Learning words in space and time: Contrasting models of the suspicious coincidence effect.

In their 2007b Psychological Review paper, Xu and Tenenbaum found that early word learning follows the classic logic of the "suspicious coincidence effect:" when presented with a novel name ('fep') and three identical exemplars (three Labradors), word learners generalized novel names more narrowly than when presented with a single exemplar (one Labrador). Xu and Tenenbaum predicted the suspicious coincidence effect based on a Bayesian model of word learning and demonstrated that no other theory captured this effect. Recent empirical studies have revealed, however, that the effect is influenced by factors seemingly outside the purview of the Bayesian account. A process-based perspective correctly predicted that when exemplars are shown sequentially, the effect is eliminated or reversed (Spencer, Perone, Smith, & Samuelson, 2011). Here, we present a new, formal account of the suspicious coincidence effect using a generalization of a Dynamic Neural Field (DNF) model of word learning. The DNF model captures both the original finding and its reversal with sequential presentation. We compare the DNF model's performance with that of a more flexible version of the Bayesian model that allows both strong and weak sampling assumptions. Model comparison results show that the dynamic field account provides a better fit to the empirical data. We discuss the implications of the DNF model with respect to broader contrasts between Bayesian and process-level models.

Grounding cognitive-level processes in behavior: the view from dynamic systems theory.

Marr's seminal work laid out a program of research by specifying key questions for cognitive science at different levels of analysis. Because dynamic systems theory (DST) focuses on time and interdependence of components, DST research programs come to very different conclusions regarding the nature of cognitive change. We review a specific DST approach to cognitive-level processes: dynamic field theory (DFT). We review research applying DFT to several cognitive-level processes: object permanence, naming hierarchical categories, and inferring intent, that demonstrate the difference in understanding of behavior and cognition that results from a DST perspective. These point to a central challenge for cognitive science research as defined by Marr-emergence. We argue that appreciating emergence raises questions about the utility of computational-level analyses and opens the door to insights concerning the origin of novel forms of behavior and thought (e.g., a new chess strategy). We contend this is one of the most fundamental questions about cognition and behavior.

Non-Bayesian noun generalization in 3- to 5-year-old children: probing the role of prior knowledge in the suspicious coincidence effect.

It is unclear how children learn labels for multiple overlapping categories such as "Labrador," "dog," and "animal." Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) suggested that learners infer correct meanings with the help of Bayesian inference. They instantiated these claims in a Bayesian model, which they tested with preschoolers and adults. Here, we report data testing a developmental prediction of the Bayesian model-that more knowledge should lead to narrower category inferences when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars. Two experiments did not support this prediction. Children with more category knowledge showed broader generalization when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars, compared to less knowledgeable children and adults. This implies a U-shaped developmental trend. The Bayesian model was not able to account for these data, even with inputs that reflected the similarity judgments of children. We discuss implications for the Bayesian model, including a combined Bayesian/morphological knowledge account that could explain the demonstrated U-shaped trend.