Using games to understand the mind.

Board, card or video games have been played by virtually every individual in the world. Games are popular because they are intuitive and fun. These distinctive qualities of games also make them ideal for studying the mind. By being intuitive, games provide a unique vantage point for understanding the inductive biases that support behaviour in more complex, ecological settings than traditional laboratory experiments. By being fun, games allow researchers to study new questions in cognition such as the meaning of 'play' and intrinsic motivation, while also supporting more extensive and diverse data collection by attracting many more participants. We describe the advantages and drawbacks of using games relative to standard laboratory-based experiments and lay out a set of recommendations on how to gain the most from using games to study cognition. We hope this Perspective will lead to a wider use of games as experimental paradigms, elevating the ecological validity, scale and robustness of research on the mind.

Bayesian Reinforcement Learning With Limited Cognitive Load.

All biological and artificial agents must act given limits on their ability to acquire and process information. As such, a general theory of adaptive behavior should be able to account for the complex interactions between an agent's learning history, decisions, and capacity constraints. Recent work in computer science has begun to clarify the principles that shape these dynamics by bridging ideas from reinforcement learning, Bayesian decision-making, and rate-distortion theory. This body of work provides an account of capacity-limited Bayesian reinforcement learning, a unifying normative framework for modeling the effect of processing constraints on learning and action selection. Here, we provide an accessible review of recent algorithms and theoretical results in this setting, paying special attention to how these ideas can be applied to studying questions in the cognitive and behavioral sciences.

Reconciling truthfulness and relevance as epistemic and decision-theoretic utility.

People use language to influence others' beliefs and actions. Yet models of communication have diverged along these lines, formalizing the speaker's objective in terms of either the listener's beliefs or actions. We argue that this divergence lies at the root of a longstanding controversy over the Gricean maxims of truthfulness and relevance. We first bridge the divide by introducing a speaker model which considers both the listener's beliefs (epistemic utility) and their actions (decision-theoretic utility). We show that formalizing truthfulness as an epistemic utility and relevance as a decision-theoretic utility reconciles the tension between them, readily explaining puzzles such as context-dependent standards of truthfulness. We then test a set of novel predictions generated by our model. We introduce a new signaling game which decouples utterances' truthfulness and relevance, then use it to conduct a pair of experiments. Our first experiment demonstrates that participants jointly maximize epistemic and decision-theoretic utility, rather than either alone. Our second experiment shows that when the two conflict, participants make a graded tradeoff rather than prioritizing one over the other. These results demonstrate that human communication cannot be reduced to influencing beliefs or actions alone. Taken together, our work provides a new foundation for grounding rational communication not only in what we believe, but in what those beliefs lead us to do. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Rational Simplification and Rigidity in Human Planning.

Planning underpins the impressive flexibility of goal-directed behavior. However, even when planning, people can display surprising rigidity in how they think about problems (e.g., "functional fixedness") that lead them astray. How can our capacity for behavioral flexibility be reconciled with our susceptibility to conceptual inflexibility? We propose that these tendencies reflect avoidance of two cognitive costs: the cost of representing task details and the cost of switching between representations. To test this hypothesis, we developed a novel paradigm that affords participants opportunities to choose different families of simplified representations to plan. In two preregistered, online studies (Ns = 377 and 294 adults), we found that participants' optimal behavior, suboptimal behavior, and reaction time were explained by a computational model that formalized people's avoidance of representational complexity and switching. These results demonstrate how the selection of simplified, rigid representations leads to the otherwise puzzling combination of flexibility and inflexibility observed in problem solving.

Humans decompose tasks by trading off utility and computational cost.

Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition (N = 806) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic-betweenness centrality-that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results suggest the computational cost of planning is a key principle guiding the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.

Show or tell? Exploring when (and why) teaching with language outperforms demonstration.

People use a wide range of communicative acts across different modalities, from concrete demonstrations to abstract language. While these modalities are typically studied independently, we take a comparative approach and ask when and why one modality might outperform another. We present a series of real-time, multi-player experiments asking participants to teach concepts using either demonstrations or language. Our first experiment (N=416) asks when language might outperform demonstration. We manipulate the complexity of the concept being taught and find that language communicates complex concepts more effectively than demonstration. We then ask why language succeeds in this setting. We hypothesized that language allowed teachers to reference abstract object features (e.g., shapes and colors), while demonstration teachers could only provide concrete examples (specific positive or negative objects). To test this hypothesis, our second experiment (N=568) ablated object features from the teacher's interface. This manipulation severely impaired linguistic (but not demonstrative) teaching. Our findings suggest that language communicates complex concepts by directly transmitting abstract rules. In contrast, demonstrations transmit examples, requiring the learner to infer the rules.

Planning with Theory of Mind.

