Do smart people have better intuitions?

There is much evidence that high-capacity reasoners perform better on a variety of reasoning tasks (Stanovich, 1999), a phenomenon that is normally attributed to differences in either the efficacy or the probability of deliberate (Type II) engagement (Evans, 2007). In contrast, we hypothesized that intuitive (Type I) processes may differentiate high- and low-capacity reasoners. To test this hypothesis, reasoners were given a reasoning task modeled on the logic of the Stroop Task, in which they had to ignore one dimension of a problem when instructed to give an answer based on the other dimension (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011). Specifically, in Experiment 1, 112 reasoners were asked to give judgments consistent with beliefs or validity for 2 different types of deductive reasoning problems. In Experiment 2, 224 reasoners gave judgments consistent with beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) or statistics (i.e., base-rates) on a base rate task; half responded under a strict deadline. For all 3 problem types and regardless of the deadline, high-capacity reasoners performed better for logic/statistics than did belief judgments when the 2 conflicted, whereas the reverse was true for low-capacity reasoners. In other words, for high-capacity reasoners, statistical information interfered with their ability to make belief-based judgments, suggesting that, for them, probabilities may be more intuitive than stereotypes. Thus, at least part of the accuracy-capacity relationship observed in reasoning may be because of intuitive (Type I) processes. (PsycINFO Database Record

Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought.

Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

Reasoning, biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (1960).

Wason (1960) published a relatively short experimental paper, in which he introduced the 2-4-6 problem as a test of inductive reasoning. This paper became one of the most highly cited to be published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology and is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 2-4-6 task itself was ingenious and yielded evidence of error and bias in the intelligent participants who attempted it. Research on the 2-4-6 problem continues to the present day. More importantly, it was Wason's first paper on reasoning and one which made strong claims for bias and irrationality in a period dominated by rationalist writers like Piaget. It set in motion the study of cognitive biases in thinking and reasoning, well before the start of Tversky and Kahneman's famous heuristics and biases research programme. I also show here something for which Wason has received insufficient credit. It was Wason's work on this task and his later studies of his four card selection task that led to the first development of the dual process theory of reasoning which is so dominant in the current literature on the topic more than half a century later.

Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning.

There has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of deductive reasoning. Many researchers no longer think it is appropriate to ask people to assume premises and decide what necessarily follows, with the results evaluated by binary extensional logic. Most every day and scientific inference is made from more or less confidently held beliefs and not assumptions, and the relevant normative standard is Bayesian probability theory. We argue that the study of "uncertain deduction" should directly ask people to assign probabilities to both premises and conclusions, and report an experiment using this method. We assess this reasoning by two Bayesian metrics: probabilistic validity and coherence according to probability theory. On both measures, participants perform above chance in conditional reasoning, but they do much better when statements are grouped as inferences, rather than evaluated in separate tasks.

Deontic introduction: A theory of inference from is to ought.

Humans have a unique ability to generate novel norms. Faced with the knowledge that there are hungry children in Somalia, we easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to famine relief charities. Although a contentious and lively issue in metaethics, such inference from "is" to "ought" has not been systematically studied in the psychology of reasoning. We propose that deontic introduction is the result of a rich chain of pragmatic inference, most of it implicit; specifically, when an action is causally linked to a valenced goal, valence transfers to the action and bridges into a deontic conclusion. Participants in 5 experiments were presented with utility conditionals in which an action results in a benefit, a cost, or neutral outcome (e.g., "If Lisa buys the booklet, she will pass the exam") and asked to evaluate how strongly deontic conclusions (e.g., "Lisa should buy the booklet") follow from the premises. Findings show that the direction of the conclusions was determined by outcome valence (Experiments 1a and 1b), whereas their strength was determined by the strength of the causal link between action and outcome (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b). We also found that deontic introduction is defeasible and can be suppressed by additional premises that interfere with any of the links in the implicit chain of inference (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3). We propose that deontic introduction is a species-specific generative capacity whose function is to regulate future behavior.

Rationality and the illusion of choice.

The psychology of reasoning and decision making (RDM) shares the methodology of cognitive psychology in that researchers assume that participants are doing their best to solve the problems according to the instruction. Unlike other cognitive researchers, however, they often view erroneous answers evidence of irrationality rather than limited efficiency in the cognitive systems studied. Philosophers and psychologists also talk of people being irrational in a special sense that does not apply to other animals, who are seen as having no choice in their own behavior. I argue here that (a) RDM is no different from other fields of cognitive psychology and should be subject to the same kind of scientific inferences, and (b) the special human sense of irrationality derives from folk psychology and the illusory belief that there are conscious people in charge of their minds and decisions.

The presumption of consciousness.

Throughout this article the authors presume - without justification - that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate.

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

Theory and Metatheory in the Study of Dual Processing: Reply to Comments.

