Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant (B.1.617.2) from a fully vaccinated human to a canine in Georgia, July 2021.

SARS-CoV-2 infection has been described in a wide range of species, including domestic animals such as dogs and cats. Illness in dogs is usually self-limiting, and further diagnostics may not be pursued if clinical signs resolve or they respond to empirical treatment. As new variants emerge, the clinical presentation and role in transmission may vary in animals. This report highlights different clinical presentations and immunological responses in two SARS-CoV-2 Delta-variant-positive dogs with similar exposure to the same fully vaccinated human with a SARS-CoV-2 infection and emphasizes the need for active surveillance and additional One Health research on SARS-CoV-2 variant infections in companion animals and other species.

Multistate Outbreak of Melioidosis Associated with Imported Aromatherapy Spray.

Melioidosis, caused by the bacterium Burkholderia pseudomallei, is an uncommon infection that is typically associated with exposure to soil and water in tropical and subtropical environments. It is rarely diagnosed in the continental United States. Patients with melioidosis in the United States commonly report travel to regions where melioidosis is endemic. We report a cluster of four non-travel-associated cases of melioidosis in Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas. These cases were caused by the same strain of B. pseudomallei that was linked to an aromatherapy spray product imported from a melioidosis-endemic area.

Brucellosis Initially Misidentified as Ochrobactrum anthropi Bacteremia: A Case Report and Review of the Literature.

Automated identification systems may misidentify Brucella, the causative agent of brucellosis, which may be re-emerging in the United States as the result of an expanding feral swine population. We present a case of Brucella suis likely associated with feral swine exposure that was misidentified as Ochrobactrum anthropi, a phylogenetic relative.

Determining the role of natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in the death of domestic pets: 10 cases (2020-2021).

OBJECTIVE: To establish a pathoepidemiological model to evaluate the role of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the first 10 companion animals that died while infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the US. ANIMALS: 10 cats and dogs that tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and died or were euthanized in the US between March 2020 and January 2021. PROCEDURES: A standardized algorithm was developed to direct case investigations, determine the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and evaluate the role, if any, that SARS-CoV-2 infection played in the animals' course of disease and death. Using clinical and diagnostic information collected by state animal health officials, state public health veterinarians, and other state and local partners, this algorithm was applied to each animal case. RESULTS: SARS-CoV-2 was an incidental finding in 8 animals, was suspected to have contributed to the severity of clinical signs leading to euthanasia in 1 dog, and was the primary reason for death for 1 cat. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: This report provides the global community with a standardized process for directing case investigations, determining the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and determining the clinical significance of SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals with fatal outcomes and provides evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can, in rare circumstances, cause or contribute to death in pets.

Low SARS-CoV-2 Seroprevalence and No Active Infections among Dogs and Cats in Animal Shelters with Laboratory-Confirmed COVID-19 Human Cases among Employees.

Human-to-animal and animal-to-animal transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been documented; however, investigations into SARS-CoV-2 transmission in congregate animal settings are lacking. We investigated four animal shelters in the United States that had identified animals with exposure to shelter employees with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19. Of the 96 cats and dogs with specimens collected, only one dog had detectable SARS-CoV-2 neutralizing antibodies; no animal specimens had detectable viral RNA. These data indicate a low probability of human-to-animal transmission events in cats and dogs in shelter settings with early implementation of infection prevention interventions.

Case Series of Laboratory-Associated Zika Virus Disease, United States, 2016-2019.

Zika virus diagnostic testing and laboratory research increased considerably when Zika virus began spreading through the Americas in 2015, increasing the risk for potential Zika virus exposure of laboratory workers and biomedical researchers. We report 4 cases of laboratory-associated Zika virus disease in the United States during 2016-2019. Of these, 2 were associated with needlestick injuries; for the other 2 cases, the route of transmission was undetermined. In laboratories in which work with Zika virus is performed, good laboratory biosafety practices must be implemented and practiced to reduce the risk for infection among laboratory personnel.

Use of Real-Time PCR for Chlamydia psittaci Detection in Human Specimens During an Outbreak of Psittacosis - Georgia and Virginia, 2018.

