Does Inflammation Contribute to Cancer Incidence and Mortality during Aging? A Conceptual Review.

Aging is associated with chronic low-grade inflammation, cancer incidence and mortality. As inflammation contributes to cancer initiation and progression, one could hypothesize that age-associated chronic low-grade inflammation contributes to the increase in cancer incidence and/or mortality observed during aging. Here, we review the evidence supporting this hypothesis: (1) epidemiological associations between biomarkers of systemic inflammation and cancer incidence and mortality in older people, (2) therapeutic clues suggesting that targeting inflammation could reduce cancer incidence and mortality and (3) experimental evidence from animal models highlighting inflammation as a link between various mechanisms of aging and cancer initiation and progression. Despite a large body of literature linking aging, inflammation and cancer, convincing evidence for the clear implication of specific inflammatory pathways explaining cancer incidence or mortality during aging is still lacking. Further dedicated research is needed to fill these gaps in evidence and pave the way for the development of applications in clinical care.

A Baldwin interpretation of adult hippocampal neurogenesis: from functional relevance to physiopathology.

Hippocampal adult neurogenesis has been associated to many cognitive, emotional, and behavioral functions and dysfunctions, and its status as a selected effect or an "appendix of the brain" has been debated. In this review, we propose to understand hippocampal neurogenesis as the process underlying the "Baldwin effect", a particular situation in evolution where fitness does not rely on the natural selection of genetic traits, but on "ontogenetic adaptation" to a changing environment. This supports the view that a strong distinction between developmental and adult hippocampal neurogenesis is made. We propose that their functions are the constitution and the lifelong adaptation, respectively, of a basic repertoire of cognitive and emotional behaviors. This lifelong adaptation occurs through new forms of binding, i.e., association or dissociation of more basic elements. This distinction further suggests that a difference is made between developmental vulnerability (or resilience), stemming from dysfunctional (or highly functional) developmental hippocampal neurogenesis, and adult vulnerability (or resilience), stemming from dysfunctional (or highly functional) adult hippocampal neurogenesis. According to this hypothesis, developmental and adult vulnerability are distinct risk factors for various mental disorders in adults. This framework suggests new avenues for research on hippocampal neurogenesis and its implication in mental disorders.

The Evolution of the Hallmarks of Aging.

The evolutionary theory of aging has set the foundations for a comprehensive understanding of aging. The biology of aging has listed and described the "hallmarks of aging," i.e., cellular and molecular mechanisms involved in human aging. The present paper is the first to infer the order of appearance of the hallmarks of bilaterian and thereby human aging throughout evolution from their presence in progressively narrower clades. Its first result is that all organisms, even non-senescent, have to deal with at least one mechanism of aging - the progressive accumulation of misfolded or unstable proteins. Due to their cumulation, these mechanisms are called "layers of aging." A difference should be made between the first four layers of unicellular aging, present in some unicellular organisms and in all multicellular opisthokonts, that stem and strike "from the inside" of individual cells and span from increasingly abnormal protein folding to deregulated nutrient sensing, and the last four layers of metacellular aging, progressively appearing in metazoans, that strike the cells of a multicellular organism "from the outside," i.e., because of other cells, and span from transcriptional alterations to the disruption of intercellular communication. The evolution of metazoans and eumetazoans probably solved the problem of aging along with the problem of unicellular aging. However, metacellular aging originates in the mechanisms by which the effects of unicellular aging are kept under control - e.g., the exhaustion of stem cells that contribute to replace damaged somatic cells. In bilaterians, additional functions have taken a toll on generally useless potentially limited lifespan to increase the fitness of organisms at the price of a progressively less efficient containment of the damage of unicellular aging. In the end, this picture suggests that geroscience should be more efficient in targeting conditions of metacellular aging rather than unicellular aging itself.

Immunological exhaustion: How to make a disparate concept operational?

In this essay, we show that 3 distinct approaches to immunological exhaustion coexist and that they only partially overlap, generating potential misunderstandings. Exploring cases ranging from viral infections to cancer, we propose that it is crucial, for experimental and therapeutic purposes, to clarify these approaches and their interconnections so as to make the concept of exhaustion genuinely operational.

