A formal model accounting for measurement reliability shows attenuated effect of higher education on intelligence in longitudinal data.

The effect of higher education on intelligence has been examined using longitudinal data. Typically, these studies reveal a positive effect, approximately 1 IQ point per year of higher education, particularly when pre-education intelligence is considered as a covariate in the analyses. However, such covariate adjustment is known to yield positively biased results if the covariate has measurement errors and is correlated with the predictor. Simultaneously, a negative bias may emerge if the intelligence measure after higher education has non-classical measurement errors as in data from the 1970 British Cohort Study that were used in a previous study of the effect of higher education. In response, we have devised an estimation method that used iterated simulations to account for both classical measurement errors in the covariate and non-classical errors in the dependent variable. Upon applying this method in a reanalysis of the data from the 1970 British Cohort Study, we find that the estimated effect of higher education diminishes to 0.4 IQ points per year. Additionally, our findings suggest that the impact of higher education is somewhat more pronounced in the initial 2 years of higher education, aligning with the notion of diminishing marginal cognitive benefits.

Evidence from 43 countries that disease leaves cultures unchanged in the short-term.

Did cultures change shortly after, and in response to, the COVID-19 outbreak? If so, then in what way? We study these questions for a set of macro-cultural dimensions: collectivism/individualism, duty/joy, traditionalism/autonomy, and pro-fertility/individual-choice norms. We also study specific perceptions and norms like perceived threats to society (e.g. immigration) and hygiene norms. We draw on Evolutionary Modernization Theory, Parasite Stress Theory, and the Behavioural Immune System, and existing evidence, to make an overarching prediction: the COVID-19 pandemic should increase collectivism, duty, traditionalism, conformity (i.e. pro-fertility), and outgroup prejudice. We derive specific hypotheses from this prediction and use survey data from 29,761 respondents, in 55 cities and 43 countries, collected before (April-December 2019) and recently after the emergence of COVID-19 (April-June 2020) to test them. We exploit variation in disease intensity across regions to test potential mechanisms behind any changes. The macro-cultural dimensions remained stable. In contrast, specific perceptions and norms related to the pandemic changed: norms of hygiene substantially increased as did perceived threats related to disease. Taken together, our findings imply that macro-cultural dimensions are primarily stable while specific perceptions and norms, particularly those related to the pandemic, can change rapidly. Our findings provide new evidence for theories of cultural change and have implications for policy, public health, daily life, and future trajectories of our societies.

Appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors in the United States now and 50 years ago.

Introduction: A crucial aspect of social norms pertains to determining which behaviors are considered appropriate. Here we consider everyday behaviors. Some everyday behaviors are rated as more appropriate than others, and ratings of the appropriateness of a given behavior may vary over time. The objective of this study is to elucidate the reasons behind variation in appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors in the United States. Our theory focuses on how the evaluation of the appropriateness of a behavior is influenced by its potential for externalities and internalities, and how this influence may cause a change in norms over time. Method: Employing a preregistered design, we asked American participants to rate 37 different everyday behaviors based on their appropriateness in a range of common situations, as well as their potential negative externalities (e.g., being loud, being aggressive, taking up space) and positive internalities (e.g., pleasurability). Changes over time were calculated as the difference between mean ratings obtained in this study and ratings of the same behavior in a similar study conducted 50 years ago. Results: As expected, overall appropriateness ratings of everyday behaviors are associated both with their externalities and their internalities, so that the least appropriate behaviors tend to have considerable potential for negative externalities and little potential for positive internalities. Moreover, behaviors that have considerable potential for negative externalities are perceived as less appropriate now than 50 years ago. Discussion: By describing how social norms for everyday behaviors depend on the externalities and internalities of behaviors, this study contributes to theories about the emergence and change of social norms.

Cultural variation in the SES-gender interaction in student achievement.

Introduction: Is the socioeconomic gap in academic achievement larger among boys than girls? Several scholars have proposed such an interaction between socioeconomic status (SES) and gender. Prior empirical studies have yielded mixed evidence, but they have been conducted almost exclusively in Western countries. Here we propose the hypothesis that the SES-gender interaction is stronger in less gender-equal societies. Methods: We estimated the SES-gender interaction in 36 countries using data from two international large-scale assessments (PIRLS and TIMSS). The degree of gender equality was measured by the Global Gender Gap Index. Results: Consistent with the hypothesis, the SES-gender interaction was stronger in societies with less gender equality. Discussion: Our findings suggest that cultural factors determine how the socioeconomic achievement gap differs between boys and girls.

Cognitive ability and ideology join forces in the culture war: A model of opinion formation.

