Evolution by habit: Peirce, Lamarck, and teleology in biology.

In our paper, we analyse the relationship of the evolutionary philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce to Lamarckian natural philosophy and link it to concepts of teleology, focusing especially on Aristotelian and Peircean conceptions of the final cause. Peirce commented on evolution in many of his writings, especially in 1891-1893 in essays such as 'Evolutionary Love' (1893) or 'Man's Glassy Essence' (1892). After introducing the three types of evolution distinguished by Peirce, we compare Peirce's and Lamarck's views on evolution, habit, and teleology. From a synthesis of concepts formulated by Peirce, Aristotle, nineteenth-century neo-Lamarckians, and current knowledge regarding epigenetics, there should emerge our own concept of biological teleology unburdened by panpsychism, subjective intentions, or determinism. We believe it could be a concept acceptable to current biology.

Lessons Learned: the 20th Gatherings in Biosemiotics.

We review the organization and contents of the 20th Gatherings in Biosemiotics. As the organizers, we share our insights from organizing a community research project in the year where the Covid-19 pandemic halted international travel. We try to describe the challenges of putting together the yearly conference on Biosemiotics and the main content that was presented by the research community.

Can quantitative approaches develop bio/semiotic theory?

This special issue addresses question about the place of quantitative methods in the field of biosemiotics. Many standpoints have been taken by contributing authors to demonstrate that the answer to this question is not straightforward. Considering quantitative methods in biosemiotics is necessarily related to inclusion of other scientific fields and interdisciplinary dialogue.

The lower threshold as a unifying principle between Code Biology and Biosemiotics.

Whether we emphasize the notion of 'sign' or the notion of 'code', either way the main interest of biosemiotics and Code Biology is the same, and we argue that the idea of the lower threshold is what still unifies these two groups. Code Biology concentrates on the notion of code: living organisms are defined as code-users or code-makers, and so it may be called the 'lower coding threshold' in this case. The semiotic threshold on the other hand is a concept without a specific definition. There are many possible ways of understanding this term. In order to maintain the lower threshold as the unifying concept between Code Biology and biosemiotics, it is important to be very clear about where this threshold is located and how it is defined. We focus on establishing the lower semiotic threshold at protein biosynthesis, and we propose basing the semiotic understanding of the lowest life forms on the following criteria: arbitrariness, representation, repetition, historicity and self-replication. We also offer that this definition of the lower threshold need not include the notion of interpretation, in the hope that this newly specified common principle of the lower threshold be accepted as a way forward in the conversation between Code Biology and biosemiotics.

Arbitrariness is not enough: towards a functional approach to the genetic code.

Arbitrariness in the genetic code is one of the main reasons for a linguistic approach to molecular biology: the genetic code is usually understood as an arbitrary relation between amino acids and nucleobases. However, from a semiotic point of view, arbitrariness should not be the only condition for definition of a code, consequently it is not completely correct to talk about "code" in this case. Yet we suppose that there exist a code in the process of protein synthesis, but on a higher level than the nucleic bases chains. Semiotically, a code should be always associated with a function and we propose to define the genetic code not only relationally (in basis of relation between nucleobases and amino acids) but also in terms of function (function of a protein as meaning of the code). Even if the functional definition of meaning in the genetic code has been discussed in the field of biosemiotics, its further implications have not been considered. In fact, if the function of a protein represents the meaning of the genetic code (the sign's object), then it is crucial to reconsider the notion of its expression (the sign) as well. In our contribution, we will show that the actual model of the genetic code is not the only possible and we will propose a more appropriate model from a semiotic point of view.