The advent of fear conditioning as an animal model of post-traumatic stress disorder: Learning from the past to shape the future of PTSD research.

Translational research on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has produced limited improvements in clinical practice. Fear conditioning (FC) is one of the dominant animal models of PTSD. In fact, FC is used in many different ways to model PTSD. The variety of FC-based models is ill defined, creating confusion and conceptual vagueness, which in turn impedes translation into the clinic. This article takes a historical and conceptual approach to provide a comprehensive picture of current research and help reorient the research focus. This work historically reviews the variety of models that have emerged from the initial association of PTSD with FC, highlighting conceptual pitfalls that have limited the translation of animal research into clinical advances. We then provide some guidance on how future translational research could benefit from conceptual and technological improvements to translate basic findings in patients. This objective will require transdisciplinary approaches and should involve physicians, engineers, philosophers, and neuroscientists.

The prospects of precision psychiatry.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, biomedical psychiatry around the globe has embraced the so-called precision medicine paradigm, a model for medical research that uses innovative techniques for data collection and analysis to reevaluate traditional theories of disease. The goal of precision medicine is to improve diagnostics by restratifying the patient population on the basis of a deeper understanding of disease processes. This paper argues that precision is ill-fitting for psychiatry for two reasons. First, in psychiatry, unlike in fields like oncology, precision medicine has been understood as an attempt to improve medicine by casting out, rather than merely revising, traditional taxonomic tools. Second, in psychiatry the term "biomarker" is often used in reference to signs or symptoms that allow patients to be classified and then matched with treatments; however, in oncology "biomarker" usually refers to a disease mechanism that is useful not only for diagnostics, but also for discovering causal pathways that drug therapies can target. Given these differences between how the precision medicine paradigm operates in psychiatry and in other medical fields like oncology, while precision psychiatry may offer successful rhetoric, it is not a promising paradigm.

Animal extrapolation in preclinical studies: An analysis of the tragic case of TGN1412.

According to the received view, the transportation view, animal extrapolation consists in inductive prediction of the outcome of a mechanism in a target, based on an analogical mechanism in a model. Through an analysis of the failure of preclinical studies of TGN1412, an innovative drug, to predict the tragic consequences of its first-in-man trial in 2006, the received view is challenged by a proposed view of animal extrapolation, the chimera view. According to this view, animal extrapolation is based on a hypothesis about how human organisms work, supported by the amalgamation of results drawn from various experimental organisms, and only predicting the 'predictive grid', that is, a global framework of the effects to be expected.

Introduction: the plurality of modeling.

Philosophers of science have recently focused on the scientific activity of modeling phenomena, and explicated several of its properties, as well as the activities embedded into it. A first approach to modeling has been elaborated in terms of representing a target system: yet other epistemic functions, such as producing data or detecting phenomena, are at least as relevant. Additional useful distinctions have emerged, such as the one between phenomenological and mechanistic models. In biological sciences, besides mathematical models, models now come in three forms: in vivo, in vitro and in silico. Each has been investigated separately, and many specific problems they raised have been laid out. Another relevant distinction is disciplinary: do models differ in significant ways according to the discipline involved-medicine or biology, evolutionary biology or earth science? Focusing on either this threefold distinction or the disciplinary boundaries reveals that they might not be sufficient from a philosophical perspective. On the contrary, focusing on the interaction between these various kinds of models, some interesting forms of explanation come to the fore, as is exemplified by the papers included in this issue. On the other hand, a focus on the use of models, rather than on their content, shows that the distinction between biological and medical models is theoretically sound.

Defining disease beyond conceptual analysis: an analysis of conceptual analysis in philosophy of medicine.

Conceptual analysis of health and disease is portrayed as consisting in the confrontation of a set of criteria--a "definition"--with a set of cases, called instances of either "health" or "disease." Apart from logical counter-arguments, there is no other way to refute an opponent's definition than by providing counter-cases. As resorting to intensional stipulation (stipulation of meaning) is not forbidden, several contenders can therefore be deemed to have succeeded. This implies that conceptual analysis alone is not likely to decide between naturalism and normativism. An alternative to this approach would be to examine whether the concept of disease can be naturalized.