We propose a model of moral policy opinion formation that integrates both ideology and cognitive ability. The link from people's ideology to their opinions is assumed to go via a semantic processing of moral arguments that relies on the individual's cognitive ability. An implication of this model is that the relative quality of arguments that justify supporting vs. opposing a moral policy-the policy's "argument advantage"-is key to how opinions will be distributed in the population and develop over time. To test this implication, we combine polling data with measures of the argument advantage for 35 moral policies. Consistent with the opinion formation model, the argument advantage of a moral policy accounts for how public opinion moves over time, and how support for the policy ideologies varies across different ideological groups and levels of cognitive ability, including a strong interaction between ideology and cognitive ability.

Gender differences in competitiveness and fear of failure help explain why girls have lower life satisfaction than boys in gender equal countries.

Among 15-year-olds, boys tend to report higher life satisfaction than girls. Recent research has shown that this gender gap tends to be larger in more gender-egalitarian countries. We shed light on this apparent paradox by examining the mediating role of two psychological dispositions: competitiveness and fear of failure. Using data from the 2018 PISA study, we analyze the life satisfaction, competitiveness, and fear of failure of more than 400,000 15-year-old boys and girls in 63 countries with known levels of gender equality. We find that competitiveness and fear of failure together mediate more than 40 percent of the effects on life satisfaction of gender and its interaction with gender equality. Thus, interventions targeting competitiveness and fear of failure could potentially have an impact on the gender gap in life satisfaction among adolescents in gender equal countries.

Acculturation of hygiene norms among immigrants to Sweden.

Hygiene norms in Sweden are generally loose compared to most other countries. Does this looseness affect the hygiene norms among people who immigrate to Sweden from other countries? In a study of hygiene norms among immigrants to Sweden, the change in the physical environment and material living conditions, acculturation to Swedish culture and norms, and selection effects were all expected to lead immigrant hygiene norms to be closer to Swedish looseness. However, in a sample of 447 immigrants from 12 different countries, immigrants reported hygiene norms that were even stricter than those found in their countries of origin. We propose an explanation based on a combination of uncertainty about prevailing hygiene norms and the social risk and stigma associated with being perceived as unhygienic. We conclude that acculturation processes may rely on mechanisms that are domain specific.

Higher-achieving children are better at estimating the number of books at home: Evidence and implications.

The number of books at home is commonly used as a proxy for socioeconomic status in educational studies. While both parents' and students' reports of the number of books at home are relatively strong predictors of student achievement, they often disagree with each other. When interpreting findings of analyses that measure socioeconomic status using books at home, it is important to understand how findings may be biased by the imperfect reliability of the data. For example, it was recently suggested that especially low-achieving students tend to underestimate the number of books at home, so that use of such data would lead researchers to overestimate the association between books at home and achievement. Here we take a closer look at how students' and parents' reports of the number of books at home relate to literacy among fourth grade students, by analyzing data from more than 250,000 students in 47 countries participating in 2011 PIRLS. Contrary to prior claims, we find more downward bias in estimates of books at home among high-achieving students than among low-achieving students, but unsystematic errors appear to be larger among low-achieving students. This holds within almost every country. It also holds between countries, that is, errors in estimates of books at home are larger in low-achieving countries. This has implications for studies of the association between books at home and achievement: the strength of the association will generally be underestimated, and this problem is exacerbated in low-achieving countries and among low-achieving students.

How does political discussion frequency impact political moral opinions? The moral argument theory of opinion dynamics.

Discussions of political issues may influence people's opinions. Is there any systematic difference in opinions between those who discuss frequently and those who do not? We measured the association between self-reported discussion frequency and the probability of holding the more liberal opinion on moral issues, using data from the General Social Survey (81 issues, n = 4,395) and the American National Election Studies (27 issues, n = 17,653). This association looked different among liberals and among conservatives. Having more frequent discussions is associated with a higher probability of holding more liberal opinions among liberals, while there is little association between discussion frequency and opinions among conservatives. These findings can be explained by the moral argument theory, which is an account of the long-term liberalization of public opinion on moral issues as an outcome of repeated discussions. The key assumption of this theory is that opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that only conservatives accept have a disadvantage compared to opinions that are justified by the kinds of arguments that everyone accepts. Consistent with this theory, we find that the effect of discussion frequency is stronger for moral opinions that have a bigger argument advantage.

Predicting how US public opinion on moral issues will change from 2018 to 2020 and beyond.

