Using theoretical constraints and the TASI taxonomy to delineate predictably replicable findings.

The focus of the present article is not on failures to replicate but on the more optimistically framed and more fruitful question: What stable findings can be reproduced reliably and can be trusted by decision makers, managers, health agents, or politicians? We propagate the working hypothesis that a twofold key to stable and replicable findings lies in the existence of theoretical constraints and, no less important, in researchers' sensitivity to metatheoretical, auxiliary assumptions. We introduce a hierarchy of four levels of theoretical constraints-a priori principles, psychophysical, empirical, and modelling constraints-combined with the TASI taxonomy of theoretical, auxiliary, statistical, and inferential assumptions Trafimow, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 52, 37-48, (2022). Although theoretical constraints clearly facilitate stable and replicable research findings, TASI reminds us of various reasons why even perfectly valid hypotheses need not always be borne out. The presented framework should help researchers to operationalize conditions under which theoretical constraints render empirical findings most predictable.

Small Sample Size and Group Homogeneity: A Crucial Ingredient to Inter-Group Bias.

Applying a recently developed framework for the study of sample-based person impressions to the level of group impressions resulted in convergent evidence for a highly robust judgment process. How stimulus traits mapped on the resulting group impressions was subject to two distinct moderators, diagnosticity of traits, and the amplifying impact of early sample truncation. Three indices of diagnosticity-negative valence, extremity, and distance to other traits in a density framework-determined participants' decision to truncate trait sampling early and hence the final group judgments. When trait samples were negative and extreme and when the distance between high-density traits was small, early truncation of the trait samples fostered high group homogeneity and polarized impressions. Granting that mental representations of in-groups and out-groups rely on systematically different samples, our sampling approach can account for various inter-group biases: out-group homogeneity, out-group polarization and (because negative traits are more diagnostic) out-group derogation.

On the role of exploitation and exploration strategies in the maintenance of cognitive biases: Beyond the pursuit of instrumental rewards.

Why can initial biases persist in repeated choice tasks? Previous research has shown that frequent rewards can lure the decision maker into premature exploitation of a supposedly best option, which can result in the persistence of initial biases. Here, we demonstrate that even in the absence of rewards, initial biases can be perpetuated through a positive testing strategy. After eliciting a biased preference for one of two equally rewarding options, participants (N = 203) could sample freely from both options without the lure of any financial rewards. When participants were told to rule out alternatives in this phase, they explored the supposedly worse option and thereby managed to overcome their initial bias. When told to optimize their strategy, however, they exhibited a positive testing strategy resulting in the continued exploitation of the supposedly better option, a bias they maintained in an incentivized choice phase and later judgments. Across all participants, individual tendencies to exploit one option in earlier phases predicted biased behavior in subsequent phases. The findings highlight that not only the pursuit of instrumental rewards can lead to exploitation and the maintenance of initial biases. We discuss potential consequences for interventions.

Pragmatic, constructive, and reconstructive memory influences on the hindsight bias.

In hindsight, when the outcome of an uncertain scenario is already known, we typically feel that this outcome was always likely; hindsight judgments of outcome probabilities exceed foresight judgments of the same probabilities without outcome knowledge. We extend prior accounts of hindsight bias with the influence of pragmatic communication inherent in the task and the consolidation of self-generated responses across time. In a novel 3 × 2 within-participants design, with three sequential judgments of outcome probabilities in two scenarios, we replicated the within-participants hindsight bias observed in the classic memory design and the between-participants hindsight bias in a hypothetical design simultaneously. Moreover, we reversed the classic memory design and showed that subjective probabilities also decreased when participants encountered foresight instructions after hindsight instructions, demonstrating that previously induced outcome knowledge did not prevent unbiased judgments. The constructive impact of self-generated and communicated judgments ("saying is believing") was apparent after a 2-week consolidation period: Not outcome knowledge, but rather the last pragmatic response (either biased or unbiased) determined judgments at the third measurement. These findings highlight the short-term malleability of hindsight influences in response to task pragmatics and has major implications for debiasing.