Psittacosis is typically a mild febrile respiratory illness caused by infection with the bacterium Chlamydia psittaci and usually transmitted to humans by infected birds (1). On average, 11 psittacosis cases per year were reported in the United States during 2000-2017. During August-October 2018, the largest U.S. psittacosis outbreak in 30 years (82 cases identified*) occurred in two poultry slaughter plants, one each in Virginia and Georgia, that shared source farms (2). CDC used C. psittaci real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to test 54 human specimens from this outbreak. This was the largest number of human specimens from a single outbreak ever tested for C. psittaci using real-time PCR, which is faster and more sensitive than commercially available serologic tests. This represented a rare opportunity to assess the utility of multiple specimen types for real-time PCR detection of C. psittaci. C. psittaci was detected more frequently in lower respiratory specimens (59% [10 of 17]) and stool (four of five) than in upper respiratory specimens (7% [two of 28]). Among six patients with sputum and nasopharyngeal swabs tested, C. psittaci was detected only in sputum in five patients. Cycle threshold (Ct) values suggested bacterial load was higher in lower respiratory specimens than in nasopharyngeal swabs. These findings support prioritizing lower respiratory specimens for real-time PCR detection of C. psittaci. Stool specimens might also have utility for diagnosis of psittacosis.

Coronavirus Disease among Workers in Food Processing, Food Manufacturing, and Agriculture Workplaces.

We describe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US food manufacturing and agriculture workers and provide updated information on meat and poultry processing workers. Among 742 food and agriculture workplaces in 30 states, 8,978 workers had confirmed COVID-19; 55 workers died. Racial and ethnic minority workers could be disproportionately affected by COVID-19.

Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - United States, April-May 2020.

Meat and poultry processing facilities face distinctive challenges in the control of infectious diseases, including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons. Assessment of COVID-19 cases among workers in 115 meat and poultry processing facilities through April 27, 2020, documented 4,913 cases and 20 deaths reported by 19 states (1). This report provides updated aggregate data from states regarding the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, the number and demographic characteristics of affected workers, and the number of COVID-19-associated deaths among workers, as well as descriptions of interventions and prevention efforts at these facilities. Aggregate data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths among workers identified and reported through May 31, 2020, were obtained from 239 affected facilities (those with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in one or more workers) in 23 states.* COVID-19 was confirmed in 16,233 workers, including 86 COVID-19-related deaths. Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected meat and poultry processing facilities (112,616), COVID-19 was diagnosed in 9.1% of workers. Among 9,919 (61%) cases in 21 states with reported race/ethnicity, 87% occurred among racial and ethnic minority workers. Commonly reported interventions and prevention efforts at facilities included implementing worker temperature or symptom screening and COVID-19 education, mandating face coverings, adding hand hygiene stations, and adding physical barriers between workers. Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19-associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations. Implementation of these interventions and prevention efforts† across meat and poultry processing facilities nationally could help protect workers in this critical infrastructure industry.

COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - 19 States, April 2020.

Congregate work and residential locations are at increased risk for infectious disease transmission including respiratory illness outbreaks. SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), is primarily spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Nationwide, the meat and poultry processing industry, an essential component of the U.S. food infrastructure, employs approximately 500,000 persons, many of whom work in proximity to other workers (1). Because of reports of initial cases of COVID-19, in some meat processing facilities, states were asked to provide aggregated data concerning the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19 and the number of workers with COVID-19 in these facilities, including COVID-19-related deaths. Qualitative data gathered by CDC during on-site and remote assessments were analyzed and summarized. During April 9-27, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases among 115 meat or poultry processing facilities in 19 states were reported to CDC. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,913 (approximately 3%) workers, and 20 COVID-19-related deaths were reported. Facility barriers to effective prevention and control of COVID-19 included difficulty distancing workers at least 6 feet (2 meters) from one another (2) and in implementing COVID-19-specific disinfection guidelines.* Among workers, socioeconomic challenges might contribute to working while feeling ill, particularly if there are management practices such as bonuses that incentivize attendance. Methods to decrease transmission within the facility include worker symptom screening programs, policies to discourage working while experiencing symptoms compatible with COVID-19, and social distancing by workers. Source control measures (e.g., the use of cloth face covers) as well as increased disinfection of high-touch surfaces are also important means of preventing SARS-CoV-2 exposure. Mitigation efforts to reduce transmission in the community should also be considered. Many of these measures might also reduce asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission (3). Implementation of these public health strategies will help protect workers from COVID-19 in this industry and assist in preserving the critical meat and poultry production infrastructure (4).