The General Social Survey, conducted every 2 years, measures public opinion on a wide range of moral issues. The data from the 2020 survey are expected to be released in mid-October 2021. In advance of this data release, we make predictions for how public opinion will have shifted since 2018. We also predict further public opinion shifts for the coming decade up until the year 2030. These predictions are based on the theory that an opinion will become more popular over time if it holds an argument advantage, that is, if it is better justified by generally accepted kinds of arguments than the opposite opinion is. While this theory has successfully accounted for historical opinion trends, this is the first time it is used to predict future shifts. To assess the accuracy of our forecast we will compare it with the benchmark forecast that predicts the same public opinion in 2020 as in 2018.

Global sex differences in hygiene norms and their relation to sex equality.

Strict norms about hygiene may sometimes have health benefits but may also be a burden. Based on research in the United States, it has been suggested that women traditionally shoulder responsibility for hygiene standards and therefore tend to have stricter views on hygiene. However, there is little systematic research on sex differences in hygiene norms at the global scale. We set up two hypotheses: (1) Stricter hygiene norms among women than among men is a global phenomenon. (2) The size of this sex difference varies across nations with the level of sex equality. We examine these hypotheses using data from a recent international survey (N = 17,632). Participants in 56 countries were asked for their views of where it is not appropriate for people to spit and in which situations people should wash their hands. As a measure of sex equality, we use an existing country-level measure of attitudes to equality between the sexes, available for 49 nations in the study. Stricter hygiene norms among women than among men are observed almost everywhere, but there are a few exceptions (most notably Nigeria and Saudi Arabia). The size of the sex difference in hygiene norms varies strongly with the level of sex equality, but in a non-linear way. The sex difference is most pronounced in moderately egalitarian countries with the highest recorded difference being in Chile. In more egalitarian parts of the world, more sex equality is associated with a smaller sex difference in hygiene norms. In the less egalitarian parts of the world, the opposite relation holds. We offer an interpretation in terms of what different levels of sex equality mean for the content of sex roles.

Vaccine confidence is higher in more religious countries.

Vaccine hesitancy is a threat to global health, but it is not ubiquitous; depending on the country, the proportion that have confidence in vaccines ranges from a small minority to a huge majority. Little is known about what explains this dramatic variation in vaccine confidence. We hypothesize that variation in religiosity may play a role because traditional religious teachings are likely to be incompatible with the specific magical/spiritual health beliefs that often undergird anti-vaccination sentiments. In analyses of publicly available data in 147 countries, we find that a country measure of religiosity is strongly positively correlated with country measures of confidence in the safety, importance, and effectiveness of vaccines, and these associations are robust to controlling for measures of human development (education, economic development, and health). The underlying mechanism needs to be examined in future research.

Cooperation in the cross-national context.

In this article, we outline the current state of research concerning cooperation in the cross-national context. We present several theoretical approaches and empirical findings regarding national differences in cooperation, as well as how cooperation may depend on the national background of the interaction partner. In addition, we discuss the influence of (national) group norms, cultural similarity, and ingroup membership. This review concludes with a call for research on cooperation to include more non-WEIRD nations and more systematically cover national background as one important social category determining the willingness to cooperate.

The Power of Tolerance vs. Unselfishness as a Cultural Determinant of Cooperation.

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner's dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.

Social mindfulness and prosociality vary across the globe.

Humans are social animals, but not everyone will be mindful of others to the same extent. Individual differences have been found, but would social mindfulness also be shaped by one's location in the world? Expecting cross-national differences to exist, we examined if and how social mindfulness differs across countries. At little to no material cost, social mindfulness typically entails small acts of attention or kindness. Even though fairly common, such low-cost cooperation has received little empirical attention. Measuring social mindfulness across 31 samples from industrialized countries and regions (n = 8,354), we found considerable variation. Among selected country-level variables, greater social mindfulness was most strongly associated with countries' better general performance on environmental protection. Together, our findings contribute to the literature on prosociality by targeting the kind of everyday cooperation that is more focused on communicating benevolence than on providing material benefits.

The Advent of the COVID-19 Epidemic Did Not Affect Americans' Endorsement of Moral Foundations.

Prior work has suggested that existential threats in the form of terror attacks may shift liberals' reliance on moral foundations to more resemble those of conservatives. We therefore hypothesized that endorsement of these moral foundations would have increased when the COVID-19 epidemic became a salient threat. To examine this hypothesis we conducted a longitudinal study with 237 American participants across the liberal-conservative spectrum, in which their endorsement of various moral foundations were measured before and after the advent of the pandemic. We did not find evidence of any systematic change in the endorsement of any moral foundation, neither in general nor specifically among liberals or specifically among those who perceived the greatest threat from COVID-19. We conclude that the threat from the pandemic does not seem to have had any substantial effect on the moral foundations that people rely on. We discuss how this finding relates to other longitudinal studies of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on measures related to conservatism.

Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions.

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., "It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!" vs. "Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!"). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.