Bounded research ethicality: researchers rate themselves and their field as better than others at following good research practice.

Bounded ethicality refers to people's limited capacity to consistently behave in line with their ethical standards. Here, we present results from a pre-registered, large-scale (N = 11,050) survey of researchers in Sweden, suggesting that researchers too are boundedly ethical. Specifically, researchers on average rated themselves as better than other researchers in their field at following good research practice, and rated researchers in their own field as better than researchers in other fields at following good research practice. These effects were stable across all academic fields, but strongest among researchers in the medical sciences. Taken together, our findings illustrate inflated self-righteous beliefs among researchers and research disciplines when it comes to research ethics, which may contribute to academic polarization and moral blindspots regarding one's own and one's colleagues' use of questionable research practices.

Individual-level solutions may support system-level change â if they are internalized as part of one's social identity.

System-level change is crucial for solving society's most pressing problems. However, individual-level interventions may be useful for creating behavioral change before system-level change is in place and for increasing necessary public support for system-level solutions. Participating in individual-level solutions may increase support for system-level solutions - especially if the individual-level solutions are internalized as part of one's social identity.

Dual-process theory is Barbapapa.

The biggest benefit of dual-process theory lies in its role as a benchmark theory that, regardless of its empirical plausibility, serves as a starting point for better and more domain-specific models. In this sense, dual-process theory is the Barbapapa of psychological theory - a blob-shaped creature that can be reshaped and adapted to fit in the context of any human behavior.

Prediction and action in cortical pain processing.

Predicting that a stimulus is painful facilitates action to avoid harm. But how distinct are the neural processes underlying the prediction of upcoming painful events vis-à-vis those taking action to avoid them? Here, we investigated brain activity as a function of current and predicted painful or nonpainful thermal stimulation, as well as the ability of voluntary action to affect the duration of upcoming stimulation. Participants performed a task which involved the administration of a painful or nonpainful stimulus (S1), which predicted an immediately subsequent very painful or nonpainful stimulus (S2). Pressing a response button within a specified time window during S1 either reduced or did not reduce the duration of the upcoming stimulation. Predicted pain increased activation in several regions, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), midcingulate cortex (MCC), and insula; however, activation in ACC and MCC depended on whether a meaningful action was performed, with MCC activation showing a direct relationship with motor output. Insula's responses for predicted pain were also modulated by potential action consequences, albeit without a direct relationship with motor output. These findings suggest that cortical pain processing is not specifically tied to the sensory stimulus, but instead, depends on the consequences of that stimulus for sensorimotor control of behavior.

A preregistered replication of motivated numeracy.

Motivated numeracy refers to the idea that people with high reasoning capacity will use that capacity selectively to process information in a manner that protects their own valued beliefs. This concept was introduced in a now classic article by Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic [2017, Behavioral Public Policy 1, 54-86], who used numeracy to index reasoning capacity, and demonstrated that the tendency to engage in ideologically congruent interpretation of facts increased substantially with people's numeracy. Despite the importance of this finding, both from a theoretical and practical point of view, there is yet no consensus in the literature about the factual strength of motivated numeracy. We therefore conducted a large-scale replication of Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic (2017), using a pre-specified analysis plan with strict evaluation criteria. We did not find good evidence for motivated numeracy; there are distinct patterns in our data at odds with the core predictions of the theory, most notably (i) there is ideologically congruent responding that is not moderated by numeracy, and (ii) when there is moderation, ideologically congruent responding occurs only at the highest levels of numeracy. Our findings suggest that the cumulative evidence for motivated numeracy is weaker than previously thought, and that caution is warranted when this feature of human cognition is leveraged to improve science communication on contested topics such as climate change or immigration.

No Effect of Ego Depletion on Risk Taking.

We investigated the effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Specifically, we conducted three studies (total n = 1,716) to test the prediction that ego depletion results in decisions that are more strongly in line with prospect theory, i.e., that ego depletion reduces risk taking for gains, increases risk taking for losses, and increases loss aversion. Ego depletion was induced using two of the most common manipulations from previous literature: the letter 'e' task (Studies 1 and 3) and the Stroop task (Study 2). Risk taking was measured using a series of standard, incentivized economic decision-making tasks assessing risk preferences in the gain domain, risk preferences in the loss domain, and loss aversion. None of the studies revealed a significant effect of ego depletion on risk taking. Our findings cast further doubts about the ability of ego-depletion manipulations to affect actual behavior in experimental settings.

