RESUMEN
In October 2017, most European countries reported unique atmospheric detections of aerosol-bound radioruthenium (106Ru). The range of concentrations varied from some tenths of µBq·m-3 to more than 150 mBq·m-3 The widespread detection at such considerable (yet innocuous) levels suggested a considerable release. To compare activity reports of airborne 106Ru with different sampling periods, concentrations were reconstructed based on the most probable plume presence duration at each location. Based on airborne concentration spreading and chemical considerations, it is possible to assume that the release occurred in the Southern Urals region (Russian Federation). The 106Ru age was estimated to be about 2 years. It exhibited highly soluble and less soluble fractions in aqueous media, high radiopurity (lack of concomitant radionuclides), and volatility between 700 and 1,000 °C, thus suggesting a release at an advanced stage in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The amount and isotopic characteristics of the radioruthenium release may indicate a context with the production of a large 144Ce source for a neutrino experiment.
RESUMEN
Between the end of September and early October 2017, 106Ru was recorded by air monitoring stations across parts of Europe. In the environment, this purely anthropogenic radionuclide can be detected very rarely only. As far as known, 106Ru is only used in radiotherapy and possibly in radiothermal generators. Therefore, the episode drew considerable interest in the monitoring community, although the activity concentrations and resulting exposure were far below radiological concern. Health consequences can be practically excluded except possibly near the source. 106Ru in aerosols could be detected for several weeks and in some regions of Central and Eastern Europe tens, up to over 100 mBq/m³ were measured as one-day means. Discussions about a possible source continue until today (early 2019). Atmospheric back-modelling led to trajectories likely originating in the Southern to Northern Ural region of Russia and possibly Northern Kazakhstan. Suspiciously, no other anthropogenic radionuclides have been observed alongside, except minute concentrations of comparatively short-lived 103Ru (half life 39â¯d vs. 376 d for 106Ru). Due to the absence of other anthropogenic radionuclides, a reactor accident can be excluded, although both Ru isotopes are fission products generated in nuclear reactors. The exposure resulting from 106Ru activity concentration in air exceeded 200 mBqâ¯×â¯d/m³ in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe. This leads to inhalation doses of up to about 0.3⯵Sv regionally, assuming the radiologically most efficient speciation, lacking better information, and inhalation dose conversion factors from ICRP 119. We show an interpolated map of the dose distribution over parts of Europe where sufficient measurements are available to us. Overlaying population density, we give an estimate of collective dose. The opportunity is also used to give a short review of origin, properties and use of 106Ru, as well as of accidents which involved release of this radionuclide.
Asunto(s)
Contaminantes Radiactivos del Aire/análisis , Dosis de Radiación , Monitoreo de Radiación , Aerosoles/análisis , Europa (Continente) , Radioisótopos de RutenioRESUMEN
Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (131I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 µBq m-3 except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m-3. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of 131I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related to 131I use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.
Asunto(s)
Contaminantes Radiactivos del Aire , Neoplasias de la Tiroides , Europa (Continente) , Humanos , Radioisótopos de Yodo , Federación de RusiaRESUMEN
Radioactive emissions into the atmosphere from the damaged reactors of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant (NPP) started on March 12th, 2011. Among the various radionuclides released, iodine-131 ((131)I) and cesium isotopes ((137)Cs and (134)Cs) were transported across the Pacific toward the North American continent and reached Europe despite dispersion and washout along the route of the contaminated air masses. In Europe, the first signs of the releases were detected 7 days later while the first peak of activity level was observed between March 28th and March 30th. Time variations over a 20-day period and spatial variations across more than 150 sampling locations in Europe made it possible to characterize the contaminated air masses. After the Chernobyl accident, only a few measurements of the gaseous (131)I fraction were conducted compared to the number of measurements for the particulate fraction. Several studies had already pointed out the importance of the gaseous (131)I and the large underestimation of the total (131)I airborne activity level, and subsequent calculations of inhalation dose, if neglected. The measurements made across Europe following the releases from the Fukushima NPP reactors have provided a significant amount of new data on the ratio of the gaseous (131)I fraction to total (131)I, both on a spatial scale and its temporal variation. It can be pointed out that during the Fukushima event, the (134)Cs to (137)Cs ratio proved to be different from that observed after the Chernobyl accident. The data set provided in this paper is the most comprehensive survey of the main relevant airborne radionuclides from the Fukushima reactors, measured across Europe. A rough estimate of the total (131)I inventory that has passed over Europe during this period was <1% of the released amount. According to the measurements, airborne activity levels remain of no concern for public health in Europe.
Asunto(s)
Contaminantes Radiactivos del Aire/análisis , Radioisótopos de Cesio/análisis , Radioisótopos de Yodo/análisis , Liberación de Radiactividad Peligrosa , Europa (Continente) , Japón , Plantas de Energía Nuclear , Monitoreo de RadiaciónRESUMEN
After the nuclear reactor accident of Chernobyl, the "Integrated Measurement and Information System (IMIS) for Monitoring the Environmental Radioactivity and Detecting Emissions from Nuclear Plants was implemented in Germany. IMIS is a nationwide comprehensive measuring system which permanently monitors the radioactivity in all important environment media in the whole federal territory. At approximately 40 sites, the activity concentration of radioactive substances is measured in air and precipitations. At least 14 of them are responsible for trace monitoring of radionuclides in the air. The legal bases of IMIS prescribe regular inter-laboratory comparison analyses in cooperation with the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), with the use of reference materials prepared by the Federal Coordinating Laboratories. In order to fulfil this requirement in the field of trace survey measurements in ground-level air, the Federal Office for Radiation Protection ("Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz", BfS) and the PTB have conducted a comparison with real, dust-loaded reference filters in 2005. The comparison was organized within the framework of a cooperation of trace survey stations from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The paper describes the preparation of the real, dust-loaded reference filters, the procedure for spiking the filters with the activity standard solution containing (22)Na, (88)Y, (89)Sr, (90)Sr, (125)Sb, (133)Ba, (134)Cs, and (241)Am. Some results are discussed and conclusions are given.