Forming impressions from self-truncated samples of traits-interplay of Thurstonian and Brunswikian sampling effects.

Consistent with sampling theories in judgment and decision research, impression judgments depend on the number of traits drawn randomly from a population of target person traits in distinct ways. When sample size is determined externally by the experimenter, the sensitivity of resulting impression judgments to the prevailing (positive or negative) valence increases with the number of traits. In contrast, sensitivity is negatively related to sample size (more extreme judgments for smaller samples) when sampling is self-truncated. Building on previous findings by Prager et al. (2018), two new experiments corroborate the judgment pattern for self-truncated sampling and elaborate on the distinction of Brunswikian sampling (of stimuli in the environment) and Thurstonian sampling (of states within the judge's mind). Thurstonian sampling effects were evident in depolarized (regressive) judgments by yoked control participants provided with exactly the same trait samples as original judges, who could truncate sampling when they felt ready for a judgment. Experiment 1 included two kinds of yoked controls, receiving trait samples truncated in a previous stage either by themselves or by other judges, distinguishing between temporal and interpersonal sources of Thurstonian sampling variance. As expected, self-yoking yielded less regressive shrinkage than other-yoking. Experiment 2 provided convergent results with yoked controls manipulated within participants, dealing with higher dispersion of impressions on self-truncated samples (Thurstone, 1927). Across both experiments, individual impression judgments were highly predictable from theoretically meaningful parameters: expected valence in the population, sampling error, sample size, and different indices of trait diagnosticity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Suppressor effects in self-enhancement research: A critical comment on condition-based regression analysis.

Self-enhancement conceived as a positive relation between happiness (H) and the difference S-O (self-rating S minus objective measure O) is inherently confounded with a positive self-view account: S alone may explain the positive relation to H. Condition-based regression analysis (CRA; Humberg et al., 2018a, 2018b) promises a solution. CRA assumes that opposite predictor weights (ßS > 0; ßO < 0) in regression of H on S and O rule out that H depends on S alone. However, despite the truism that two significant regression weights imply that both S and O contribute to the prediction model, they cannot rule out a positive self-view account. If only S shares variance with H, O may improve the prediction indirectly, by suppressing unpredictive S-variance in the prediction model. Granting S-O-redundancy, a classical suppressor effect (Conger & Jackson, 1972) results in a negative regression weight for O (binding S-variance that is unpredictive of H). Thus, the regression pattern that CRA presumes to rule out a positive self-view account indeed follows necessarily from a suppressor effect entailed in a positive self-view account. Computer simulations illustrate and corroborate this critique. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Quo Vadis, Methodology? The Key Role of Manipulation Checks for Validity Control and Quality of Science.

The current debate about how to improve the quality of psychological science revolves, almost exclusively, around the subordinate level of statistical significance testing. In contrast, research design and strict theorizing, which are superordinate to statistics in the methods hierarchy, are sorely neglected. The present article is devoted to the key role assigned to manipulation checks (MCs) for scientific quality control. MCs not only afford a critical test of the premises of hypothesis testing but also (a) prompt clever research design and validity control, (b) carry over to refined theorizing, and (c) have important implications for other facets of methodology, such as replication science. On the basis of an analysis of the reality of MCs reported in current issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, we propose a future methodology for the post-p < .05 era that replaces scrutiny in significance testing with refined validity control and diagnostic research designs.

Speed-accuracy trade-offs in sample-based decisions.

