Mood congruency affects physiological synchrony but not empathic accuracy in a naturalistic empathy task.

Empathy is a crucial aspect of our daily lives, as it enhances our wellbeing and is a proxy for prosocial behavior. It encompasses two related but partially distinct components: cognitive and affective empathy. Both are susceptible to context, biases and an individual's physiological state. Few studies have explored the effects of a person's mood on these empathy components, and results are mixed. The current study takes advantage of an ecological, naturalistic empathy task - the empathic accuracy (EA) task - in combination with physiological measurements to examine and differentiate between the effects of one's mood on both empathy components. Participants were induced with positive or negative mood and presented videos of targets narrating autobiographical negative stories, selected from a Chinese empathy dataset that we developed (now publicly available). The stories were conveyed in audio-only, visual-only and full-video formats. Participants rated the target's emotional state while watching or listening to their stories, and physiological measures were taken throughout the process. Importantly, similar measures were taken from the targets when they narrated the stories, allowing a comparison between participants' and targets' measures. We found that in audio-only and visual-only conditions, participants whose moods were congruent with the target showed higher physiological synchrony than those with incongruent mood, implying a mood-congruency effect on affective empathy. However, there was no mood effect on empathic accuracy (reflecting cognitive empathy), suggesting a different influence of mood on the two empathy components.

Impaired empathic accuracy following damage to the left hemisphere.

Failing to understand others accurately can be extremely costly. Unfortunately, events such as strokes can lead to a decline in emotional understanding. Such impairments have been documented in stroke patients and are widely hypothesized to be related to right-hemisphere lesions, as well as to the amygdala, and are thought to be driven in part by attentional biases, for example, less fixation on the eyes. Notably, most of the previous research relied on measurements of emotional understanding from simplified cues, such as facial expressions or prosody. We hypothesize that chronic damage to the left hemisphere could hinder empathic accuracy and emotion recognition in naturalistic social settings that require complex language comprehension, even after a patient regains core language capacities. To assess this notion, we use an empathic accuracy task and eye-tracking measurements with chronic stroke patients with either right (N = 13) or left (N = 11) hemispheric damage-together with aged-matched controls (N = 15)-to explore the patients' understanding of others' affect inferred from stimuli that separates audio and visual cues. While we find that patients with right-hemisphere lesions showed visual attention bias compared to the other two groups, we uncover a disadvantage for patients with left-hemisphere lesions in empathic accuracy, especially when only auditory cues are present. These results suggest that patients with left-hemisphere damage have long-lasting difficulties comprehending real-world complex emotional situations.

The contribution of linguistic and visual cues to physiological synchrony and empathic accuracy.

There is an ongoing debate concerning the contribution of different aspects of empathy to achieving an accurate understanding of others. In this study, we aimed to better comprehend the roles of experience sharing and mentalizing using a modified empathic-accuracy task. We analyzed the unique contribution of each of these mechanisms with an explicit cognitive report as well as an affective physiological synchrony measurement. First, we recorded the emotional autobiographical stories told by participants ("targets", N = 28). Then, the targets watched their own videos as their heart rate (HR) was measured, and they reported on both a continuous and a discrete emotion scale what they felt while relaying the story. Next, we collected HR data from new participants ("observers", N = 72) as they similarly rated the targets' valence and discrete emotional states. In order to test the contribution of sensorimotor cues and contextual cues to empathic accuracy, observers viewed some videos with audio, others without audio, and listened to a third set of only the audio. We hypothesized that empathic accuracy-a cognitive measure that is a proxy for mentalizing and is operationalized by the correlation between a target's reported emotions and an observer's inference of those emotions-would be greater when linguistic information is present. We also hypothesized that physiological synchrony, a proxy for experience sharing, would be greater in the video-only condition, which was limited to sensorimotor cues to infer the other's emotional state. Indeed, we found that empathic accuracy was greater when auditory information was present, and that HR synchrony was more prevalent when visual cues were presented alone. Having both information streams together did not enhance accuracy, yet it was the only condition in which both behavioral empathic-accuracy measures correlated with HR synchrony. This study provides evidence that separate experience sharing and mentalizing pathways are active in the same task.

The interactive effect of empathy and motor cortex stimulation on hand gesture comprehension.

Previous research has demonstrated that the Action-Observation Network (AON) is involved in both emotional-embodiment (empathy) and action-embodiment mechanisms. In the current study, we hypothesized that interfering with the AON will impair action recognition and that this impairment will be modulated by empathy levels. Fifty-two participants conducted a semantic decision task of hand gesture recognition, while we interfered with the AON by applying active (n = 26) or sham (n = 26) transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) to the hand area of the primary motor cortex. We found that interfering with the AON impaired the performance of participants with high empathy levels and enhanced the performance of participants with low empathy. This finding suggests that the embodiment module may be flexible, and that it can be enhanced in individuals with low empathy by simple manipulation of motor activation.

The interaction between embodiment and empathy in facial expression recognition.

Previous research has demonstrated that the Action-Observation Network (AON) is involved in both emotional-embodiment (empathy) and action-embodiment mechanisms. In this study, we hypothesized that interfering with the AON will impair action recognition and that this impairment will be modulated by empathy levels. In Experiment 1 (n = 90), participants were asked to recognize facial expressions while their facial motion was restricted. In Experiment 2 (n = 50), we interfered with the AON by applying transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to the motor cortex. In both experiments, we found that interfering with the AON impaired the performance of participants with high empathy levels; however, for the first time, we demonstrated that the interference enhanced the performance of participants with low empathy. This novel finding suggests that the embodiment module may be flexible, and that it can be enhanced in individuals with low empathy by simple manipulation of motor activation.

The Role of Embodiment and Individual Empathy Levels in Gesture Comprehension.

Research suggests that the action-observation network is involved in both emotional-embodiment (empathy) and action-embodiment (imitation) mechanisms. Here we tested whether empathy modulates action-embodiment, hypothesizing that restricting imitation abilities will impair performance in a hand gesture comprehension task. Moreover, we hypothesized that empathy levels will modulate the imitation restriction effect. One hundred twenty participants with a range of empathy scores performed gesture comprehension under restricted and unrestricted hand conditions. Empathetic participants performed better under the unrestricted compared to the restricted condition, and compared to the low empathy participants. Remarkably however, the latter showed the exactly opposite pattern and performed better under the restricted condition. This pattern was not found in a facial expression recognition task. The selective interaction of embodiment restriction and empathy suggests that empathy modulates the way people employ embodiment in gesture comprehension. We discuss the potential of embodiment-induced therapy to improve empathetic abilities in individuals with low empathy.