In this article, we respond to the four comments on our target article. Some of the commentators suggest that we have formulated our proposals in a way that renders our account of dual-process theory untestable and less interesting than the broad theory that has been critiqued in recent literature. Our response is that there is a confusion of levels. Falsifiable predictions occur not at the level of paradigm or metatheory-where this debate is taking place-but rather in the instantiation of such a broad framework in task level models. Our proposal that many dual-processing characteristics are only correlated features does not weaken the testability of task-level dual-processing accounts. We also respond to arguments that types of processing are not qualitatively distinct and discuss specific evidence disputed by the commentators. Finally, we welcome the constructive comments of one commentator who provides strong arguments for the reality of the dual-process distinction.

Subtracting "ought" from "is": descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.

We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial "is-ought" inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we propose that a clear distinction between normative systems and competence theories is essential, arguing that equating them invites an "is-ought" inference: to wit, supporting normative "ought" theories with empirical "is" evidence. We analyze in detail two research programmes with normativist features - Oaksford and Chater's rational analysis and Stanovich and West's individual differences approach - demonstrating how, in each case, equating norm and competence leads to an is-ought inference. Normativism triggers a host of research biases in the psychology of reasoning and decision making: focusing on untrained participants and novel problems, analyzing psychological processes in terms of their normative correlates, and neglecting philosophically significant paradigms when they do not supply clear standards for normative judgement. For example, in a dual-process framework, normativism can lead to a fallacious "ought-is" inference, in which normative responses are taken as diagnostic of analytic reasoning. We propose that little can be gained from normativism that cannot be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis, illustrating our position with Hypothetical Thinking Theory and the theory of the suppositional conditional. We conclude that descriptivism is a viable option, and that theories of higher mental processing would be better off freed from normative considerations.

The role of working memory capacity in multiple-cue probability learning.

Multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) involves learning to predict a criterion when outcome feedback is provided for multiple cues. A great deal of research suggests that working memory capacity (WMC) is involved in a wide range of tasks that draw on higher level cognitive processes. In three experiments, we examined the role of WMC in MCPL by introducing measures of working memory capacity, as well as other task manipulations. While individual differences in WMC positively predicted performance in some kinds of multiple-cue tasks, performance on other tasks was entirely unrelated to these differences. Performance on tasks that contained negative cues was correlated with working memory capacity, as well as measures of explicit knowledge obtained in the learning process. When the relevant cues predicted positively, however, WMC became irrelevant. The results are discussed in terms of controlled and automatic processes in learning and judgement.

Conditional reasoning in autism: activation and integration of knowledge and belief.

Everyday conditional reasoning is typically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 26) were less influenced by background knowledge than typically developing adolescents (N = 38) when engaged in conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences (p = .01) and invalid inferences (p = .01) compared with the typical group. In a secondary probability judgment task, no significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in the ability to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to exhibit a "yes" response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everyday reasoning. These findings are discussed with reference to weak central coherence theory and the conditional reasoning literature.

Do people reason on the Wason selection task? A new look at the data of Ball et al. (2003).

Despite the popularity of the Wason selection task in the psychology of reasoning, doubt remains as to whether card choices actually reflect a process of reasoning. One view is that while participants reason about the cards and their hidden sides-as indicated by protocol analysis-this reasoning merely confabulates explanations for cards that were preconsciously cued. This hypothesis has apparently been supported by studies that show that participants predominantly inspect cards which they end up selecting. In this paper, we reanalyse the data of one such study, which used eye-movement tracking to record card inspection times (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). We show that while cards favoured by matching bias are inspected for roughly equal lengths of times, their selection rates are strongly affected by their logical status. These findings strongly support a two-stage account in which attention is necessary but not sufficient for card selections. Hence, reasoning does indeed affect participants' choices on this task.

Heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer.

Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2009) present a review of research on fast and frugal heuristics, arguing that complex problems are best solved by simple heuristics, rather than the application of knowledge and logical reasoning. We argue that the case for such heuristics is overrated. First, we point out that heuristics can often lead to biases as well as effective responding. Second, we show that the application of logical reasoning can be both necessary and relatively simple. Finally, we argue that the evidence for a logical reasoning system that co-exists with simpler heuristic forms of thinking is overwhelming. Not only is it implausible a priori that we would have evolved such a system that is of no use to us, but extensive evidence from the literature on dual processing in reasoning and judgement shows that many problems can only be solved when this form of reasoning is used to inhibit and override heuristic thinking.

The influence of cognitive ability and instructional set on causal conditional inference.

We report a large study in which participants are invited to draw inferences from causal conditional sentences with varying degrees of believability. General intelligence was measured, and participants were split into groups of high and low ability. Under strict deductive-reasoning instructions, it was observed that higher ability participants were significantly less influenced by prior belief than were those of lower ability. This effect disappeared, however, when pragmatic reasoning instructions were employed in a separate group. These findings are in accord with dual-process theories of reasoning. We also took detailed measures of beliefs in the conditional sentences used for the reasoning tasks. Statistical modelling showed that it is not belief in the conditional statement per se that is the causal factor, but rather correlates of it. Two different models of belief-based reasoning were found to fit the data according to the kind of instructions and the type of inference under consideration.