Success on many tasks depends on a trade-off between speed and accuracy. In a novel variant, a speed-accuracy trade-off with sample-based decisions in which both speed and accuracy jointly depend on (self-truncated) sample size, we found strong accuracy biases. On every trial of a sequential investment game, participants chose between 2 investment funds based on binary samples of the funds' past outcomes. Participants could stop sampling and decide whenever they felt sufficiently informed. Total payoff was the product of choice accuracy and number of choices completed within the available time (speed). Participants' failure to understand the dominance of speed over accuracy-that speed decreases more than accuracy improves with increasing sample size-led to dramatic oversampling. Our research aimed to examine to what extent metacognitive functions of monitoring and control could correct for the accuracy bias. Experiments 1a through 1c demonstrated similarly strong accuracy biases and payoff losses in psychology and economics students, depressed, and control patients. In Experiments 2 through 4, the accuracy bias persisted despite several manipulations (feedback, sample limit, choice difficulty, payoff, sampling truncation as default) that underlined the speed advantage, reflecting a conspicuous metacognitive deficit. Even when participants faced no risk of losing on incorrect trials but could still win on correct trials (Experiment 3) and when sampling was contingent on the active solicitation of every new element (Experiment 4), participants continued to sample too much and failed to overcome the accuracy bias. The final discussion focuses on psychological reasons and possible remedies for the metacognitive deficit in trade-off regulation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive representations and the predictive brain depend heavily on the environment.

In their scholarly target article, Gilead et al. explain how abstract mental representations and the predictive brain enable prospection and time-traveling. However, their exclusive focus on intrapsychic capacities misses an important point, namely, the degree to which mind and brain are tuned by the environment. This neglected aspect of adaptive cognition is discussed and illustrated from a cognitive-ecological perspective.

Biased preferences through exploitation: How initial biases are consolidated in reward-rich environments.

In the current article, we test the prediction that an initial bias favoring 1 of 2 equally rewarding options-either based on a genuine contingency or a pseudocontingency in a small sample of initial observations-can survive over an extended period of further sampling from both options, when the reward structure fosters exploitation. Specifically, we argue and demonstrate that in reward-rich environments where two options predominantly-but equally frequently-yield positive outcomes, the initial bias should be upheld because exploitation of the allegedly superior option reinforces the biased preference. In contrast, in reward-impoverished environments, where both options yield predominantly negative outcomes, initial biases can be expected to be eradicated through exploration, which increases the chance of recognizing the equality of the initially nonpreferred option. In 3 experiments, initial evidence in a guided-sampling phase was set up for participants to perceive an actual contingency (Experiment 1) or infer a pseudocontingency (Experiment 2a and b) that made 1 option look more rewarding. In a subsequent free-sampling phase this led to a sustained bias toward this option when the environment contained mostly positive but not when it contained mostly negative outcomes. We argue that biased sampling in reward-rich environments could be responsible for false beliefs about the outcomes of behavioral options, and as such could be relevant to a broad range of topics including social interactions or health contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Metacognitive myopia in change detection: A collective approach to overcome a persistent anomaly.

Going beyond the origins of cognitive biases, which have been the focus of continued research, the notion of metacognitive myopia refers to the failure to monitor, control, and correct for biased inferences at the metacognitive level. Judgments often follow the given information uncritically, even when it is easy to find out or explicitly explained that information samples are misleading or invalid. The present research is concerned with metacognitive myopia in judgments of change. Participants had to decide whether pairs of binomial samples were drawn from populations with decreasing, equal, or increasing proportions p of a critical feature. Judgments of p changes were strongly affected by changes in absolute sample size n, such that only increases (decreases) in p that came along with increasing (decreasing) n were readily detected. Across 4 experiments these anomalies persisted even though the distinction of p and n was strongly emphasized through outcome feedback and full debriefing (Experiment 1-4), simultaneous presentation (Experiments 2-4), and recoding of experienced samples into descriptive percentages (Experiment 3-4). In Experiment 4, a joint attempt was made by 10 scientists working in 7 different institutions to develop an effective debiasing training, suggesting how multilab-collaboration might improve the quality of science in the early stage of operational research designing. Despite significant improvements in change judgments, debiasing treatments did not eliminate the anomalies. Possible ways of dealing with the metacognitive deficit are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Laughter is in the air: involvement of key nodes of the emotional motor system in the anticipation of tickling.