Psittacosis Outbreak among Workers at Chicken Slaughter Plants, Virginia and Georgia, USA, 2018.

During August-October, 2018, an outbreak of severe respiratory illness was reported among poultry slaughter plant workers in Virginia and Georgia, USA. A multiorganizational team investigated the cause and extent of illness, determined that the illness was psittacosis, and evaluated and recommended controls for health hazards in the workplace to prevent additional cases.

Transmission of Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus From an Organ Donor to 3 Transplant Recipients.

BACKGROUND: In fall 2017, 3 solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients from a common donor developed encephalitis within 1 week of transplantation, prompting suspicion of transplant-transmitted infection. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) infection was identified during testing of endomyocardial tissue from the heart recipient. METHODS: We reviewed medical records of the organ donor and transplant recipients and tested serum, whole blood, cerebrospinal fluid, and tissue from the donor and recipients for evidence of EEEV infection by multiple assays. We investigated blood transfusion as a possible source of organ donor infection by testing remaining components and serum specimens from blood donors. We reviewed data from the pretransplant organ donor evaluation and local EEEV surveillance. RESULTS: We found laboratory evidence of recent EEEV infection in all organ recipients and the common donor. Serum collected from the organ donor upon hospital admission tested negative, but subsequent samples obtained prior to organ recovery were positive for EEEV RNA. There was no evidence of EEEV infection among donors of the 8 blood products transfused into the organ donor or in products derived from these donations. Veterinary and mosquito surveillance showed recent EEEV activity in counties nearby the organ donor's county of residence. Neuroinvasive EEEV infection directly contributed to the death of 1 organ recipient and likely contributed to death in another. CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation demonstrated EEEV transmission through SOT. Mosquito-borne transmission of EEEV to the organ donor was the likely source of infection. Clinicians should be aware of EEEV as a cause of transplant-associated encephalitis.

Notes from the Field: Rickettsia parkeri Rickettsiosis - Georgia, 2012-2014.

During 2012-2014, five cases of Rickettsia parkeri rickettsiosis were identified by a single urgent care practice in Georgia, located approximately 40 miles southwest of Atlanta. Symptom onset occurred during June-October, and all patients had a known tick bite. Patients ranged in age from 27 to 72 years (median = 53 years), and all were male. The most commonly reported initial signs were erythema (n = 3) and swelling (n = 2) at the site of the bite. Two patients reported fever and a third patient reported a rash and lymphadenopathy without fever. Other symptoms included myalgia (n = 3), chills (n = 3), fatigue (n = 2), arthralgia (n = 2), and headache (n = 2). Eschar biopsy specimens were collected from each patient using a 4-mm or 5-mm punch and placed in 10% neutral buffered formalin or sterile saline. These specimens were tested by immunohistochemical (IHC) stains, quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assays, or cell culture isolation to determine if there was evidence of infection with a Rickettsia species (1). IHC evidence of spotted fever group rickettsiae was found in the eschar biopsy specimens in all five cases. In four cases, the biopsy specimens were also positive for R. parkeri by qPCR. The fifth case (specimen positive only by IHC testing) was considered a probable R. parkeri case based on clinical signs and symptoms. R. parkeri was grown in cell culture from one specimen from which isolation was attempted. All patients were treated with oral doxycycline (100 mg twice daily) for a minimum of 10 days, and all recovered.

Ebola active monitoring system for travelers returning from West Africa­Georgia, 2014-2015.

The Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa has so far produced approximately 25,000 cases, more than 40 times the number in any previously documented Ebola outbreak. Because of the risk for imported disease from infected travelers, in October 2014 CDC recommended that all travelers to the United States from Ebola-affected countries receive enhanced entry screening and postarrival active monitoring for Ebola signs or symptoms until 21 days after their departure from an Ebola-affected country. The state of Georgia began its active monitoring program on October 25, 2014. The Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH) modified its existing, web-based electronic notifiable disease reporting system to create an Ebola Active Monitoring System (EAMS). DPH staff members developed EAMS from conceptualization to implementation in 6 days. In accordance with CDC recommendations, "low (but not zero) risk" travelers are required to report their daily health status to DPH, and the EAMS dashboard enables DPH epidemiologists to track symptoms and compliance with active monitoring. Through March 31, 2015, DPH monitored 1,070 travelers, and 699 (65%) used their EAMS traveler login instead of telephone or e-mail to report their health status. Medical evaluations were performed on 30 travelers, of whom three were tested for Ebola. EAMS has enabled two epidemiologists to monitor approximately 100 travelers daily, and to rapidly respond to travelers reporting signs and symptoms of potential Ebola virus infection. Similar electronic tracking systems might be useful for other jurisdictions.

Trace-forward investigation of mice in response to lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus outbreak.

During follow-up of a 2012 US outbreak of lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV), we conducted a trace-forward investigation. LCMV-infected feeder mice originating from a US rodent breeding facility had been distributed to >500 locations in 21 states. All mice from the facility were euthanized, and no additional persons tested positive for LCMV infection.

Molecular epidemiology of foodborne hepatitis a outbreaks in the United States, 2003.

BACKGROUND: Molecular epidemiologic investigations can link geographically separate foodborne hepatitis A outbreaks but have not been used while field investigations are in progress. In 2003, outbreaks of foodborne hepatitis A were reported in multiple states. METHODS: Case-control studies were conducted in 3 states. Hepatitis A virus was sequenced from serologic specimens from individuals associated with outbreaks and from individuals concurrently ill with hepatitis A in non-outbreak settings in the United States and Mexico. RESULTS: Case-control studies in Tennessee (TN), North Carolina (NC), and Georgia (GA) found green onions to be associated with illness among restaurant patrons (TN: odds ratio [OR], 65.5 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 8.9-482.5; NC: OR, 2.4 [95% CI, 0.3-21.9]; GA: OR, 20.9 [95% CI, 3.9-110.3]). Viral sequences from TN case patients differed by 2 nt, compared with those from case patients in NC and GA. A third sequence, differing from the TN and GA/NC sequences by 1 nt, was identified among case patients in a subsequent outbreak in Pennsylvania. Each outbreak sequence was identical to > or =1 sequence isolated from northern Mexican resident(s) with hepatitis A. The sources of green onions served in restaurants in TN and GA were 3 farms in northern Mexico. CONCLUSIONS: Ongoing viral strain surveillance facilitated the rapid implementation of control measures. Incorporation of molecular epidemiologic methods into routine hepatitis A surveillance would improve the detection of hepatitis A outbreaks and increase our understanding of hepatitis A epidemiology in the United States.

Infant pertussis: who was the source?

BACKGROUND: In the United States in the 1990s, the incidence of reported pertussis in adults, adolescents and infants increased; infants younger than 1 year of age had the highest reported incidence. METHODS: In 4 states with Enhanced Pertussis Surveillance, we examined the epidemiology of reported pertussis cases to determine the source of pertussis among infants. A source was defined as a person with an acute cough illness who had contact with the case-infant 7-20 days before the infant's onset of cough. RESULTS: The average annual pertussis incidence per 100,000 infants younger than 1 year of age varied by state: 22.9 in Georgia; 42.1 in Illinois; 93.0 in Minnesota; and 35.8 in Massachusetts. Family members of 616 (80%) of 774 reported case-infants were interviewed; a source was identified for 264 (43%) of the 616 case-infants. Among the 264 case-infants, mothers were the source for 84 (32%) and another family member was the source for 113 (43%). Of the 219 source-persons with known age, 38 (17%) were age 0-4 years, 16 (7%) were age 5-9 years, 43 (20%) were age 10-19 years, 45 (21%) were age 20-29 years and 77 (35%) were age > or =30 years. CONCLUSIONS: The variation in reported pertussis incidence in the 4 states might have resulted from differences in awareness of pertussis among health care providers, diagnostic capacity and case classification. Among case-infants with an identifiable source, family members (at any age) were the main source of pertussis. Understanding the source of pertussis transmission to infants may provide new approaches to prevent pertussis in the most vulnerable infants.