15-Lipoxygenation of leukotriene A(4). Studies Of 12- and 15-lipoxygenase efficiency to catalyze lipoxin formation.

The unstable epoxide leukotriene (LT) A(4) is a key intermediate in leukotriene biosynthesis, but may also be transformed to lipoxins via a second lipoxygenation at C-15. The capacity of various 12- and 15-lipoxygenases, including porcine leukocyte 12-lipoxygenase, a human recombinant platelet 12-lipoxygenase preparation, human platelet cytosolic fraction, rabbit reticulocyte 15-lipoxygenase, soybean 15-lipoxygenase and human eosinophil cytosolic fraction, to catalyze conversion of LTA(4) to lipoxins was investigated and standardized against the ability of the enzymes to transform arachidonic acid to 12- or 15-hydroxyeicosatetraenoic acids (HETE), respectively. The highest ratio between the capacity to produce lipoxins and HETE (LX/HETE ratio) was obtained for porcine leukocyte 12-lipoxygenase with an LX/HETE ratio of 0.3. In addition, the human platelet 100000xg supernatant 12-lipoxygenase preparation and the human platelet recombinant 12-lipoxygenase and human eosinophil 100000xg supernatant 15-lipoxygenase preparation possessed considerable capacity to produce lipoxins (ratio 0.07, 0.01 and 0.02 respectively). In contrast, lipoxin formation by the rabbit reticulocyte and soybean 15-lipoxygenases was much less pronounced (LX/HETE ratios <0.002). Kinetic studies of the human lipoxygenases revealed lower apparent K(m) for LTA(4) (9-27 microM), as compared to the other lipoxygenases tested (58-83 microM). The recombinant human 12-lipoxygenase demonstrated the lowest K(m) value for LTA(4) (9 microM) whereas the porcine leukocyte 12-lipoxygenase had the highest V(max). The profile of products was identical, irrespective of the lipoxygenase used. Thus, LXA(4) and 6S-LXA(4) together with the all-trans LXA(4) and LXB(4) isomers were isolated. Production of LXB(4) was not observed with any of the lipoxygenases. The lipoxygenase inhibitor cinnamyl-3,4-dihydroxy-alpha-cyanocinnamate was considerably more efficient to inhibit conversion of LTA(4) to lipoxins, as compared to the inhibitory effect on 12-HETE formation from arachidonic acid (IC(50) 1 and 50 microM, respectively) in the human platelet cytosolic fraction.

Safe biotechnology 9: values in risk assessment for the environmental application of microorganisms. The Safety in Biotechnology Working Party of the European Federation of Biotechnology.

Risk assessment for the deliberate release of microorganisms into the environment is traditionally carried out on a case-by-case basis. In a similar approach to that used when assessing human pathogenicity, we propose an alternative approach by introducing risk classes to facilitate or complement this type of risk assessment. These consider several sets of scenarios that address the different values that need to be protected. Examples of this approach include risk-class definitions for soil fertility and biodiversity.

Safe biotechnology. 8. Transport of infectious and biological materials. Working Party "Safety in Biotechnology" of the European Federation of Biotechnology.

The transport of infectious and biological material is regulated by a number of international organizations. This mini-review has been compiled to increase awareness within the scientific community of problems caused by differences in terminology (such as infectious materials/substances, biological products, diagnostic specimens, genetically modified microorganisms) and certain technical aspects of the main international guidelines, and to assist policy makers in the creation of harmonized guidelines. A list of relevant Internet resources has been compiled.

Safe biotechnology. 7. Classification of microorganisms on the basis of hazard. Working Party "Safety in Biotechnology" of the European Federation Biotechnology.

The current systems for classifying human pathogens on the basis of hazard are well developed and their basic criteria are in general agreement one with another. Of more importance, the safety practices based on these classifications have generally been successful. They have enabled extensive research activities, medical practice and industrial production to be conducted on an ever-increasing scale, involving dangerous microorganisms (e.g. in vaccine production and treatment of infected patients) with a very low incidence of adverse effects on the workers involved and the general public. Although the EU has adopted a harmonised list of agents in groups 1-4 there is as yet no complete agreement among member states and individual microbiologists. The purpose of this paper is to present a historical survey and to discuss the current processes for identifying and classifying the hazards posed by the use of microorganisms in research and technology. This is essential in the design of appropriate methods of counteracting potential risks.