In analogy to the appreciation of humor, that of tickling is based upon the re-interpretation of an anticipated emotional situation. Hence, the anticipation of tickling contributes to the final outburst of ticklish laughter. To localize the neuronal substrates of this process, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was conducted on 31 healthy volunteers. The state of anticipation was simulated by generating an uncertainty respecting the onset of manual foot tickling. Anticipation was characterized by an augmented fMRI signal in the anterior insula, the hypothalamus, the nucleus accumbens and the ventral tegmental area, as well as by an attenuated one in the internal globus pallidus. Furthermore, anticipatory activity in the anterior insula correlated positively with the degree of laughter that was produced during tickling. These findings are consistent with an encoding of the expected emotional consequences of tickling and suggest that early regulatory mechanisms influence, automatically, the laughter circuitry at the level of affective and sensory processing. Tickling activated not only those regions of the brain that were involved during anticipation, but also the posterior insula, the anterior cingulate cortex and the periaqueductal gray matter. Sequential or combined anticipatory and tickling-related neuronal activities may adjust emotional and sensorimotor pathways in preparation for the impending laughter response.

Towards a deeper understanding of impression formation-New insights gained from a cognitive-ecological perspective.

Impression formation is a basic module of fundamental research in social cognition, with broad implications for applied research on interpersonal relations, social attitudes, employee selection, and person judgments in legal and political context. Drawing on a pool of 28 predominantly positive traits used in Solomon Asch's (1946) seminal impression studies, two research teams have investigated the impact of the number of person traits sampled randomly from the pool on the evaluative impression of the target person. Whereas Norton, Frost, and Ariely (2007) found a "less-is-more" effect, reflecting less positive impressions with increasing sample size n, Ullrich, Krueger, Brod, and Groschupf (2013) concluded that an n-independent averaging rule can account for the data patterns obtained in both labs. We address this issue by disentangling different influences of n on resulting impressions, namely varying baserates of positive and negative traits, different sampling procedures, and trait diagnosticity. Depending on specific task conditions, which can be derived on theoretical grounds, the strength of resulting impressions (in the direction of the more prevalent valence) (a) increases with increasing n for diagnostic traits, (b) is independent of n for nondiagnostic traits, or (c) decreases with n when self-truncated sampling produces a distinct primacy effect. This refined pattern, which holds for the great majority of individual participants, illustrates the importance of strong theorizing in cumulative science (Fiedler, 2017) built on established empirical laws and logically sound theorizing. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Creative Cycle and the Growth of Psychological Science.

Scientific progress relies on the dialectics of loosening and tightening processes. Although most gripping accomplishments in psychological science testify to the critical role of creative and innovative theorizing (loosening), the ongoing debate on the quality of psychological science is focused almost totally on a restrictive sense of tightening, revolving around statistical hypothesis testing (tightening). A discussion of the imbalance between the conspicuous neglect of theory and the overstated importance of the sacred cow of significance testing raises a skeptical question: Do we seriously believe that stricter compliance rules, exact p values, effect size calculations, new statistics, and monitoring of research practices will foster the growth of excellent science? A more effective strategy would be to start a positive debate that focuses on the best exemplars of strong theorizing and fascinating findings, replacing the focus on insufficient science and unwanted practices.

Metacognitive Myopia in Hidden-Profile Tasks: The Failure to Control for Repetition Biases.

The failure to exploit collective wisdom is evident in the conspicuous difficulty to solve hidden-profile tasks. While previous accounts focus on group-dynamics and motivational biases, the present research applies a metacognitive perspective to an ordinary learning approach. Assuming that evaluative learning is sensitive to the frequency with which targets are paired with positive versus negative attributes, selective repetition of targets' assets and deficits will inevitably bias the resulting evaluations. As selective repetition effects are ubiquitous, metacognitive monitoring and control functions are required to correct for repetition biases. However, three experiments show that metacognitive myopia prevents judges from correction, even when explicitly warned to ignore selective repetition (Experiment 1), when same-speaker repetitions rule out social validation (Experiment 2) and when blatant debriefing enforces superficial corrections (Experiment 3). For a comprehensive understanding of collective judgments and decisions, it is essential to take metacognitive monitoring and control into account.

