The unlikelihood effect: When knowing more creates the perception of less.

People face increasingly detailed information related to a range of risky decisions. To aid individuals in thinking through such risks, various forms of policy and health messaging often enumerate their causes. Whereas some prior literature suggests that adding information about causes of an outcome increases its perceived likelihood, we identify a novel mechanism through which the opposite regularly occurs. Across seven primary and six supplementary experiments, we find that the estimated likelihood of an outcome decreases when people learn about the (by- definition lower) probabilities of the pathways that lead to that outcome. This "unlikelihood" bias exists despite explicit communication of the outcome's total objective probability and occurs for both positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, awareness of a low-probability pathway decreases subjective perceptions of the outcome's likelihood even when its addition objectively increases the outcome's actual probability. These findings advance the current understanding of how people integrate information under uncertainty and derive subjective perceptions of risk. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

How consumer digital signals are reshaping the customer journey.

Marketers are adopting increasingly sophisticated ways to engage with customers throughout their journeys. We extend prior perspectives on the customer journey by introducing the role of digital signals that consumers emit throughout their activities. We argue that the ability to detect and act on consumer digital signals is a source of competitive advantage for firms. Technology enables firms to collect, interpret, and act on these signals to better manage the customer journey. While some consumers' desire for privacy can restrict the opportunities technology provides marketers, other consumers' desire for personalization can encourage the use of technology to inform marketing efforts. We posit that this difference in consumers' willingness to emit observable signals may hinge on the strength of their relationship with the firm. We next discuss factors that may shift consumer preferences and consequently affect the technology-enabled opportunities available to firms. We conclude with a research agenda that focuses on consumers, firms, and regulators.

Change Appeals: How Referencing Change Boosts Curiosity and Promotes Persuasion.

Does merely referencing that an object or entity has changed affect people's attitudes and intentions toward it? This research investigates the possibility that change references spark curiosity and information seeking, which can have a positive or negative effect on people's evaluations of a target stimulus, depending on the information environment. Seven experiments reveal that referencing that an object or entity has changed decreases perceptions of its longevity, but also sparks curiosity about it-a desire to learn more. This curiosity motivates people to seek information about the object or entity, which can enhance or depress their evaluations depending on whether that information search leads to favorable or unfavorable information. When further information is unavailable, change references appear to have a negative impact on people's evaluations, consistent with well-established longevity biases. This research suggests that change references have an important and generalizable impact on persuasive outcomes and pinpoints the conditions surrounding and processes driving this effect.

Moral Choice When Harming Is Unavoidable.

Past research suggests that actors often seek to minimize harm at the cost of maximizing social welfare. However, this prior research has confounded a desire to minimize the negative impact caused by one's actions (harm aversion) with a desire to avoid causing any harm whatsoever (harm avoidance). Across six studies (N = 2,152), we demonstrate that these two motives are distinct. When decision-makers can completely avoid committing a harmful act, they strongly prefer to do so. However, harming cannot always be avoided. Often, decision-makers must choose between committing less harm for less benefit and committing more harm for more benefit. In these cases, harm aversion diminishes substantially, and decision-makers become increasingly willing to commit greater harm to obtain greater benefits. Thus, value trade-offs that decision-makers refuse to accept when it is possible to completely avoid committing harm can suddenly become desirable when some harm must be committed.

Being "good" or "good enough": Prosocial risk and the structure of moral self-regard.

The motivation to feel moral powerfully guides people's prosocial behavior. We propose that people's efforts to preserve their moral self-regard conform to a moral threshold model. This model predicts that people are primarily concerned with whether their prosocial behavior legitimates the claim that they have acted morally, a claim that often diverges from whether their behavior is in the best interests of the recipient. Specifically, it predicts that for people to feel moral following a prosocial decision, that decision need not have promised the greatest benefit for the recipient but only one larger than at least one other available outcome. Moreover, this model predicts that once people produce a benefit that exceeds this threshold, their moral self-regard is relatively insensitive to the magnitude of benefit that they produce. In 6 studies, we test this moral threshold model by examining people's prosocial risk decisions. We find that, compared with risky egoistic decisions, people systematically avoid making risky prosocial decisions that carry the possibility of producing the worst possible outcome in a choice set-even when this means avoiding a decision that is objectively superior. We further find that this aversion to producing the worst possible prosocial outcome leads people's prosocial (vs. egoistic) risk decisions to be less sensitive to those decisions' maximum possible benefit. We highlight theoretical and practical implications of these findings, including the detrimental consequence that people's desire to protect their moral self-regard can have on the amount of good that they produce. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

And the winner is . . . ? Forecasting the outcome of others' competitive efforts.

People frequently forecast the outcomes of competitive events. Some forecasts are about oneself (e.g., forecasting how one will perform in an athletic competition, school or job application, or professional contest), while many other forecasts are about others (e.g., predicting the outcome of another individual's athletic competition, school or job application, or professional contest). In this research, we examine people's forecasts about others' competitive outcomes, illuminate a systematic bias in these forecasts, and document the source of this bias as well as its downstream consequences. Eight experiments with a total of 3,219 participants in a variety of competitive contexts demonstrate that when observers forecast the outcome that another individual will experience, observers systematically overestimate the probability that this individual will win. This misprediction stems from a previously undocumented lay belief-the belief that other people generally achieve their intentions-that skews observers' hypothesis testing. We find that this lay belief biases observers' forecasts even in contexts in which the other person's intent is unlikely to generate the person's intended outcome, and even when observers are directly incentivized to formulate an accurate forecast. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Half a Gift Is Not Half-Hearted: A Giver-Receiver Asymmetry in the Thoughtfulness of Partial Gifts.

Four studies document an asymmetry in givers' and receivers' evaluations of gifts: Givers underestimate the extent to which receivers perceive partial (but more desirable) gifts to be thoughtful, valuable, and worthy of appreciation. Study 1 documents this asymmetry and suggests that givers underestimate the extent to which partial gifts signal thoughtfulness to receivers. Study 2 replicates this asymmetry in the context of a real gift exchange among friends. Study 3 shows that this asymmetry arises because givers believe that purchasing partial gifts is a greater violation of gift-giving norms than do receivers, leading givers to expect that partial gifts will damage receivers' perceptions of a gift's value. Study 4 offers an intervention that induces givers to select the (partial) gifts that receivers prefer more than givers expect: framing a gift's separate components as complete units.

Anticipating divine protection? Reminders of god can increase nonmoral risk taking.

Religiosity and participation in religious activities have been linked with decreased risky behavior. In the current research, we hypothesized that exposure to the concept of God can actually increase people's willingness to engage in certain types of risks. Across seven studies, reminders of God increased risk taking in nonmoral domains. This effect was mediated by the perceived danger of a risky option and emerged more strongly among individuals who perceive God as a reliable source of safety and protection than among those who do not. Moreover, in an eighth study, when participants were first reminded of God and then took a risk that produced negative consequences (i.e., when divine protection failed to materialize), participants reported feeling more negatively toward God than did participants in the same situation who were not first reminded of God. This research contributes to an understanding of the divergent effects that distinct components of religion can exert on behavior.