Confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality.

Perceptual reality monitoring refers to the ability to distinguish internally triggered imagination from externally triggered reality. Such monitoring can take place at perceptual or cognitive levels-for example, in lucid dreaming, perceptual experience feels real but is accompanied by a cognitive insight that it is not real. We recently developed a paradigm to reveal perceptual reality monitoring errors during wakefulness in the general population, showing that imagined signals can be erroneously attributed to perception during a perceptual detection task. In the current study, we set out to investigate whether people have insight into perceptual reality monitoring errors by additionally measuring perceptual confidence. We used hierarchical Bayesian modeling of confidence criteria to characterize metacognitive insight into the effects of imagery on detection. Over two experiments, we found that confidence criteria moved in tandem with the decision criterion shift, indicating a failure of reality monitoring not only at a perceptual but also at a metacognitive level. These results further show that such failures have a perceptual rather than a decisional origin. Interestingly, offline queries at the end of the experiment revealed global, task-level insight, which was uncorrelated with local, trial-level insight as measured with confidence ratings. Taken together, our results demonstrate that confidence ratings do not distinguish imagination from reality during perceptual detection. Future research should further explore the different cognitive dimensions of insight into reality judgments and how they are related.

Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models.

Technological advances raise new puzzles and challenges for cognitive science and the study of how humans think about and interact with artificial intelligence (AI). For example, the advent of large language models and their human-like linguistic abilities has raised substantial debate regarding whether or not AI could be conscious. Here, we consider the question of whether AI could have subjective experiences such as feelings and sensations ('phenomenal consciousness'). While experts from many fields have weighed in on this issue in academic and public discourse, it remains unknown whether and how the general population attributes phenomenal consciousness to AI. We surveyed a sample of US residents (n = 300) and found that a majority of participants were willing to attribute some possibility of phenomenal consciousness to large language models. These attributions were robust, as they predicted attributions of mental states typically associated with phenomenality-but also flexible, as they were sensitive to individual differences such as usage frequency. Overall, these results show how folk intuitions about AI consciousness can diverge from expert intuitions-with potential implications for the legal and ethical status of AI.

Different components of cognitive-behavioral therapy affect specific cognitive mechanisms.

Psychological therapies are among the most effective treatments for common mental health problems-however, we still know relatively little about how exactly they improve symptoms. Here, we demonstrate the power of combining theory with computational methods to parse effects of different components of cognitive-behavioral therapies onto underlying mechanisms. Specifically, we present data from a series of randomized-controlled experiments testing the effects of brief components of behavioral and cognitive therapies on different cognitive processes, using well-validated behavioral measures and associated computational models. A goal setting intervention, based on behavioral activation therapy activities, reliably and selectively reduced sensitivity to effort when deciding how to act to gain reward. By contrast, a cognitive restructuring intervention, based on cognitive therapy materials, reliably and selectively reduced the tendency to attribute negative everyday events to self-related causes. The effects of each intervention were specific to these respective measures. Our approach provides a basis for beginning to understand how different elements of common psychotherapy programs may work.

Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond.

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness ('C-tests') are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them.

Identifying content-invariant neural signatures of perceptual vividness.

Some conscious experiences are more vivid than others. Although perceptual vividness is a key component of human consciousness, how variation in this magnitude property is registered by the human brain is unknown. A striking feature of neural codes for magnitude in other psychological domains, such as number or reward, is that the magnitude property is represented independently of its sensory features. To test whether perceptual vividness also covaries with neural codes that are invariant to sensory content, we reanalyzed existing magnetoencephalography and functional MRI data from two distinct studies which quantified perceptual vividness via subjective ratings of awareness and visibility. Using representational similarity and decoding analyses, we find evidence for content-invariant neural signatures of perceptual vividness distributed across visual, parietal, and frontal cortices. Our findings indicate that the neural correlates of subjective vividness may share similar properties to magnitude codes in other cognitive domains.

Distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental sources of the value of choice.

Considerable evidence suggests that people value the freedom to choose. However, it is unclear whether this preference for choice stems purely from choice's intrinsic value, or whether people prefer to choose because it tends to provide instrumental information about desirable outcomes. To address this question, participants completed a novel choice task in which they could freely choose to exert choice or not, manipulating the level of instrumental contingency between participants' choices and eventual outcomes, which we operationalized using the information-theoretic concept of mutual information. Across two experiments (N = 100 each), we demonstrate a marked preference for choice, but importantly found that participants' preference for free choice is weakened when actions are decoupled from outcomes. Taken together, our results demonstrate that a significant factor in people's preference for choice is an assumption about the instrumental value of choice, suggesting against a purely intrinsic value of choice.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis.

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

The future of metacognition research: Balancing construct breadth with measurement rigor.

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one's capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition - such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.

Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience.

To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts. To investigate this question, we used three carefully matched manipulations that typically result in behavioral shifts in decision criteria: a visual illusion (Müller-Lyer condition), a punishment scheme (payoff condition), and a change in the ratio of relevant stimuli (base rate condition). To gauge shifts in subjective experience, we introduce a task in which participants not only make decisions about what they have just seen but are also asked to reproduce their experience of a target stimulus. Using Bayesian ordinal modeling, we show that each of these three manipulations affects the decision criterion as intended but that the visual illusion uniquely affects sensory experience as measured by reproduction. In a series of follow-up experiments, we use computational modeling to show that although the visual illusion results in a distinct drift-diffusion (DDM) parameter profile relative to nonsensory manipulations, reliance on DDM parameter estimates alone is not sufficient to ascertain whether a given manipulation is perceptual or nonperceptual.

Paradoxical evidence weighting in confidence judgments for detection and discrimination.

When making discrimination decisions between two stimulus categories, subjective confidence judgments are more positively affected by evidence in support of a decision than negatively affected by evidence against it. Recent theoretical proposals suggest that this "positive evidence bias" may be due to observers adopting a detection-like strategy when rating their confidence-one that has functional benefits for metacognition in real-world settings where detectability and discriminability often go hand in hand. However, it is unknown whether, or how, this evidence-weighting asymmetry affects detection decisions about the presence or absence of a stimulus. In four experiments, we first successfully replicate a positive evidence bias in discrimination confidence. We then show that detection decisions and confidence ratings paradoxically suffer from an opposite "negative evidence bias" to negatively weigh evidence even when it is optimal to assign it a positive weight. We show that the two effects are uncorrelated and discuss our findings in relation to models that account for a positive evidence bias as emerging from a confidence-specific heuristic, and alternative models where decision and confidence are generated by the same, Bayes-rational process.

Interoceptive and metacognitive facets of fatigue in multiple sclerosis.

Numerous disorders are characterised by fatigue as a highly disabling symptom. Fatigue plays a particularly important clinical role in multiple sclerosis (MS) where it exerts a profound impact on quality of life. Recent concepts of fatigue grounded in computational theories of brain-body interactions emphasise the role of interoception and metacognition in the pathogenesis of fatigue. So far, however, for MS, empirical data on interoception and metacognition are scarce. This study examined interoception and (exteroceptive) metacognition in a sample of 71 persons with a diagnosis of MS. Interoception was assessed by prespecified subscales of a standard questionnaire (Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness [MAIA]), while metacognition was investigated with computational models of choice and confidence data from a visual discrimination paradigm. Additionally, autonomic function was examined by several physiological measurements. Several hypotheses were tested based on a preregistered analysis plan. In brief, we found the predicted association of interoceptive awareness with fatigue (but not with exteroceptive metacognition) and an association of autonomic function with exteroceptive metacognition (but not with fatigue). Furthermore, machine learning (elastic net regression) showed that individual fatigue scores could be predicted out-of-sample from our measurements, with questionnaire-based measures of interoceptive awareness and sleep quality as key predictors. Our results support theoretical concepts of interoception as an important factor for fatigue and demonstrate the general feasibility of predicting individual levels of fatigue from simple questionnaire-based measures of interoception and sleep.

Re-evaluating frontopolar and temporoparietal contributions to detection and discrimination confidence.

Previously, we identified a subset of regions where the relation between decision confidence and univariate functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity was quadratic, with stronger activation for both high and low compared with intermediate levels of confidence. We further showed that, in a subset of these regions, this quadratic modulation appeared only for confidence in detection decisions about the presence or absence of a stimulus, and not for confidence in discrimination decisions about stimulus identity (Mazor et al. 2021). Here, in a pre-registered follow-up experiment, we sought to replicate our original findings and identify the origins of putative detection-specific confidence signals by introducing a novel asymmetric-discrimination condition. The new condition required discriminating two alternatives but was engineered such that the distribution of perceptual evidence was asymmetric, just as in yes/no detection. We successfully replicated the quadratic modulation of subjective confidence in prefrontal, parietal and temporal cortices. However, in contrast with our original report, this quadratic effect was similar in detection and discrimination responses, but stronger in the novel asymmetric-discrimination condition. We interpret our findings as weighing against the detection-specificity of confidence signatures and speculate about possible alternative origins of a quadratic modulation of decision confidence.

Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination.

Humans are voracious imaginers, with internal simulations supporting memory, planning and decision-making. Because the neural mechanisms supporting imagery overlap with those supporting perception, a foundational question is how reality and imagination are kept apart. One possibility is that the intention to imagine is used to identify and discount self-generated signals during imagery. Alternatively, because internally generated signals are generally weaker, sensory strength is used to index reality. Traditional psychology experiments struggle to investigate this issue as subjects can rapidly learn that real stimuli are in play. Here, we combined one-trial-per-participant psychophysics with computational modelling and neuroimaging to show that imagined and perceived signals are in fact intermixed, with judgments of reality being determined by whether this intermixed signal is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. A consequence of this account is that when virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality.

Age-related decreases in global metacognition are independent of local metacognition and task performance.

Metacognition refers to a capacity to reflect on and control other cognitive processes, commonly quantified as the extent to which confidence tracks objective performance. There is conflicting evidence about how "local" metacognition (monitoring of individual judgments) and "global" metacognition (estimates of self-performance) change across the lifespan. Additionally, the degree to which metacognition generalises across cognitive domains may itself change with age due to increased experience with one's own abilities. Using a gamified suite of performance-controlled memory and visual perception tasks, we measured local and global metacognition in an age-stratified sample of 304 healthy volunteers (18-83 years; N = 50 in each of 6 age groups). We calculated both local and global metrics of metacognition and quantified how and whether domain-generality changes with age. First-order task performance was stable across the age range. People's global self-performance estimates and local metacognitive bias decreased with age, indicating overall lower confidence in performance. In contrast, local metacognitive efficiency was spared in older age and remained correlated across the two cognitive domains. A stability of local metacognition indicates distinct mechanisms contributing to local and global metacognition. Our study reveals how local and global metacognition change across the lifespan and provide a benchmark against which disease-related changes in metacognition can be compared.

Metacognitive computations for information search: Confidence in control.

The metacognitive sense of confidence can play a critical role in regulating decision making. In particular, a lack of confidence can justify the explicit, potentially costly, instrumental acquisition of extra information that might resolve uncertainty. Human confidence is highly complex, and recent computational work has suggested a statistically sophisticated tapestry behind the information that governs both the making and monitoring of choices. However, the consequences of the form of such confidence computations for search have yet to be understood. Here, we reveal extra richness in the use of confidence for information seeking by formulating joint models of action, confidence, and information search within a Bayesian and reinforcement learning framework. Through detailed theoretical analysis of these models, we show the intricate normative downstream consequences for search arising from more complex forms of metacognition. For example, our results highlight how the ability to monitor errors or general metacognitive sensitivity impact seeking decisions and can generate diverse relationships between action, confidence, and the optimal search for information. We also explore whether empirical search behavior enjoys any of the characteristics of normatively derived prescriptions. More broadly, our work demonstrates that it is crucial to treat metacognitive monitoring and control as closely linked processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Why and When Beliefs Change.