What Constitutes Strong Psychological Science? The (Neglected) Role of Diagnosticity and A Priori Theorizing.

A Bayesian perspective on Ioannidis's (2005) memorable statement that "Most Published Research Findings Are False" suggests a seemingly inescapable trade-off: It appears as if research hypotheses are based either on safe ground (high prior odds), yielding valid but unsurprising results, or on unexpected and novel ideas (low prior odds), inspiring risky and surprising findings that are inevitably often wrong. Indeed, research of two prominent types, sexy hypothesis testing and model testing, is often characterized by low priors (due to astounding hypotheses and conjunctive models) as well as low-likelihood ratios (due to nondiagnostic predictions of the yin-or-yang type). However, the trade-off is not inescapable: An alternative research approach, theory-driven cumulative science, aims at maximizing both prior odds and diagnostic hypothesis testing. The final discussion emphasizes the value of pluralistic science, within which exploratory phenomenon-driven research can play a similarly strong part as strict theory-testing science.

Higher order influences on evaluative priming: Processing styles moderate congruity effects.

A growing body of research challenges the automaticity of evaluative priming (EP). The present research adds to this literature by suggesting that EP is sensitive to processing styles. We relied on previous research showing that EP is determined by the extent to which the prime and the target events on a given trial are processed as a unified compound. Here, we further hypothesised that processing styles encouraging the inclusion of the prime to the target episode support congruity effects, whereas processing styles that enhance the exclusion of the prime from the target episode interrupt (or reverse) these effects. In Experiment 1, a preceding similarity search task produced a congruity effect, whereas a dissimilarity search task eliminated and (non-significantly) reversed this effect. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated and extended these findings using a global/local processing manipulation. Overall, these findings confirm that EP is flexible, open to top-down influences and strategic regulation.

The dynamics of choice in a changing world: Effects of full and partial feedback.

We explored the dynamics of choice behavior while the values of the options changed, unannounced, several times. In particular, choice dynamics were compared when the outcome values of all available options were known (full feedback) and when the outcome value of only the chosen option was known (partial feedback). The frequency of change, the values of the options, and the difference between them were also manipulated. In an experiment with N = 427, we found that the patterns of choices were different for the two levels of feedback. Whereas behavior in the full-feedback condition showed a tendency to switch choices following a missed opportunity-replicating previous findings-the behavior in the partial-feedback condition was different. It was sensitive to the outcome value of the chosen option in comparison to some memory of the last-experienced outcome value of the unchosen option. However, the comparison of these two values influenced choice behavior only when the outcome of the currently chosen option was satisfactory and the last outcome of the unchosen one was not. As expected, the other manipulated variables (change frequency, the options' values, and the difference between them) had no effect on the dynamics of behavior.

Insular cortex activity and the evocation of laughter.

The insular cortex is fundamentally involved in the processing of interoceptive information. It has been postulated that the integrative monitoring of the bodily responses to environmental stimuli is crucial for the recognition and experience of emotions. Because emotional arousal is known to be closely coupled to functions of the anterior insula, we suspected laughter to be associated primarily with neuronal activity in this region. An anatomically constrained re-analysis of our imaging data pertaining to ticklish laughter, to inhibited ticklish laughter, and to voluntary laughter revealed regional differences in the levels of neuronal activity in the posterior and mid-/anterior portions of the insula. Ticklish laughter was associated specifically with right ventral anterior insular activity, which was not detected under the other two conditions. Hence, apparently, only laughter that is evoked as an emotional response bears the signature of autonomic arousal in the insular cortex.