The effect of acute pain on risky and intertemporal choice.

Pain is a highly salient and attention-demanding experience that motivates people to act. We investigated the effect of pain on decision making by delivering acute thermal pain to participants' forearm while they made risky and intertemporal choices involving money. Participants (n = 107) were more risk seeking under pain than in a no-pain control condition when decisions involved gains but not when they involved equivalent losses. Pain also resulted in greater preference for immediate (smaller) over future (larger) monetary rewards. We interpret these results as a motivation to offset the aversive, pain-induced state, where monetary rewards become more appealing under pain than under no pain and when delivered sooner rather than later. Our findings add to the long-standing debate regarding the role of intuition and reflection in decision making.

The (Null) Effect of Affective Touch on Betrayal Aversion, Altruism, and Risk Taking.

Pleasant touch is thought to increase the release of oxytocin. Oxytocin, in turn, has been extensively studied with regards to its effects on trust and prosocial behavior, but results remain inconsistent. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of touch on economic decision making. Participants (n = 120) were stroked on their left arm using a soft brush (touch condition) or not at all (control condition; varied within subjects), while they performed a series of decision tasks assessing betrayal aversion (the Betrayal Aversion Elicitation Task), altruism (donating money to a charitable organization), and risk taking (the Balloon Analog Risk Task). We found no significant effect of touch on any of the outcome measures, neither within nor between subjects. Furthermore, effects were not moderated by gender or attachment. However, attachment avoidance had a significant effect on altruism in that those who were high in avoidance donated less money. Our findings contribute to the understanding of affective touch-and, by extension, oxytocin-in social behavior, and decision making by showing that touch does not directly influence performance in tasks involving risk and prosocial decisions. Specifically, our work casts further doubt on the validity of oxytocin research in humans.

Intuition and Moral Decision-Making - The Effect of Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Moral Judgment and Altruistic Behavior.

Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking-induced by time pressure and cognitive load-in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making.

A Multilab Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect.

Good self-control has been linked to adaptive outcomes such as better health, cohesive personal relationships, success in the workplace and at school, and less susceptibility to crime and addictions. In contrast, self-control failure is linked to maladaptive outcomes. Understanding the mechanisms by which self-control predicts behavior may assist in promoting better regulation and outcomes. A popular approach to understanding self-control is the strength or resource depletion model. Self-control is conceptualized as a limited resource that becomes depleted after a period of exertion resulting in self-control failure. The model has typically been tested using a sequential-task experimental paradigm, in which people completing an initial self-control task have reduced self-control capacity and poorer performance on a subsequent task, a state known as ego depletion Although a meta-analysis of ego-depletion experiments found a medium-sized effect, subsequent meta-analyses have questioned the size and existence of the effect and identified instances of possible bias. The analyses served as a catalyst for the current Registered Replication Report of the ego-depletion effect. Multiple laboratories (k = 23, total N = 2,141) conducted replications of a standardized ego-depletion protocol based on a sequential-task paradigm by Sripada et al. Meta-analysis of the studies revealed that the size of the ego-depletion effect was small with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) that encompassed zero (d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]. We discuss implications of the findings for the ego-depletion effect and the resource depletion model of self-control.

The Arithmetic of Emotion: Integration of Incidental and Integral Affect in Judgments and Decisions.

Research has demonstrated that two types of affect have an influence on judgment and decision making: incidental affect (affect unrelated to a judgment or decision such as a mood) and integral affect (affect that is part of the perceiver's internal representation of the option or target under consideration). So far, these two lines of research have seldom crossed so that knowledge concerning their combined effects is largely missing. To fill this gap, the present review highlights differences and similarities between integral and incidental affect. Further, common and unique mechanisms that enable these two types of affect to influence judgment and choices are identified. Finally, some basic principles for affect integration when the two sources co-occur are outlined. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to existing work that has focused on incidental or integral affect but not both.