Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? the effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds.

Understanding how health care utilization responds to cost-sharing is of central importance for providing high quality care and limiting the growth of costs. We study whether the framing of cost-sharing incentives has an effect on health care utilization. For this we make use of a policy change in the Netherlands. Until 2007, patients received a refund if they consumed little or no health care; the refund was the lower the more care they had consumed. From 2008 onward, there was a deductible. This means that very similar economic incentives were first framed in terms of smaller gains and later as losses. We find that patients react to incentives much more strongly when they are framed in terms of losses. The effect on yearly spending is 8.6 percent. This suggests that discussions on the optimal design of cost-sharing incentives should also revolve around the question how these are presented to patients.

What health plans do people prefer? The trade-off between premium and provider choice.

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans.

Incorporating shared savings programs into primary care: from theory to practice.

BACKGROUND: In several countries, health care policies gear toward strengthening the position of primary care physicians. Primary care physicians are increasingly expected to take accountability for overall spending and quality. Yet traditional models of paying physicians do not provide adequate incentives for taking on this new role. Under a so-called shared savings program physicians are instead incentivized to take accountability for spending and quality, as the program lets them share in cost savings when quality targets are met. We provide a structured approach to designing a shared savings program for primary care, and apply this approach to the design of a shared savings program for a Dutch chain of primary care providers, which is currently being piloted. METHODS: Based on the literature, we defined five building blocks of shared savings models that encompass the definition of the scope of the program, the calculation of health care expenditures, the construction of a savings benchmark, the assessment of savings and the rules and conditions under which savings are shared. We apply insights from a variety of literatures to assess the relative merits of alternative design choices within these building blocks. The shared savings program uses an econometric model of provider expenditures as an input to calculating a casemix-corrected benchmark. RESULTS: The minimization of risk and uncertainty for both payer and provider is pertinent to the design of a shared savings program. In that respect, the primary care setting provides a number of unique opportunities for achieving cost and quality targets. Accountability can more readily be assumed due to the relatively long-lasting relationships between primary care physicians and patients. A stable population furthermore improves the confidence with which savings can be attributed to changes in population management. Challenges arise from the institutional context. The Dutch health care system has a fragmented structure and providers are typically small in size. CONCLUSION: Shared savings programs fit the concept of enhanced primary care. Incorporating a shared savings program into existing payment models could therefore contribute to the financial sustainability of this organizational form.

Accountable Care Organizations: how to dress for success.

Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) need to reconsider their provider configuration and make it capable of managing clinical and financial risk. To that aim, their management must decide which medical procedures are done by the ACO itself, and which are contracted out to market providers. Making this decision requires a balanced treatment of market and firm organization, recognizing that each has properties that can turn into relative strengths. Such a balanced treatment is lacking in the ACO debate. Using the transaction cost theory, we provide such a balanced treatment of market and firm organization, and discuss implications for the design of ACOs and accountable care initiatives in general.