Applying the IEEE BRAIN neuroethics framework to intra-cortical brain-computer interfaces.

Objective. Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are neuroprosthetic devices that allow for direct interaction between brains and machines. These types of neurotechnologies have recently experienced a strong drive in research and development, given, in part, that they promise to restore motor and communication abilities in individuals experiencing severe paralysis. While a rich literature analyzes the ethical, legal, and sociocultural implications (ELSCI) of these novel neurotechnologies, engineers, clinicians and BCI practitioners often do not have enough exposure to these topics.Approach. Here, we present the IEEE Neuroethics Framework, an international, multiyear, iterative initiative aimed at developing a robust, accessible set of considerations for diverse stakeholders.Main results. Using the framework, we provide practical examples of ELSCI considerations for BCI neurotechnologies. We focus on invasive technologies, and in particular, devices that are implanted intra-cortically for medical research applications.Significance. We demonstrate the utility of our framework in exposing a wide range of implications across different intra-cortical BCI technology modalities and conclude with recommendations on how to utilize this knowledge in the development and application of ethical guidelines for BCI neurotechnologies.

Realigning the Neural Paradigm for Death.

Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death.

Contemplative Meditation and Neuroscience: Prospects for Mental Health.

Numerous studies show that personal spirituality developed through prayer positively influences mental health. Phenomenological and neuroscientific studies of mindfulness, an Eastern meditative prayer form, reveal significant health benefits now yielding important insights useful for guiding treatment of psychological disorders. By contrast, and despite its practice for millennia, Christian meditation is largely unrepresented in studies of clinical efficacy. Resemblances between mindfulness and disciplinary acts in Christian meditation taken from the ancient Greek practice of askesis suggest that Christian meditation will prove similarly beneficial; furthermore, psychological and neuroscientific studies suggest that its retention of a dialogical and transcendent praxis will additionally benefit social and existential psychotherapy. This paper thus argues that study of contemplative meditation for its therapeutic potential is warranted.

Self-Deception in Terminal Patients: Belief System at Stake.

A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes - deep-seated beliefs - intimately related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms, mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth: whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less effort than accepting the truth.