Understanding Theory of Mind should begin with an analysis of the problems it solves. The traditional answer is that Theory of Mind is used for predicting others' thoughts and actions. However, the same Theory of Mind is also used for planning to change others' thoughts and actions. Planning requires that Theory of Mind consists of abstract structured causal representations and supports efficient search and selection from innumerable possible actions. Theory of Mind contrasts with less cognitively demanding alternatives: statistical predictive models of other people's actions, or model-free reinforcement of actions by their effects on other people. Theory of Mind is likely used to plan novel interventions and predict their effects, for example, in pedagogy, emotion regulation, and impression management.

People construct simplified mental representations to plan.

One of the most striking features of human cognition is the ability to plan. Two aspects of human planning stand out-its efficiency and flexibility. Efficiency is especially impressive because plans must often be made in complex environments, and yet people successfully plan solutions to many everyday problems despite having limited cognitive resources1-3. Standard accounts in psychology, economics and artificial intelligence have suggested that human planning succeeds because people have a complete representation of a task and then use heuristics to plan future actions in that representation4-11. However, this approach generally assumes that task representations are fixed. Here we propose that task representations can be controlled and that such control provides opportunities to quickly simplify problems and more easily reason about them. We propose a computational account of this simplification process and, in a series of preregistered behavioural experiments, show that it is subject to online cognitive control12-14 and that people optimally balance the complexity of a task representation and its utility for planning and acting. These results demonstrate how strategically perceiving and conceiving problems facilitates the effective use of limited cognitive resources.

Communication in action: Planning and interpreting communicative demonstrations.

Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others' behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer's mental representations. Our framework extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators' actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the sociocognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A rational model of people's inferences about others' preferences based on response times.

There's a difference between someone instantaneously saying "Yes!" when you ask them on a date compared to "…yes." Psychologists and economists have long studied how people can infer preferences from others' choices. However, these models have tended to focus on what people choose and not how long it takes them to make a choice. We present a rational model for inferring preferences from response times, using a drift diffusion model to characterize how preferences influence response time, and Bayesian inference to invert this relationship. We test our model's predictions for three experimental questions. Matching model predictions, participants inferred that a decision-maker preferred a chosen item more if the decision-maker spent less time deliberating (Experiment 1), participants predicted a decision-maker's choice in a novel comparison based on inferring the decision-maker's relative preferences from previous response times and choices (Experiment 2), and participants could incorporate information about a decision-maker's mental state of cautious or careless (Experiments 3, 4A, and 4B).

Punishment is Organized around Principles of Communicative Inference.

Humans use punishment to influence each other's behavior. Many current theories presume that this operates as a simple form of incentive. In contrast, we show that people infer the communicative intent behind punishment, which can sometimes diverge sharply from its immediate incentive value. In other words, people respond to punishment not as a reward to be maximized, but as a communicative signal to be interpreted. Specifically, we show that people expect harmless, yet communicative, punishments to be as effective as harmful punishments (Experiment 1). Under some situations, people display a systematic preference for harmless punishments over more canonical, harmful punishments (Experiment 2). People readily seek out and infer the communicative message inherent in a punishment (Experiment 3). And people expect that learning from punishment depends on the ease with which its communicative intent can be inferred (Experiment 4). Taken together, these findings demonstrate that people expect punishment to be constructed and interpreted as a communicative act.

People teach with rewards and punishments as communication, not reinforcements.

Carrots and sticks motivate behavior, and people can teach new behaviors to other organisms, such as children or nonhuman animals, by tapping into their reward learning mechanisms. But how people teach with reward and punishment depends on their expectations about the learner. We examine how people teach using reward and punishment by contrasting two hypotheses. The first is evaluative feedback as reinforcement, where rewards and punishments are used to shape learner behavior through reinforcement learning mechanisms. The second is evaluative feedback as communication, where rewards and punishments are used to signal target behavior to a learning agent reasoning about a teacher's pedagogical goals. We present formalizations of learning from these 2 teaching strategies based on computational frameworks for reinforcement learning. Our analysis based on these models motivates a simple interactive teaching paradigm that distinguishes between the two teaching hypotheses. Across 3 sets of experiments, we find that people are strongly biased to use evaluative feedback communicatively rather than as reinforcement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Social is special: A normative framework for teaching with and learning from evaluative feedback.

Humans often attempt to influence one another's behavior using rewards and punishments. How does this work? Psychologists have often assumed that "evaluative feedback" influences behavior via standard learning mechanisms that learn from environmental contingencies. On this view, teaching with evaluative feedback involves leveraging learning systems designed to maximize an organism's positive outcomes. Yet, despite its parsimony, programs of research predicated on this assumption, such as ones in developmental psychology, animal behavior, and human-robot interaction, have had limited success. We offer an explanation by analyzing the logic of evaluative feedback and show that specialized learning mechanisms are uniquely favored in the case of evaluative feedback from a social partner. Specifically, evaluative feedback works best when it is treated as communicating information about the value of an action rather than as a form of reward to be maximized. This account suggests that human learning from evaluative feedback depends on inferences about communicative intent, goals and other mental states-much like learning from other sources, such as demonstration, observation and instruction. Because these abilities are especially developed in humans, the present account also explains why evaluative feedback is far more widespread in humans than non-human animals.