How does a psychiatrist infer from an observed condition to a case of mental disorder?

The main thesis of this paper is that mental health practitioners can legitimately infer that a patient's given condition is a case of mental disorder without having diagnosed any specific mental disorder. The article shows how this is justifiable by relying either on psychopathological reasoning, on 'intentional' analysis or possibly on other modes of reasoning. In the end, it highlights the clinical and philosophical consequences of the plurality of modes of 'inferences to mental disorder'.

From depersonalization to hallucination.

Henri Ey suggested that all hallucinations occur against the background of depersonalization, which is an alteration in experience that people find hard to describe, where the subject feels a strangeness pervading the world and her/his own body, emotions and thoughts. Embracing Ey's proposal, this paper draws a comparison between depersonalization in hallucinations and depersonalization in some delusional states (especially the Capgras and the Cotard syndromes), which by the most recent models used in cognitive neuroscience is considered to be a disruption in so-called 'affective familiarity'. Sensory information regarding the world is divided into the 'overt pathway' of perceptual inputs and the 'covert pathway' of 'atmospheric cues'. In hallucinating subjects, we suggest that a breakdown of the grasping of atmospheric qualities in the environment triggers a compensatory process consisting of the production of hypotheses that make sense of the world perceived. Finally, we report on a case that illustrates our proposal.

Criteria of validity for animal models of psychiatric disorders: focus on anxiety disorders and depression.

Animal models of psychiatric disorders are usually discussed with regard to three criteria first elaborated by Willner; face, predictive and construct validity. Here, we draw the history of these concepts and then try to redraw and refine these criteria, using the framework of the diathesis model of depression that has been proposed by several authors. We thus propose a set of five major criteria (with sub-categories for some of them); homological validity (including species validity and strain validity), pathogenic validity (including ontopathogenic validity and triggering validity), mechanistic validity, face validity (including ethological and biomarker validity) and predictive validity (including induction and remission validity). Homological validity requires that an adequate species and strain be chosen: considering species validity, primates will be considered to have a higher score than drosophila, and considering strains, a high stress reactivity in a strain scores higher than a low stress reactivity in another strain. Pathological validity corresponds to the fact that, in order to shape pathological characteristics, the organism has been manipulated both during the developmental period (for example, maternal separation: ontopathogenic validity) and during adulthood (for example, stress: triggering validity). Mechanistic validity corresponds to the fact that the cognitive (for example, cognitive bias) or biological mechanisms (such as dysfunction of the hormonal stress axis regulation) underlying the disorder are identical in both humans and animals. Face validity corresponds to the observable behavioral (ethological validity) or biological (biomarker validity) outcomes: for example anhedonic behavior (ethological validity) or elevated corticosterone (biomarker validity). Finally, predictive validity corresponds to the identity of the relationship between the triggering factor and the outcome (induction validity) and between the effects of the treatments on the two organisms (remission validity). The relevance of this framework is then discussed regarding various animal models of depression.

Latent variables and the network perspective.

We discuss the latent variables construct, particularly in regard to the following: that latent variables are considered as the sole explanatory factor of a disorder; that pragmatic concerns are ignored; and that the relationship of these variables to biological markers is not addressed. Further, we comment on the relationship between bridge symptoms and causality, and discuss the proposal in relationship to other constructs (endophenotypes, connectionist-inspired networks).

The meaning of the opposition between the healthy and the pathological and its consequences.

If the healthy and the pathological are not merely judgments qualifiers, but real phenomena, it must be possible to define both of them positively, which, in this context, means as factual contraries. On the other hand, only a privative definition, either of the pathological as 'non-healthy', or of the healthy as 'non-pathological', can rationally circumscribe all possible states of an organism. This fluctuation between two meanings of the 'healthy'-'pathological' opposition, factual vs. rational, characterizes the ordinary usage of these concepts and puts all philosophical definitions in a hopeless situation. Although a scientific definition may conceal this equivocation by adequately setting out the terms of the problem of discriminating between the 'healthy' and the 'pathological', it could explain some of the difficulties met in determining 'gold standards', in the choice of separators, and in the assessment of the diagnostic qualities of tests.