Influences of past moral behavior on future behavior: A review of sequential moral behavior studies using meta-analytic techniques.

Experimental research on sequential moral behavior (SMB) has found that engaging in an initial moral (or immoral) behavior can sometimes lead to moral balancing (i.e., switching between positive and negative behavior) and sometimes to moral consistency (i.e., maintaining a consistent pattern of positive or negative behavior). In two meta-analyses, we present the first comprehensive syntheses of SMB studies and test moderators to identify the conditions under which moral balancing and moral consistency are most likely to occur. Meta-Analysis 1 (k = 217 effect sizes, N = 31,242) revealed that engaging in an initial positive behavior only reliably resulted in moral licensing (i.e., balancing) in studies that measured engagement in negative target behaviors (Hedges' g = 0.25, 95% CI [0.16, 0.44]) and only resulted in positive consistency in foot-in-the-door studies using prosocial requests (Hedges' g = -0.44, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.29]). Meta-Analysis 2 (k = 132 effect sizes, N = 14,443) revealed that engaging in an initial negative behavior only reliably resulted in moral compensation (i.e., balancing) in studies that measured engagement in positive target behaviors (Hedges' g = 0.27, 95% CI [0.18, 0.37]). We found no evidence for reliable negative consistency effects in any conditions. These results cannot be readily explained by current theories of SMB effects, and so further research is needed to better understand the mechanisms that drive moral balancing and consistency under the conditions observed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Morally excused but socially excluded: Denying agency through the defense of mental impairment.

Defendants can deny they have agency, and thus responsibility, for a crime by using a defense of mental impairment. We argue that although this strategy may help defendants evade blame, it may carry longer-term social costs, as lay people's perceptions of a person's agency might determine some of the moral rights they grant them. Three randomized between-group experiments (N = 1601) used online vignettes to examine lay perceptions of a hypothetical defendant using a defense of mental impairment (versus a guilty plea). We find that using a defense of mental impairment significantly reduces responsibility, blame, and punitiveness relative to a guilty plea, and these judgments are mediated by perceptions of reduced moral agency. However, after serving their respective sentences, those using the defense are sometimes conferred fewer rights, as reduced agency corresponds to an increase in perceived dangerousness. Our findings were found to be robust across different types of mental impairment, offences/sentences, and using both manipulated and measured agency. The findings have implications for defendants claiming reduced agency through legal defenses, as well as for the broader study of moral rights and mind perception.

Morally excused but socially excluded: Denying agency through the defense of mental impairment.

Defendants can deny they have agency, and thus responsibility, for a crime by using a defense of mental impairment. We argue that although this strategy may help defendants evade blame, it may carry longer-term social costs, as lay people's perceptions of a person's agency might determine some of the moral rights they grant them. In this registered report protocol, we seek to expand upon preliminary findings from two pilot studies to examine how and why those using the defense of mental impairment are seen as less deserving of certain rights. The proposed study uses a hypothetical vignette design, varying the type of mental impairment, type of crime, and type of sentence. Our design for the registered study improves on various aspects of our pilot studies and aims to rigorously test the reliability and credibility of our model. The findings have implications for defendants claiming reduced agency through legal defenses, as well as for the broader study of moral rights and mind perception.