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1.
Pest Manag Sci ; 76(6): 2030-2039, 2020 Jun.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31930763

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: It has been frequently argued that growers have less incentive to manage the evolution and spread of herbicide-resistant weeds on leased than on owned land. This is because resistance management provides long-term rather than short-term benefits that operators may be less assured of capturing on land they do not own. Yet, empirical evidence supporting this argument has been lacking. RESULTS: This study reports on results from a large-scale national survey of weed management and other crop production practices on US agricultural fields. Up to 11 weed management practices were compared across owner-operated versus renter-operated fields. Analysis of survey data from corn and soybean fields did not support the hypothesis that adoption of resistance management practices is lower on rented acres. In most instances, there were no statistically significant differences in herbicide use or weed management practices on rented versus owned land. This was true at both national and regional levels of analysis. Where there were significant differences, practices associated with greater herbicide resistance management were, as often as not, more prevalent on rented than owned land. CONCLUSIONS: A useful area of future research would be to test for land tenure differences in resistance management using multivariate analysis to control for confounding effects. Unobserved farmer or land characteristics may be confounding results and masking land tenure effects. Results here, however, suggest that these other effects are dominating any obvious disincentive effects of land leasing on resistance management. Of greater concern, the adoption of key resistance management practices was low on both owned and rented land. © 2020 Society of Chemical Industry.


Asunto(s)
Glycine max , Zea mays , Productos Agrícolas , Agricultores , Granjas , Herbicidas , Humanos , Malezas , Control de Malezas
2.
Pest Manag Sci ; 75(5): 1223-1233, 2019 May.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30407721

RESUMEN

Recent research has suggested that a high proportion of farms can dramatically reduce pesticide applications without reducing crop yields or farm profits. Yet this research has made estimation choices that may systematically bias downwards estimates of the productivity and profitability of pesticides. Fifty years of agricultural economics research provides lessons about how to avoid pitfalls in estimating pesticide productivity. Carefully executed econometric studies have found evidence of overuse, underuse, and near-optimal use of pesticides in different cropping systems. There are now standard methods to test and correct for sources of biases (either upward or downward) in estimates of pesticide productivity. Ignoring these lessons and methods can seriously bias estimates of the potential for reducing pesticide use at little or no economic cost. © 2018 Society of Chemical Industry.


Asunto(s)
Agricultura/estadística & datos numéricos , Plaguicidas , Agricultura/economía , Animales , Plaguicidas/economía , Riesgo
3.
Pest Manag Sci ; 74(10): 2376-2382, 2018 Oct.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-29656533

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: This article provides instructions and materials to moderate an interactive resistance management game. The game is designed to generate discussion about the challenges and possibilities of coordinating resistance management activities among groups of farmers. The game has been successfully applied in classroom settings, extension workshops, and at professional weed science meetings. Research has found farmers often perceive the success of their own resistance management may be thwarted if their neighbors are not adequately managing resistance as well. This can lead to negative 'tragedy of the commons' outcomes. RESULTS: In past applications of the game exercise, participants have often responded in ways consistent with similar studies in experimental and behavioral economics. This includes dividing benefits evenly (even though this is not a requirement of the game) or treating one-time transactions as potentially repeated exchanges. Player behavior may also be greatly influenced by their attitudes toward monetary risks. CONCLUSION: The game allows participants to explore ways to overcome the tragedy of the commons and illustrates the roles of information sharing and economic incentives in finding solutions. It also allows participants to experiment with bottom-up voluntary approaches toward resistance management as an alternative to top-down regulatory approaches. © 2018 Society of Chemical Industry.


