in each cycle. Changes reflect varying needs in representing, understanding, and interacting with the world. Interaction control dominates episodic representation in infancy; attention control and perceptual awareness dominate in realistic representations in preschool; inferential control and awareness dominate rule-based representation in primary school; truth and validity control and precise self-evaluation dominate in principle-based thought in adolescence. We demonstrate that the best predictors of school learning in each cycle are the cycle's cognitive priorities. Also learning in different domains, e.g., language and mathematics, depends on an interaction between the general cognitive processes dominating in each cycle and the state of the representational systems associated with each domain. When a representational system is deficient, specific learning difficulties may emerge, e.g., dyslexia and dyscalculia. We also discuss the educational implications for evaluation and learning at school.

How Wisdom Emerges from Intellectual Development: A Developmental/Historical Theory for Raising Mandelas.

This paper invokes cognitive developmental theory as a means for preparing citizens to deal with and resolve conflicts within or across nations. We take the centuries-old Greek-Turkish dispute as an example. We first outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that mental changes emerge in response to changing developmental priorities in successive life periods, namely, interaction control in infancy, attention control and representational awareness in preschool, inferential control and cognitive management in primary school, and advanced forms of reasoning and self-evaluation in adolescence. Based on this model, we outline a control theory of wisdom postulating that different aspects of wisdom emerge during development as different levels of control of relations with others: trust and care for others in infancy, taking the other's perspective, reflectivity, and empathy in preschool, rationality and understanding the rules underlying individual and group interactions in primary school, and understanding the general principles of societal operation explaining the differences in approach and interest between groups in adolescence and early adulthood. We also outline the educational implications of this theory for the education of citizens by capitalizing on intellectual strengths at successive developmental periods to comprehensively understand the world and to act prudently when dealing with interpersonal and social or national conflict. Finally, the paper discusses the political constraints and implications of this theory. This is the first attempt to derive wisdom from the development of cognitive and personality processes from infancy through early adulthood and to connect it to serious world problems.

Abstracting abstraction in development and cognitive ability.

We focus on the theory of abstraction proposed by the target article. We suggest that abstraction varies at different levels of learning, cognitive development, or cognitive ability. We argue that this theory does not specify how abstraction is done at each of these levels. Because of these weaknesses, the theory cannot explicate how individuals differ in mental time travel at different phases of life or different levels of cognitive ability.

Mapping Mind-Brain Development: Towards a Comprehensive Theory.

The relations between the developing mind and developing brain are explored. We outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that the mind comprises four systems of processes (domain-specific, attention and working memory, reasoning, and cognizance) developing in four cycles (episodic, realistic, rule-based, and principle-based representations, emerging at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively), with two phases in each. Changes in reasoning relate to processing efficiency in the first phase and working memory in the second phase. Awareness of mental processes is recycled with the changes in each cycle and drives their integration into the representational unit of the next cycle. Brain research shows that each type of processes is served by specialized brain networks. Domain-specific processes are rooted in sensory cortices; working memory processes are mainly rooted in hippocampal, parietal, and prefrontal cortices; abstraction and alignment processes are rooted in parietal, frontal, and prefrontal and medial cortices. Information entering these networks is available to awareness processes. Brain networks change along the four cycles, in precision, connectivity, and brain rhythms. Principles of mind-brain interaction are discussed.

The developmental trinity of mind: Cognizance, executive control, and reasoning.

This paper summarizes research on how cognizance, that is, awareness of mental processes, interacts with executive control and reasoning from childhood to adolescence. Central positions are that (a) cognizance changes extensively with age; (b) it contributes to the formation of executive control, and (c) mediates between executive control and reasoning. Cognizance recycles with changes in executive and inferential possibilities in four developmental cycles: it registers their present state, yielding insight into their operation, allowing their better management; this catalyzes their transformation into the next level. Implications for theory of intellectual development and practical implications for education are discussed. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Development and Aging Neuroscience > Cognition Neuroscience > Development Philosophy > Consciousness.

Mind-Personality Relations from Childhood to Early Adulthood.

We present three studies which investigated the relations between cognition and personality from 7 to 20 years of age. All three studies showed that general cognitive ability and the general factor of personality are significantly related throughout this age span. This relation was expressed in several ways across studies. The first investigated developmental relations between three reasoning domains (inductive, deductive, and scientific) and Eysenck's four personality dimensions in a longitudinal-sequential design where 260 participants received the cognitive tests three times, and the personality test two times, covering the span from 9 to 16 years. It was found that initial social likeability significantly shapes developmental momentum in cognition and vice versa, especially in the 9- to 11-year period. The second study involved 438 participants from 7 to 17 years, tested twice on attention control, working memory, reasoning in different domains, and once by a Big Five Factors inventory. Extending the findings of the first, this study showed that progression in reasoning is affected negatively by conscientiousness and positively by openness, on top of attention control and working memory influences. The third study tested the relations between reasoning in several domains, the ability to evaluate one's own cognitive performance, self-representation about the reasoning, the Big Five, and several aspects of emotional intelligence, from 9 to 20 years of age (N = 247). Network, hierarchical network, and structural equation modeling showed that cognition and personality are mediated by the ability of self-knowing. Emotional intelligence was not an autonomous dimension. All dimensions except emotional intelligence influenced academic performance. A developmental model for mind-personality relations is proposed.

gP for What is Common between Developing Intelligence and Personality: Response to the Commentators.

