Shared Responsibility Decreases the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain.

Sharing responsibility in social decision-making helps individuals use the flexibility of the collective context to benefit themselves by claiming credit for good outcomes or avoiding the blame for bad outcomes. Using magnetoencephalography, we examined the neuronal basis of the impact that social context has on this flexible sense of responsibility. Participants performed a gambling task in various social contexts and reported feeling less responsibility when playing as a member of a team. A reduced magnetoencephalography outcome processing effect was observed as a function of decreasing responsibility at 200 msec post outcome onset and was centered over parietal, central, and frontal brain regions. Before outcome revelation in socially made decisions, an attenuated motor preparation signature at 500 msec after stimulus onset was found. A boost in reported responsibility for positive outcomes in social contexts was associated with increased activity in regions related to social and reward processing. Together, these results show that sharing responsibility with others reduces agency, influencing pre-outcome motor preparation and post-outcome processing, and provides opportunities to flexibly claim credit for positive outcomes.

Stage 1 Registered Report: How responsibility attributions to self and others relate to outcome ownership in group decisions.

Responsibility judgements have important consequences in human society. Previous research focused on how someone's responsibility determines the outcome they deserve, for example, whether they are rewarded or punished. Here, we investigate the opposite link: How outcome ownership influences responsibility attributions in a social context. Participants in a group of three perform a majority vote decision-making task between gambles that can lead to a reward or no reward. Only one group member receives the outcome and participants evaluate their and the other players' responsibility for the obtained outcome. Two hypotheses are tested: 1) Whether outcome ownership increases responsibility attributions even when the control over an outcome is similar. 2) Whether people's tendency to attribute higher responsibility for positive vs negative outcomes will be stronger for players who received the outcome. The findings of this study may help reveal how credit attributions can be biased toward particular individuals who receive outcomes as a result of collective work.

Social influence matters: We follow pandemic guidelines most when our close circle does.

Why do we adopt new rules, such as social distancing? Although human sciences research stresses the key role of social influence in behaviour change, most COVID-19 campaigns emphasize the disease's medical threat. In a global data set (n = 6,675), we investigated how social influences predict people's adherence to distancing rules during the pandemic. Bayesian regression analyses controlling for stringency of local measures showed that people distanced most when they thought their close social circle did. Such social influence mattered more than people thinking distancing was the right thing to do. People's adherence also aligned with their fellow citizens, but only if they felt deeply bonded with their country. Self-vulnerability to the disease predicted distancing more for people with larger social circles. Collective efficacy and collectivism also significantly predicted distancing. To achieve behavioural change during crises, policymakers must emphasize shared values and harness the social influence of close friends and family.

Stage 2 Registered Report: How responsibility attributions to self and others relate to outcome ownership in group decisions.

Background: Responsibility judgements have important consequences in human society. Previous research focused on how someone's responsibility determines the outcome they deserve, for example, whether they are rewarded or punished. Here, in a pre-registered study (Stage 1 Registered Report: https://doi.org/10.12688/wellcomeopenres.16480.2), we investigate the opposite link: How outcome ownership influences responsibility attributions in a social context.  Methods: In an online study, participants in a group of three perform a majority vote decision-making task between gambles that can lead to a reward or no reward. Only one group member receives the outcome and participants evaluate their and the other players' responsibility for the obtained outcome. Results: We found that outcome ownership increases responsibility attributions even when the control over an outcome is similar. Moreover, ownership had an effect on the valence bias: participants' higher responsibility attributions for positive vs negative outcomes was stronger for players who received the outcome. Finally, this effect was more pronounced when people rated their own responsibility as compared to when they were rating another's player responsibility. Conclusions: The findings of this study reveal how credit attributions can be biased toward particular individuals who receive outcomes as a result of collective work, both when people judge their own and someone else's responsibility.

Gaze direction biases emotion categorisation in schizophrenia.

The successful integration of eye gaze direction and emotion cues from faces is important not only for co-ordinated interactions, but also for the detection of social signals alerting us to threat posed by a conspecific, or elsewhere in our immediate environment. It is now well-established that people with schizophrenia experience aberrant eye gaze and facial emotion processing. These social-cognitive differences might contribute to the maintenance of socially-themed delusions which are characterised by the hyper-attribution of threatening intentions to others. However, no study has directly examined whether the mechanisms which govern the integration of eye gaze and emotion information diverge in schizophrenia, and more importantly, whether this reflects a fundamental 'bottom-up' perceptual deficit or a 'top-down' cognitive bias. Fifteen outpatients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 21 healthy age- and IQ-matched controls performed an emotion categorisation task (anger/fear) on morphed facial expressions of anger or fear, displaying either direct or averted gaze. Results in both controls and patients replicated the previous finding that combinations of anger with direct gaze, and fear with averted gaze - which signal a relevant threat to the observer - benefited from more accurate emotion recognition than alternate gaze-emotion combinations. Bayesian model selection revealed that for patients this effect was mediated by a shift in decision bias towards emotions which signal self-relevant threat, rather than a change in sensitivity as observed in controls. These results critically highlight a different cognitive mechanism governing gaze and face-cued emotion integration in schizophrenia, which has a top-down influence on the evaluation of perceptual input.

