Children's and adults' evaluations of self-enhancement and self-deprecation depend on the usual performance of the self-presenter.

This study examined how evaluations of self-presentation vary with age depending on the self-presenter's usual performance. People's usual performance is a key factor because it generally influences the social evaluations and judgments that others make about them. Children aged 7 and 8 years (second graders) and 10 and 11 years (fifth graders), as well as adults, were presented with scenarios in which protagonists responded to praise after a good performance using either self-enhancement or self-deprecation. The other person in scenarios knew that the protagonist's usual performance on the task was either good or poor. After the protagonist responded to praise in a self-enhancing or self-deprecating way, the participants judged how the other person would evaluate the protagonist's ability (good/poor) and character (nice/mean). For ability evaluations specifically concerning protagonists who usually performed poorly, the results showed that by around 10 years of age children no longer tended to give more positive ability evaluations for self-enhancement than for self-deprecation. Adults gave less positive ability evaluations for self-deprecation than for self-enhancement, but only when the protagonists usually performed well. In relation to the character evaluations, by around 10 years of age self-enhancement led to less positive character evaluations than self-deprecation, but only when the protagonists usually performed poorly. Overall, second graders evaluated self-presenters as more competent and nicer. These results indicate that the expected evaluation of self-enhancement and self-deprecation is influenced by the usual level of performance but that there are developmental changes in this aspect of social cognition.

Omission bias in children's and adults' moral judgments of lies.

This study examined whether omission bias occurs in moral judgments of lies. Omission bias is the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders) and 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), as well as adults, made moral judgments about lies of commission and omission to conceal transgressions. Descriptions of four scenarios varied in terms of whether the protagonists lied to benefit themselves or others and whether the transgression was deliberate or accidental. The results showed that both age groups of children, as well as adults, judged that lies of commission were morally worse than lies of omission in all four scenarios, indicating that omission bias clearly occurs in moral judgments of lies. However, there were age differences in the magnitude of omission bias. Third and sixth graders generally showed omission bias of the same magnitude for all scenarios, whereas omission bias in adults was stronger for the scenarios that benefited self rather than others and for scenarios in which deliberate transgressions, rather than accidental ones, were concealed. These results reveal differences in moral judgments of lies between middle childhood and adulthood.

Do 5- and 6-Year-Old Children Attempt to Appear Fair to Others?

Children come to prefer fair distributions at the age of 5 to 6 years. But do they actually want to be fair, or do they want to appear fair to others? In three conditions, an experimenter initially distributed chocolates to 5-/6-year-old participants and partners they were paired with. Participants always possessed, through some means, two chocolates when the experimenter returned after a brief absence, and they had to decide whether to take an extra one for themselves. To measure the extent to which children were concerned with actually being fair versus appearing fair, two conditions were created in which children were led to believe that the experimenter did not know that the distributions had become equal. In the windfall condition, a confederate gave one additional chocolate to the participant, and in the partner condition, the partner transferred one chocolate to the participant. Compared to the control condition, participants who passed the false belief task in both of these conditions tried to appear fair in their distribution. Thus 5-/6-year-old children seem to prefer appearing fair to others regardless of the situation.

Egocentric bias in emotional understanding of children and adults.

This study examined whether egocentric bias in emotional understanding occurs in children and adults. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders), 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), and 15 and 16 years (tenth graders), as well as adults, participated. They were presented with two types of stories in both negative and positive contexts. In one story, an actor intentionally harmed or helped a protagonist. In the other story, an actor accidentally harmed or helped a protagonist. In the knowledge condition, the protagonists in both stories watched the actors and therefore knew that the actors intentionally or accidentally harmed or helped. In the ignorance condition, the protagonists in both stories did not watch the actors and therefore did not know the actors' intentions. Participants were asked which protagonists felt sadder or happier. Not only in the knowledge condition but also in the ignorance condition, all age groups judged that the protagonists who were harmed or helped by the actors' intentional actions felt sadder or happier than the protagonists who were harmed or helped by the actors' accidental actions, aligning with participants' current knowledge. This tendency was greater in third and sixth graders than in tenth graders and adults. These results indicate that egocentric bias in emotional understanding occurred irrespective of age and negative or positive context, although this bias was stronger at younger ages.

Children's Understanding of Lies in Elementary School Years.

The author examined whether children's understanding of lies exhibits developmental trends in the elementary school years. Four story contexts were presented to 51 first-grade students, 44 fourth-grade students, and 58 adults. These stories represented combinations of a protagonist's intention (truthful or deceptive) and the truth of the protagonist's message (true or false). The results showed that adults judged whether these messages were lies by considering the protagonist's intentions. By contrast, approximately 30% of first-grade students and some fourth-grade students did not consider intentions in making judgments, although they appropriately predicted the outcomes of the messages. These results suggest that children in the early elementary school years have a conception of lies different from that of adults, and their conception of lies becomes more sophisticated after middle childhood.

Omission bias and perceived intention in children and adults.

Omission bias refers to the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 7-8 and 11-12 years, as well as adults, made moral judgements about acts of commission and omission in two conditions in which the protagonist obtained a self-directed benefit. In the antisocial condition, the other person was harmed; in the selfish condition, the other person was not harmed. The results showed that adults and both age groups of children judged that the agent who did something (act of commission) was morally worse than the agent who did nothing (omission) for both antisocial and selfish conditions, although this judgement tendency was clearer in the selfish condition than in the antisocial condition. Agent intention was held constant across commission and omission, but most participants rated the intention of the agent who did something as stronger than that of the agent who did nothing. These results suggest that omission bias occurs regardless of differences in age and situation. In addition, perceived intention appears to change in conjunction with omission bias.

[Possibility of solving complex problems by recursive thinking].

This study examined the ability in recursive thinking to solve problems. To think recursively is one of the most effective ways to break up large and complex problems into smaller ones. This study prepared two problems with the same tail recursion: The "Guess-the-Number game" and the "Hat puzzle (Wise men puzzle)." Because participants (N = 35) were not familiar with recursive thinking, they learned how to think recursively in the Guess-the-Number game. Then, we tested whether they could solve the Hat puzzle recursively. The results show that two-thirds of the participants could solve the problem recursively, even if the size of the problem increased. Furthermore, their solution times had differed between correct and incorrect answers. This suggests that the difference reflected a "saving" of effort for problem solving.