Three are the main postulates of our article under discussion: First, both human intelligence and personality are hierarchically organized, with a general factor at the apex of each hierarchy, i. [...].

Developmental Differentiation and Binding of Mental Processes with g through the Life-Span.

Integration/differentiation of mental processes is major mechanism of development. Developmental theories ascribe intellectual development to it. In psychometric theory, Spearman's law of diminishing returns postulates that increasing g allows increasing differentiation of cognitive abilities, because increased mental power allows variable investment in domain-specific learning. Empirical evidence has been inconsistent so far, with some studies supporting and others contradicting this mechanism. This state of affairs is due to a developmental phenomenon: Both differentiation and strengthening of relations between specific processes and g may happen but these changes are phase-specific and ability-specific, depending upon the developmental priorities in the formation of g in each phase. We present eight studies covering the age span from 4 to 85 years in support of this phenomenon. Using new powerful modeling methods we showed that differentiation and binding of mental processes in g occurs in cycles. Specific processes intertwine with g at the beginning of cycles when they are integrated into it; when well established, these processes may vary with increasing g, reflecting its higher flexibility. Representational knowledge, inductive inference and awareness of it, and grasp of logical constraints framing inference are the major markers of g, first intertwining with in their respective cycles and differentiating later during the periods of 2-6, 7-11, and 11-20 years, respectively. The implications of these findings for an overarching cognitive developmental/differential theory of human mind are discussed.

From Cognitive Development to Intelligence: Translating Developmental Mental Milestones into Intellect.

This special issue aimed to contribute to the unification of two disciplines focusing on cognition and intelligence: the psychology of cognitive development and the psychology of intelligence. The general principles of the organization and development of human intelligence are discussed first. Each paper is then summarized and discussed vis-à-vis these general principles. The implications for major theories of cognitive development and intelligence are briefly discussed.

Coping With Logical Fallacies: A Developmental Training Program for Learning to Reason.

This study trained children to master logical fallacies and examined how learning is related to processing efficiency and fluid intelligence (gf). A total of one hundred and eighty 8- and 11-year-old children living in Cyprus were allocated to a control, a limited (LI), and a full instruction (FI) group. The LI group learned the notion of logical contradiction and the logical structure of the schemes involved. The FI group learned, additionally, to recognize other deductive reasoning principles. Reasoning improved proportionally to training. Awareness improved equally in LI and FI. Changes in reasoning and awareness changes were related to attention control and gf. Awareness mediated the influence of training on reasoning but not vice versa, suggesting that awareness is necessary for conditional reasoning. Implications are discussed.

Mind God's mind: History, development, and teaching.

We dispute the target article that belief in Big Gods facilitated development of large societies and suggest that the direction of causality might be inverted. We also suggest that plain theory of mind (ToM), although necessary, is not sufficient to conceive Big Gods. Grasp of other aspects of the mind is required. However, this theory is useful for the teaching of religion.

Embedding cognizance in intellectual development.

This study examined whether cognizance of cognitive processes (i.e., awareness of the perceptual and inferential origins of knowledge) mediates between basic processing efficiency functions (i.e., processing speed, attention control, and working memory) and fluid cognition (e.g., performance on Raven-like matrices) during development. For this aim, children from 4 to 8 years of age were examined by various measures addressed to each of these processes. All processes developed systematically throughout this age period. Structural equation modeling showed that awareness does have this mediating role, that this mediation is phase specific based on perceptual awareness and theory of mind during the 5- and 6-year phase and on inferential awareness during the 7- and 8-year phase, and that it builds up within each developmental cycle. Attention control emerges from, rather than directs, working memory and largely remains beyond awareness through the age span studied. Implications for theory of intellectual development are discussed.

Longitudinal associations between adolescent alcohol use and parents' sources of knowledge.

The aim of this study was to test the direction of effect in the relationship between parents' sources of knowledge (parental monitoring and child disclosure) and adolescent alcohol use. The participants were 215 adolescents and their mothers, randomly selected from urban and rural areas in Cyprus. A 3-month, two-timepoint longitudinal design was used in which adolescents completed the alcohol use disorders identification test while mothers completed a parental knowledge questionnaire. The results of this study showed that parental monitoring did not predict subsequent adolescent alcohol use. However, child disclosure at Time 1 negatively predicted adolescent alcohol use at Time 2. Moreover, adolescents' alcohol dependence symptoms at Time 1 negatively predicted both sources of parental knowledge at Time 2.

Dimensionality of coping: an empirical contribution to the construct validation of the brief-COPE with a Greek-speaking sample.

The construct of coping has received increasing attention over the past years in relation to psychological and physical health, yet its dimensional and conceptual understanding is not consistent across theoretical models. The present study investigates the dimensionality of coping in a sample of 1127 Greek-speaking adults using the Brief-COPE. Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a structure comprised of eight factors, four of which were broader, and included active/positive, avoidant, support seeking and negative emotional approaches. Results indicated adequate psychometric characteristics for the Greek translation of the Brief-COPE for this population. Associations between coping strategies with gender, education, and psychological symptomatology are also discussed.