Joining a group diverts regret and responsibility away from the individual.

It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from the negative consequences of undesirable outcomes. To test this claim, we investigated how experienced outcomes triggering loss and regret impacted people's tendency to decide alone or join a group, and how decisions differed when voluntarily made alone versus in group. Replicated across two experiments, participants (n = 125 and n = 496) selected whether to play alone or contribute their vote to a group decision. Next, they chose between two lotteries with different probabilities of winning and losing. The higher the negative outcome, the more participants switched from deciding alone to with others. When joining a group to choose the lottery, choices were less driven by outcome and regret anticipation. Moreover, negative outcomes experienced alone, not part of a group vote, led to worse subsequent choices than positive outcomes. These results suggest that the protective shield of the collective reduces the influence of negative emotions that may help individuals re-evaluate past choices.

Shared responsibility in collective decisions.

Research investigating collective decision-making has focused primarily on the improvement of accuracy in collective decisions and less on the motives that drive individuals to make these decisions. We argue that a strong but neglected motive for making collective decisions is minimizing the material and psychological burden of an individual's responsibility. Making difficult decisions with others shields individuals from the consequences of negative outcomes by reducing regret, punishment and stress. Considering shared responsibility as a another key motivation to join groups helps understand behaviours with societal implications such as political voting, committing norm violations, predicting natural disasters and making health-related decisions.

Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation.

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants' overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

Pervasive influence of idiosyncratic associative biases during facial emotion recognition.

Facial morphology has been shown to influence perceptual judgments of emotion in a way that is shared across human observers. Here we demonstrate that these shared associations between facial morphology and emotion coexist with strong variations unique to each human observer. Interestingly, a large part of these idiosyncratic associations does not vary on short time scales, emerging from stable inter-individual differences in the way facial morphological features influence emotion recognition. Computational modelling of decision-making and neural recordings of electrical brain activity revealed that both shared and idiosyncratic face-emotion associations operate through a common biasing mechanism rather than an increased sensitivity to face-associated emotions. Together, these findings emphasize the underestimated influence of idiosyncrasies on core social judgments and identify their neuro-computational signatures.

Anxiety dissociates the adaptive functions of sensory and motor response enhancements to social threats.

Efficient detection and reaction to negative signals in the environment is essential for survival. In social situations, these signals are often ambiguous and can imply different levels of threat for the observer, thereby making their recognition susceptible to contextual cues - such as gaze direction when judging facial displays of emotion. However, the mechanisms underlying such contextual effects remain poorly understood. By computational modeling of human behavior and electrical brain activity, we demonstrate that gaze direction enhances the perceptual sensitivity to threat-signaling emotions - anger paired with direct gaze, and fear paired with averted gaze. This effect arises simultaneously in ventral face-selective and dorsal motor cortices at 200 ms following face presentation, dissociates across individuals as a function of anxiety, and does not reflect increased attention to threat-signaling emotions. These findings reveal that threat tunes neural processing in fast, selective, yet attention-independent fashion in sensory and motor systems, for different adaptive purposes.

Selective attention effects on early integration of social signals: same timing, modulated neural sources.

Humans combine co-emitted social signals to predict other's immediate intentions and prepare an adapted response. However, little is known about whether attending to only one of co-emitted social signals impacts on its combination with other signals. Here, using electroencephalography, we address selective attention effects on early combination of social signals. We manipulated three visual cues: gaze direction, emotional expression, and pointing gesture, while participants performed either emotion or gaze direction judgments. Results showed that a temporal marker of social cues integration emerges 170ms after the stimulus onset, even if the integration of the three visual cues was not required to perform the task, as only one feature at a time was task relevant. Yet in addition to common temporal regions, the relative contribution of specific neural sources of this integration changed as a function of the attended feature: integration during emotion judgments was mainly implemented in classic limbic areas but in the dorsal pathway during gaze direction judgments. Together, these findings demonstrate that co-emitted social cues are integrated as long as they are relevant to the observer, even when they are irrelevant to the ongoing task.