RESUMEN
In order to refer using a name, speakers must believe that their addressee knows about the link between the name and the intended referent. In cases where speakers and addressees learned a subset of names together, speakers are adept at using only the names their partner knows. But speakers do not always share such learning experience with their conversational partners. In these situations, what information guides speakers' choice of referring expression? A speaker who is uncertain about a names' common ground (CG) status often uses a name and description together. This N+D form allows speakers to demonstrate knowledge of a name, and could provide, even in the absence of miscommunication, useful evidence to the addressee regarding the speaker's knowledge. In cases where knowledge of one name is associated with knowledge of other names, this could provide indirect evidence regarding knowledge of other names that could support generalizations used to update beliefs about CG. Using Bayesian approaches to language processing as a guiding framework, we predict that interlocutors can use their partner's choice of referring expression, in particular their use of an N+D form, to generate more accurate beliefs regarding their partner's knowledge of other names. In Experiment 1, we find that domain experts are able to use their partner's referring expression choices to generate more accurate estimates of CG. In Experiment 2, we find that interlocutors are able to infer from a partner's use of an N+D form which other names that partner is likely to know or not know. Our results suggest that interlocutors can use the information conveyed in their partner's choice of referring expression to make generalizations that contribute to more accurate beliefs about what is shared with their partner, and further, that models of CG for reference need to account not just for the status of referents, but the status of means of referring to those referents.
RESUMEN
Definite noun phrases typically refer to entities that are uniquely identifiable in the speaker and addressee's common ground. Some definite noun phrases (e.g., the hospital in Mary had to go the hospital and John did too) seem to violate this uniqueness constraint. We report six experiments that were motivated by the hypothesis that these "weak definite" interpretations arise in "incorporated" constructions. Experiments 1-3 compared nouns that seem to allow for a weak definite interpretation (e.g., hospital, bank, bus, radio) with those that do not (e.g., farm, concert, car, book). Experiments 1 and 2 used an instruction-following task and picture-judgment task, respectively, to demonstrate that a weak definite need not uniquely refer. In Experiment 3 participants imagined scenarios described by sentences such as The Federal Express driver had to go to the hospital/farm. Scenarios following weak definite noun phrases were more likely to include conventional activities associated with the object, whereas following regular nouns, participants were more likely to imagine scenarios that included typical activities associated with the subject; similar effects were observed with weak indefinites. Experiment 4 found that object-related activities were reduced when the same subject and object were used with a verb that does not license weak definite interpretations. In Experiment 5, a science fiction story introduced an artificial lexicon for novel concepts. Novel nouns that shared conceptual properties with English weak definite nouns were more likely to allow weak reference in a judgment task. Experiment 6 demonstrated that familiarity for definite articles and anti-familiarity for indefinite articles applies to the activity associated with the noun, consistent with predictions made by the incorporation analysis.
