Emplacement and 3D geometry of crustal-scale saucer-shaped intrusions in the Fennoscandian Shield.

Saucer-shaped intrusions of tens of meters to tens of kilometres across have been observed both from surface geological mapping and geophysical observations. However, there is only one location where they have been reported to extend c. 100 km laterally, and emplaced both in a sedimentary basin and the crystalline basement down to 12 km depth. The legacy BABEL offshore seismic data, acquired over the central Fennoscandian Shield in 1989, have been recovered and reprocessed with the main goal of focusing on this series of globally unique crustal-scale saucer-shaped intrusions present onshore and offshore below the Bothnian Sea. The intrusions (c. 1.25 Ga), emplaced in an extensional setting, are observed within both sedimentary rocks (<1.5 Ga) and in the crystalline basement (>1.5 Ga). They have oval shapes with diameters ranging 30-100 km. The reprocessed seismic data provide evidence of up-doming of the lower crust (representing the melt reservoir) below the intrusions that, in turn, are observed at different depths in addition to a steep seismically transparent zone interpreted to be a discordant feeder dyke system. Relative age constraints and correlation with onshore saucer-shaped intrusions of different size suggest that they are internally connected and fed by each other from deeper to shallower levels. We argue for a nested emplacement mechanism and against a controlling role by the overlying sedimentary basin as the saucer-shaped intrusions are emplaced in both the sedimentary rocks as well as in the underlying crystalline basement. The interplay between magma pressure and overburden pressure, as well as the, at the time, ambient stress regime, are responsible for their extensive extent and rather constant thicknesses (c. 100-300 m). Saucer-shaped intrusions may therefore be present elsewhere in the crystalline basement to the same extent as observed in this study some of which are a significant source of raw materials.

Local seismic network for monitoring of a potential nuclear power plant area.

This study presents a plan for seismic monitoring of a region around a potential nuclear power plant. Seismic monitoring is needed to evaluate seismic risk. The International Atomic Energy Agency has set guidelines on seismic hazard evaluation and monitoring of such areas. According to these guidelines, we have made a plan for a local network of seismic stations to collect data for seismic source characterization and seismotectonic interpretations, as well as to monitor seismic activity and natural hazards. The detection and location capability of the network were simulated using different station configurations by computing spatial azimuthal coverages and detection threshold magnitudes. Background noise conditions around Pyhäjoki were analyzed by comparing data from different stations. The annual number of microearthquakes that should be detected with a dense local network centered around Pyhäjoki was estimated. The network should be dense enough to fulfill the requirements of azimuthal coverage better than 180° and automatic event location capability down to ML ∼ 0 within a distance of 25 km from the site. A network of 10 stations should be enough to reach these goals. With this setup, the detection threshold magnitudes are estimated to be ML = -0.1 and ML = 0.1 within a radius of 25 and 50 km from Pyhäjoki, respectively. The annual number of earthquakes detected by the network is estimated to be 2 (ML ≥ ∼ -0.1) within 25 km radius and 5 (ML ≥ ∼-0.1 to ∼0.1) within 50 km radius. The location accuracy within 25 km radius is estimated to be 1-2 and 4 km for horizontal coordinates and depth, respectively. Thus, the network is dense enough to map out capable faults with horizontal accuracy of 1-2 km within 25 km radius of the site. The estimation is based on the location accuracies of five existing networks in northern Europe. Local factors, such as seismic noise sources, geology and infrastructure might limit the station configuration and detection and location capability of the network.