Exploring cognitive individuality and the underlying creativity in statistical learning and phase entrainment.

Statistical learning starts at an early age and is intimately linked to brain development and the emergence of individuality. Through such a long period of statistical learning, the brain updates and constructs statistical models, with the model's individuality changing based on the type and degree of stimulation received. However, the detailed mechanisms underlying this process are unknown. This paper argues three main points of statistical learning, including 1) cognitive individuality based on "reliability" of prediction, 2) the construction of information "hierarchy" through chunking, and 3) the acquisition of "1-3Hz rhythm" that is essential for early language and music learning. We developed a Hierarchical Bayesian Statistical Learning (HBSL) model that takes into account both reliability and hierarchy, mimicking the statistical learning processes of the brain. Using this model, we conducted a simulation experiment to visualize the temporal dynamics of perception and production processes through statistical learning. By modulating the sensitivity to sound stimuli, we simulated three cognitive models with different reliability on bottom-up sensory stimuli relative to top-down prior prediction: hypo-sensitive, normal-sensitive, and hyper-sensitive models. We suggested that statistical learning plays a crucial role in the acquisition of 1-3 Hz rhythm. Moreover, a hyper-sensitive model quickly learned the sensory statistics but became fixated on their internal model, making it difficult to generate new information, whereas a hypo-sensitive model has lower learning efficiency but may be more likely to generate new information. Various individual characteristics may not necessarily confer an overall advantage over others, as there may be a trade-off between learning efficiency and the ease of generating new information. This study has the potential to shed light on the heterogeneous nature of statistical learning, as well as the paradoxical phenomenon in which individuals with certain cognitive traits that impede specific types of perceptual abilities exhibit superior performance in creative contexts.

Identification and disruption of a neural mechanism for accumulating prospective metacognitive information prior to decision-making.

More than one type of probability must be considered when making decisions. It is as necessary to know one's chance of performing choices correctly as it is to know the chances that desired outcomes will follow choices. We refer to these two choice contingencies as internal and external probability. Neural activity across many frontal and parietal areas reflected internal and external probabilities in a similar manner during decision-making. However, neural recording and manipulation approaches suggest that one area, the anterior lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC), is highly specialized for making prospective, metacognitive judgments on the basis of internal probability; it is essential for knowing which decisions to tackle, given its assessment of how well they will be performed. Its activity predicted prospective metacognitive judgments, and individual variation in activity predicted individual variation in metacognitive judgments. Its disruption altered metacognitive judgments, leading participants to tackle perceptual decisions they were likely to fail.

The role of gesture as simulated action in reinterpretation of mental imagery.

In two experiments, we examined the role of gesture in reinterpreting a mental image. In Experiment 1, we found that participants gestured more about a figure they had learned through manual exploration than about a figure they had learned through vision. This supports claims that gestures emerge from the activation of perception-relevant actions during mental imagery. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether such gestures have a causal role in affecting the quality of mental imagery. Participants were randomly assigned to gesture, not gesture, or engage in a manual interference task as they attempted to reinterpret a figure they had learned through manual exploration. We found that manual interference significantly impaired participants' success on the task. Taken together, these results suggest that gestures reflect mental imaginings of interactions with a mental image and that these imaginings are critically important for mental manipulation and reinterpretation of that image. However, our results suggest that enacting the imagined movements in gesture is not critically important on this particular task.

Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without visual cues: a validation of previous research.

Is visual reinterpretation of bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) in visual imagery possible? Current consensus suggests that it is in principle possible because of converging evidence of quasi-pictorial functioning of visual imagery. Yet, studies that have directly tested and found evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery, allow for the possibility that reinterpretation was already achieved during memorization of the figure(s). One study resolved this issue, providing evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery (Mast and Kosslyn, Cognition 86:57-70, 2002). However, participants in that study performed reinterpretations with aid of visual cues. Hence, reinterpretation was not performed with mental imagery alone. Therefore, in this study we assessed the possibility of reinterpretation without visual support. We further explored the possible role of haptic cues to assess the multimodal nature of mental imagery. Fifty-three participants were consecutively presented three to be remembered bistable 2-D figures (reinterpretable when rotated 180°), two of which were visually inspected and one was explored hapticly. After memorization of the figures, a visually bistable exemplar figure was presented to ensure understanding of the concept of visual bistability. During recall, 11 participants (out of 36; 30.6%) who did not spot bistability during memorization successfully performed reinterpretations when instructed to mentally rotate their visual image, but additional haptic cues during mental imagery did not inflate reinterpretation ability. This study validates previous findings that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible.