Race and resource allocation: an online survey of US and UK adults' attitudes toward COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine distribution.

OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to assess US/UK adults' attitudes towards COVID-19 ventilator and vaccine allocation. DESIGN: Online survey including US and UK adults, sampled to be representative for sex, age, race, household income and employment. A total of 2580 participated (women=1289, age range=18 to 85 years, Black American=114, BAME=138). INTERVENTIONS: Participants were asked to allocate ventilators or vaccines in scenarios involving individuals or groups with different medical risk and additional risk factors. RESULTS: Participant race did not impact vaccine or ventilator allocation decisions in the USA, but did impact ventilator allocation attitudes in the UK (F(4,602)=6.95, p<0.001). When a racial minority or white patient had identical chances of survival, 14.8% allocated a ventilator to the minority patient (UK BAME participants: 24.4%) and 68.9% chose to toss a coin. When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower chance of survival, 12.4% participants allocated them the ventilator (UK BAME participants: 22.1%). For patients with identical risk of severe COVID-19, 43.6% allocated a vaccine to a minority patient, 7.2% chose a white patient and 49.2% chose a coin toss. When the racial minority patient had a 10% lower risk of severe COVID-19, 23.7% participants allocated the vaccine to the minority patient. Similar results were seen for obesity or male sex as additional risk factors. In both countries, responses on the Modern Racism Scale were strongly associated with attitudes toward race-based ventilator and vaccine allocations (p<0.0001). CONCLUSIONS: Although living in countries with high racial inequality during a pandemic, most US and UK adults in our survey allocated ventilators and vaccines preferentially to those with the highest chance of survival or highest chance of severe illness. Race of recipient led to vaccine prioritisation in cases where risk of illness was similar.

Personal ethical settings for driverless cars and the utility paradox: An ethical analysis of public attitudes in UK and Japan.

Driverless cars are predicted to dramatically reduce collisions and casualties on the roads. However, there has been controversy about how they should be programmed to respond in the event of an unavoidable collision. Should they aim to save the most lives, prioritise the lives of pedestrians, or occupants of the vehicle? Some have argued that driverless cars should all be programmed to minimise total casualties. While this would appear to have wide international public support, previous work has also suggested regional variation and public reluctance to purchase driverless cars with such a mandated ethical setting. The possibility that algorithms designed to minimise collision fatalities would lead to reduced consumer uptake of driverless cars and thereby to higher overall road deaths, represents a potential "utility paradox". To investigate this paradox further, we examined the views of the general public about driverless cars in two online surveys in the UK and Japan, examining the influence of choice of a "personal ethical setting" as well as of framing on hypothetical purchase decisions. The personal ethical setting would allow respondents to choose between a programme which would save the most lives, save occupants or save pedestrians. We found striking differences between UK and Japanese respondents. While a majority of UK respondents wished to buy driverless cars that prioritise the most lives or their family members' lives, Japanese survey participants preferred to save pedestrians. We observed reduced willingness to purchase driverless cars with a mandated ethical setting (compared to offering choice) in both countries. It appears that the public values relevant to programming of driverless cars differ between UK and Japan. The highest uptake of driverless cars in both countries can be achieved by providing a personal ethical setting. Since uptake of driverless cars (rather than specific algorithm used) is potentially the biggest factor in reducing in traffic related accidents, providing some choice of ethical settings may be optimal for driverless cars according to a range of plausible ethical theories.

When Helping Is Risky: The Behavioral and Neurobiological Trade-off of Social and Risk Preferences.

Helping other people can entail risks for the helper. For example, when treating infectious patients, medical volunteers risk their own health. In such situations, decisions to help should depend on the individual's valuation of others' well-being (social preferences) and the degree of personal risk the individual finds acceptable (risk preferences). We investigated how these distinct preferences are psychologically and neurobiologically integrated when helping is risky. We used incentivized decision-making tasks (Study 1; N = 292 adults) and manipulated dopamine and norepinephrine levels in the brain by administering methylphenidate, atomoxetine, or a placebo (Study 2; N = 154 adults). We found that social and risk preferences are independent drivers of risky helping. Methylphenidate increased risky helping by selectively altering risk preferences rather than social preferences. Atomoxetine influenced neither risk preferences nor social preferences and did not affect risky helping. This suggests that methylphenidate-altered dopamine concentrations affect helping decisions that entail a risk to the helper.

British laypeople's attitudes towards gradual sedation, sedation to unconsciousness and euthanasia at the end of life.

BACKGROUND: Many patients at the end of life require analgesia to relieve pain. Additionally, up to 1/5 of patients in the UK receive sedation for refractory symptoms at the end of life. The use of sedation in end-of-life care (EOLC) remains controversial. While gradual sedation to alleviate intractable suffering is generally accepted, there is more opposition towards deliberate and rapid sedation to unconsciousness (so-called "terminal anaesthesia", TA). However, the general public's views about sedation in EOLC are not known. We sought to investigate the general public's views to inform policy and practice in the UK. METHODS: We performed two anonymous online surveys of members of the UK public, sampled to be representative for key demographic characteristics (n = 509). Participants were given a scenario of a hypothetical terminally ill patient with one week of life left. We sought views on the acceptability of providing titrated analgesia, gradual sedation, terminal anaesthesia, and euthanasia. We asked participants about the intentions of doctors, what risks of sedation would be acceptable, and the equivalence of terminal anaesthesia and euthanasia. FINDINGS: Of the 509 total participants, 84% and 72% indicated that it is permissible to offer titrated analgesia and gradual sedation (respectively); 75% believed it is ethical to offer TA. Eighty-eight percent of participants indicated that they would like to have the option of TA available in their EOLC (compared with 79% for euthanasia); 64% indicated that they would potentially wish for TA at the end of life (52% for euthanasia). Two-thirds indicated that doctors should be allowed to make a dying patient completely unconscious. More than 50% of participants believed that TA and euthanasia were non-equivalent; a third believed they were. INTERPRETATION: These novel findings demonstrate substantial support from the UK general public for the use of sedation and TA in EOLC. More discussion is needed about the range of options that should be offered for dying patients.

Which factors should be included in triage? An online survey of the attitudes of the UK general public to pandemic triage dilemmas.

OBJECTIVE: As cases of COVID-19 infections surge, concerns have renewed about intensive care units (ICUs) being overwhelmed and the need for specific triage protocols over winter. This study aimed to help inform triage guidance by exploring the views of lay people about factors to include in triage decisions. DESIGN, SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Online survey between 29th of May and 22nd of June 2020 based on hypothetical triage dilemmas. Participants recruited from existing market research panels, representative of the UK general population. Scenarios were presented in which a single ventilator is available, and two patients require ICU admission and ventilation. Patients differed in one of: chance of survival, life expectancy, age, expected length of treatment, disability and degree of frailty. Respondents were given the option of choosing one patient to treat or tossing a coin to decide. RESULTS: Seven hundred and sixty-three participated. A majority of respondents prioritised patients who would have a higher chance of survival (72%-93%), longer life expectancy (78%-83%), required shorter duration of treatment (88%-94%), were younger (71%-79%) or had a lesser degree of frailty (60%-69%, all p<0.001). Where there was a small difference between two patients, a larger proportion elected to toss a coin to decide which patient to treat. A majority (58%-86%) were prepared to withdraw treatment from a patient in intensive care who had a lower chance of survival than another patient currently presenting with COVID-19. Respondents also indicated a willingness to give higher priority to healthcare workers and to patients with young children. CONCLUSION: Members of the UK general public potentially support a broadly utilitarian approach to ICU triage in the face of overwhelming need. Survey respondents endorsed the relevance of patient factors currently included in triage guidance, but also factors not currently included. They supported the permissibility of reallocating treatment in a pandemic.

Confirmation bias in the utilization of others' opinion strength.

Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.

Mental Contrasting With Implementation Intentions Reduces Drinking When Drinking Is Hazardous: An Online Self-Regulation Intervention.

Introduction. Drinking alcohol has detrimental health consequences, and effective interventions to reduce hazardous drinking are needed. The self-regulation intervention of Mental Contrasting with Implementation Intentions (MCII) promotes behavior change across a variety of health behaviors. In this study, we tested if online delivery of MCII reduced hazardous drinking in people who were worried about their drinking. Method. Participants (N = 200, female = 107) were recruited online. They were randomized to learn MCII or solve simple math problems (control). Results. Immediately after the intervention, participants in the MCII condition (vs. control) reported an increased commitment to reduce drinking. After 1 month, they reported having taken action measured by the Readiness to Change drinking scale. When drinking was hazardous (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test ≥ 8, n = 85), participants in the MCII condition indicated a decreased number of drinking days, exp(ß) = 0.47, CI (confidence interval) [-1.322, -.207], p = .02, and drinks per week, exp(ß) = 0.57, CI [0.94, 5.514], p = .007, compared with the control condition. Discussion. These findings demonstrate that a brief, self-guided online intervention (Mdn = 28 minutes) can reduce drinking in people who worry about their drinking. Our findings show a higher impact in people at risk for hazardous drinking. Conclusion. MCII is scalable as an online intervention. Future studies should test the cost-effectiveness of the intervention in real-world settings.

Concern for Others Leads to Vicarious Optimism.

An optimistic learning bias leads people to update their beliefs in response to better-than-expected good news but neglect worse-than-expected bad news. Because evidence suggests that this bias arises from self-concern, we hypothesized that a similar bias may affect beliefs about other people's futures, to the extent that people care about others. Here, we demonstrated the phenomenon of vicarious optimism and showed that it arises from concern for others. Participants predicted the likelihood of unpleasant future events that could happen to either themselves or others. In addition to showing an optimistic learning bias for events affecting themselves, people showed vicarious optimism when learning about events affecting friends and strangers. Vicarious optimism for strangers correlated with generosity toward strangers, and experimentally increasing concern for strangers amplified vicarious optimism for them. These findings suggest that concern for others can bias beliefs about their future welfare and that optimism in learning is not restricted to oneself.

Uncertainty about the impact of social decisions increases prosocial behaviour.

Uncertainty about how our choices will affect others infuses social life. Past research suggests uncertainty has a negative effect on prosocial behaviour1-12 by enabling people to adopt self-serving narratives about their actions1,13. We show that uncertainty does not always promote selfishness. We introduce a distinction between two types of uncertainty that have opposite effects on prosocial behaviour. Previous work focused on outcome uncertainty (uncertainty about whether or not a decision will lead to a particular outcome). However, as soon as people's decisions might have negative consequences for others, there is also impact uncertainty (uncertainty about how others' well-being will be impacted by the negative outcome). Consistent with past research1-12, we found decreased prosocial behaviour under outcome uncertainty. In contrast, prosocial behaviour was increased under impact uncertainty in incentivized economic decisions and hypothetical decisions about infectious disease threats. Perceptions of social norms paralleled the behavioural effects. The effect of impact uncertainty on prosocial behaviour did not depend on the individuation of others or the mere mention of harm, and was stronger when impact uncertainty was made more salient. Our findings offer insights into communicating uncertainty, especially in contexts where prosocial behaviour is paramount, such as responding to infectious disease threats.

The Benefits and Costs of a Rose-Colored Hindsight.

Self-serving biases lead people to see themselves and their future through rose-colored glasses. New research by Kouchaki and Gino suggests this rosy view also extends backwards: memories of unethical behavior are less vivid than memories of good deeds. This so-called 'unethical amnesia' has many individual benefits, but also carries social costs.

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment.

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed.

Flanker performance in female college students with ADHD: a diffusion model analysis.

Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterized by poor adaptation to environmental demands, which leads to various everyday life problems. The present study had four aims: (1) to compare performance in a flanker task in female college students with and without ADHD (N = 39) in a classical analyses of reaction time and error rate and studying the underlying processes using a diffusion model, (2) to compare the amount of focused attention, (3) to explore the adaptation of focused attention, and (4) to relate adaptation to psychological functioning. The study followed a 2-between (group: ADHD vs. control) × 2-within (flanker conflict: incongruent vs. congruent) × 2-within (conflict frequency: 20 vs. 80 %) design. Compared to a control group, the ADHD group displayed prolonged response times accompanied by fewer errors in a flanker task. Results from the diffusion model analyses revealed that the members of the ADHD group showed deficits in non-decisional processes (i.e., higher non-decision time) and leaned more toward accuracy than participants without ADHD (i.e., setting higher boundaries). The ADHD group showed a more focused attention and less adaptation to the task conditions which is related to psychological functioning. Deficient non-decisional processes and poor adaptation are in line with theories of ADHD and presumably typical for the ADHD population, although this has not been shown using a diffusion model. However, we assume that the cautious strategy of trading speed of for accuracy is specific to the subgroup of female college students with ADHD and might be interpreted as a compensation mechanism.

Implicit theories of emotion shape regulation of negative affect.

Implicit theories of emotion--assumptions about whether emotions are fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory)--have previously been shown to influence affective outcomes over time. We examined whether implicit theories of emotion also relate to the immediate regulation of negative affect. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that the more students endorsed an entity theory of emotion, the more discomfort they reported while watching an aversive movie clip, the more they avoided affective stimuli in this movie clip, the more negative affect they reported after the clip, and the less likely they were to watch the same clip again to learn about its ending. These findings suggest that implicit theories of emotion might produce poor affective outcomes immediately as well as over time. They also offer insight into why some people avoid negative affect while others confront it.

Mental contrasting and the self-regulation of responding to negative feedback.

Mentally contrasting a desired future with impeding reality promotes goal pursuit when expectations of success are high and curbs goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. Four studies tested whether mental contrasting affects responses to goal-relevant negative feedback. Mental contrasting promoted the processing of negative feedback (Studies 1 and 2), which in turn helped participants to form plans beneficial for goal pursuit (Study 2). Mental contrasting also protected the self-view of competence against negative feedback (Study 3) and facilitated beneficial attributions for negative feedback (Study 4). All effects occurred in line with expectations of success. These results suggest that mental contrasting regulates effective responses to negative feedback by bringing goal pursuit in line with expectations of success.