Why people do or do not change their beliefs has been a long-standing puzzle. Sometimes people hold onto false beliefs despite ample contradictory evidence; sometimes they change their beliefs without sufficient reason. Here, we propose that the utility of a belief is derived from the potential outcomes associated with holding it. Outcomes can be internal (e.g., positive/negative feelings) or external (e.g., material gain/loss), and only some are dependent on belief accuracy. Belief change can then be understood as an economic transaction in which the multidimensional utility of the old belief is compared against that of the new belief. Change will occur when potential outcomes alter across attributes, for example because of changing environments or when certain outcomes are made more or less salient.

Identifying cultural differences in metacognition.

Some aspects of human metacognition, such as the ability to consciously evaluate our beliefs and decisions, are hypothesized to be culturally acquired. However, direct evidence for this claim is lacking. As an initial step toward answering this question, here we examine differences in metacognitive performance between populations matched for occupation (students), income, demographics and general intelligence but drawn from 2 distinct cultural milieus (Beijing, China and London, U.K.). Chinese participants showed more efficient metacognitive evaluation of perceptual decision-making task performance compared to U.K. participants. These differences manifested in boosts to postdecisional processing following error trials, despite no differences in first-order performance. In a second experiment, we directly replicate these findings and show that a metacognitive advantage generalizes to a task that replaces postdecision evidence with equivalent social advice. Together, our results are consistent with a proposal that metacognitive capacity is shaped via sociocultural interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition.

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Neurocomputational mechanisms of confidence in self and others.

Computing confidence in one's own and others' decisions is critical for social success. While there has been substantial progress in our understanding of confidence estimates about oneself, little is known about how people form confidence estimates about others. Here, we address this question by asking participants undergoing fMRI to place bets on perceptual decisions made by themselves or one of three other players of varying ability. We show that participants compute confidence in another player's decisions by combining distinct estimates of player ability and decision difficulty - allowing them to predict that a good player may get a difficult decision wrong and that a bad player may get an easy decision right. We find that this computation is associated with an interaction between brain systems implicated in decision-making (LIP) and theory of mind (TPJ and dmPFC). These results reveal an interplay between self- and other-related processes during a social confidence computation.

Low self-esteem and the formation of global self-performance estimates in emerging adulthood.

High self-esteem, an overall positive evaluation of self-worth, is a cornerstone of mental health. Previously we showed that people with low self-esteem differentially construct beliefs about momentary self-worth derived from social feedback. However, it remains unknown whether these anomalies extend to constructing beliefs about self-performance in a non-social context, in the absence of external feedback. Here, we examined this question using a novel behavioral paradigm probing subjects' self-performance estimates with or without external feedback. We analyzed data from young adults (N = 57) who were selected from a larger community sample (N = 2402) on the basis of occupying the bottom or top 10% of a reported self-esteem distribution. Participants performed a series of short blocks involving two perceptual decision-making tasks with varying degrees of difficulty, with or without feedback. At the end of each block, they had to decide on which task they thought they performed best, and gave subjective task ratings, providing two measures of self-performance estimates. We found no robust evidence of differences in objective performance between high and low self-esteem participants. Nevertheless, low self-esteem participants consistently underestimated their performance as expressed in lower subjective task ratings relative to high self-esteem participants. These results provide an initial window onto how cognitive processes underpinning the construction of self-performance estimates across different contexts map on to global dispositions relevant to mental health such as self-esteem.