Asunto(s)
Agricultura/educación , Agricultores/educación , Resistencia a los Herbicidas , Herbicidas/farmacología , Malezas/efectos de los fármacos , Control de Malezas/métodos , Productos Agrícolas/efectos de los fármacos , Herbicidas/toxicidad
4.
Pest Manag Sci ; 73(11): 2209-2220, 2017 Nov.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28618159

RESUMEN

The efficacy of any pesticide is an exhaustible resource that can be depleted over time. For decades, the dominant paradigm - that weed mobility is low relative to insect pests and pathogens, that there is an ample stream of new weed control technologies in the commercial pipeline, and that technology suppliers have sufficient economic incentives and market power to delay resistance - supported a laissez faire approach to herbicide resistance management. Earlier market data bolstered the belief that private incentives and voluntary actions were sufficient to manage resistance. Yet, there has been a steady growth in resistant weeds, while no new commercial herbicide modes of action (MOAs) have been discovered in 30 years. Industry has introduced new herbicide tolerant crops to increase the applicability of older MOAs. Yet, many weed species are already resistant to these compounds. Recent trends suggest a paradigm shift whereby herbicide resistance may impose greater costs to farmers, the environment, and taxpayers than earlier believed. In developed countries, herbicides have been the dominant method of weed control for half a century. Over the next half-century, will widespread resistance to multiple MOAs render herbicides obsolete for many major cropping systems? We suggest it would be prudent to consider the implications of such a low-probability, but high-cost development. © 2017 Society of Chemical Industry.


Asunto(s)
Productos Agrícolas/efectos de los fármacos , Resistencia a los Herbicidas , Herbicidas/farmacología , Malezas/efectos de los fármacos , Control de Malezas/economía , Control de Malezas/métodos , Productos Agrícolas/genética
5.
Pest Manag Sci ; 73(6): 1110-1120, 2017 Jun.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28139047

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: Dynamic optimization models are normative; they solve for what growers 'ought to do' to maximize some objective, such as long-run profits. While valuable for research, such models are difficult to solve computationally, limiting their applicability to grower resistance management education. While discussing properties of normative models in general, this study presents results of a specific positive model of herbicide resistance management, applied to Palmer amaranth control on a representative cotton farm. This positive model compares a proactive resistance management strategy to a reactive strategy with lower short-run costs, but greater risk of herbicide resistance developing. RESULTS: The proactive strategy can pay for itself within 1-4 years, with a yield advantage of 4% or less if the yield advantage begins within 1-2 years of adoption. Whether the proactive strategy is preferable is sensitive to resistance onset and yield losses, but less sensitive to cotton prices or baseline yields. Industry rebates to encourage residual herbicide use (to delay resistance to post-emergence treatments) may be too small to alter grower behavior or they may be paid to growers who would have used residuals anyway. Rebates change grower behavior over a relatively narrow range of model parameters. The size of rebates needed to induce a grower to adopt the proactive strategy declines significantly if growers extend their planning horizon from 1 year to 3-4 years. CONCLUSIONS: Whether proactive resistance management is more profitable than a reactive strategy is more sensitive to biological parameters than economic ones. Simulation results suggest growers with longer time horizons (perhaps younger ones) would be more responsive to rebate programs. More empirical work is needed to determine how much rebates increase residual use above what would occur without them. © 2017 Society of Chemical Industry.


Asunto(s)
Amaranthus , Productos Agrícolas/economía , Gossypium , Resistencia a los Herbicidas , Herbicidas , Control de Malezas/economía , Arkansas , Modelos Teóricos , Malezas/efectos de los fármacos , Control de Malezas/métodos
6.
Annu Rev Entomol ; 60: 621-45, 2015 Jan 07.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25423598

RESUMEN

Biological control is an underlying pillar of integrated pest management, yet little focus has been placed on assigning economic value to this key ecosystem service. Setting biological control on a firm economic foundation would help to broaden its utility and adoption for sustainable crop protection. Here we discuss approaches and methods available for valuation of biological control of arthropod pests by arthropod natural enemies and summarize economic evaluations in classical, augmentative, and conservation biological control. Emphasis is placed on valuation of conservation biological control, which has received little attention. We identify some of the challenges of and opportunities for applying economics to biological control to advance integrated pest management. Interaction among diverse scientists and stakeholders will be required to measure the direct and indirect costs and benefits of biological control that will allow farmers and others to internalize the benefits that incentivize and accelerate adoption for private and public good.


Asunto(s)
Agricultura , Artrópodos , Control de Plagas , Agricultura/economía , Animales , Control de Plagas/economía , Plantas
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