Long-run consequences of informal elderly care and implications of public long-term care insurance.

We estimate a dynamic structural model of labor supply, retirement, and informal caregiving to study short and long-term costs of informal caregiving in Germany. Incorporating labor market frictions and the German tax and benefit system, we find that in the absence of Germany's public long-term insurance scheme, informal elderly care has adverse and persistent effects on labor market outcomes and, thus, negatively affects lifetime earnings and future pension benefits. These consequences of caregiving are heterogeneous and depend on age, previous earnings, and institutional regulations. Policy simulations suggest that while public long-term care insurance policies are fiscally costly and induce negative labor market effects, they can largely offset the personal costs of caregiving and increase welfare, especially for low-income individuals.

Care choices in Europe: To Each According to His or Her Needs?

Growing long-term care (LTC) needs represent a major challenge for our aging societies. Understanding how utilization patterns of different types of care are influenced by LTC policies or changes in the population composition such as age patterns or health can provide helpful insight on how to adequately prepare for this situation. To this aim, this paper explores how individuals choose between different forms of LTC. We exploit variation between countries as well as between individuals within countries using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Using nonlinear decomposition techniques, we break down the difference in utilization rates between countries into differences based on observed sociodemographic and need-related characteristics and differences in the impacts of these characteristics, which allows us to identify the drivers behind differences in the formal-informal care mix. Our results show that a substantial fraction of the observed country differences can be explained by differences in impacts. We argue that this is a result of the different incentives provided by the different LTC systems.

Labor supply effects of long-term care reform in Germany.

Many informal caregivers are of working age, facing the double burden of providing care and working. Negative labor supply effects can severely reduce the comparative cost advantage of informal over formal care arrangements. When designing long-term care (LTC) policies, it is crucial to understand the effects not only on health outcomes but also on labor supply behavior of informal caregivers. We evaluate labor supply reactions to the introduction of the German long-term care insurance in 1995 using a difference-in-differences approach. The long-term care insurance changes the caregivers' trade-off between labor supply and care provision. The aim of the reform was to strengthen informal care arrangements. We find a strong negative labor supply effect for men but not for women. We argue that the LTC benefits increased incentives for older men to leave the labor market. The results reveal a trade-off for policy makers that is important for future reforms-in particular for countries that mainly base their LTC system on informal care.

Long-term Care Insurance and Carers' Labor Supply - A Structural Model.

In Germany, individuals in need of long-term care receive support through benefits of the long-term care insurance. A central goal of the insurance is to support informal care provided by family members. Care recipients can choose between benefits in kind (formal home care services) and benefits in cash. From a budgetary perspective, family care is often considered a cost-saving alternative to formal home care and to stationary nursing care. However, the opportunity costs resulting from reduced labor supply of the carer are often overlooked. We focus on the labor supply decision of family carers and the incentives set by the long-term care insurance. We estimate a structural model of labor supply and the choice of benefits of family carers. We find that benefits in kind have small positive effects on labor supply. Labor supply elasticities of cash benefits are larger and negative. If both types of benefits increase, negative labor supply effects are offset to a large extent. However, the average effect is significantly negative.