Does nuclear energy produce neodymium? Negative perception of nuclear energy drives the assumption that it is polluting.

The public tends to exaggerate the dangers of nuclear energy, mistakenly associating it with various environmental problems such as ozone depletion and the production of CO2. First, we investigate the acquisition of misconceptions about nuclear energy. In Experiments 1 (N = 198, United Kingdom) and 2 (N = 204, France), participants were more likely to develop new negative misconceptions about nuclear energy, compared to renewables or even some fossil fuels. Participants were also more likely to attribute the emission of hazardous substances produced by renewables to nuclear energy than to the energy sources actually emitting it. This suggests that specific misconceptions about nuclear energy are likely the by-products of negative perceptions of nuclear energy. Second, we ask whether correcting specific misconceptions leads to less negative attitudes about nuclear energy. In Experiments 3 (N = 296, United Kingdom.) and 4 (N = 305, France), participants were exposed to pronuclear energy arguments, one of which informed them of its low CO2 emissions. This argument led to a decrease in the perception that nuclear energy contributes to climate change. Thus, even if specific misconceptions about nuclear energy derive from overall negative perceptions, addressing these misconceptions can still help align public opinion with expert opinion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Happy thoughts: The role of communion in accepting and sharing (mis)beliefs.

The negativity bias favours the cultural diffusion of negative beliefs, yet many common (mis)beliefs-naturopathy works, there's a heaven-are positive. Why? People might share 'happy thoughts'-beliefs that might make others happy-to display their kindness. Five experiments conducted among Japanese and English-speaking participants (N = 2412) show that: (i) people higher on communion are more likely to believe and share happier beliefs, by contrast with people higher in competence and dominance; (ii) when they want to appear nice and kind, rather than competent and dominant, people avoid sharing sad beliefs, and instead prefer sharing happy beliefs; (iii) sharing happier beliefs instead of sad beliefs leads to being perceived as nicer and kinder; and (iv) sharing happy beliefs instead of sad beliefs fleads to being perceived as less dominant. Happy beliefs could spread, despite a general negativity bias, because they allow their senders to signal kindness.

Information delivered by a chatbot has a positive impact on COVID-19 vaccines attitudes and intentions.

The Coronavirus disease; COVID-19 vaccines will not end the pandemic if they stay in freezers. In many countries, such as France, COVID-19 vaccines hesitancy is high. It is crucial that governments make it as easy as possible for people who want to be vaccinated to do so, but also that they devise communication strategies to address the concerns of vaccine hesitant individuals. We introduce and test on 701 French participants a novel messaging strategy: A chatbot that answers people's questions about COVID-19 vaccines. We find that interacting with this chatbot for a few minutes significantly increases people's intentions to get vaccinated (ß = 0.12) and has a positive impact on their attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination (ß = 0.23). Our results suggest that a properly scripted and regularly updated chatbot could offer a powerful resource to help fight hesitancy toward COVID-19 vaccines. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Scaling up interactive argumentation by providing counterarguments with a chatbot.

Discussion is more convincing than standard, unidirectional messaging, but its interactive nature makes it difficult to scale up. We created a chatbot to emulate the most important traits of discussion. A simple argument pointing out the existence of a scientific consensus on the safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) already led to more positive attitudes towards GMOs, compared with a control message. Providing participants with good arguments rebutting the most common counterarguments against GMOs led to much more positive attitudes towards GMOs, whether the participants could immediately see all the arguments or could select the most relevant arguments in a chatbot. Participants holding the most negative attitudes displayed more attitude change in favour of GMOs. Participants updated their beliefs when presented with good arguments, but we found no evidence that an interactive chatbot proves more persuasive than a list of arguments and counterarguments.

The effect of disagreement on children's source memory performance.

Source representations play a role both in the formation of individual beliefs as well as in the social transmission of such beliefs. Both of these functions suggest that source information should be particularly useful in the context of interpersonal disagreement. Three experiments with an identical design (one original study and two replications) with 3- to 4-year-old-children (N = 100) assessed whether children's source memory performance would improve in the face of disagreement and whether such an effect interacts with different types of sources (first- vs. second-hand). In a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design, children found out about the contents of a container either by looking inside or being told (IV1). Then they were questioned about the contents of the container by an interlocutor puppet who either agreed or disagreed with their answer (IV2). We measured children's source memory performance in response to a free recall question (DV1) followed by a forced-choice question (DV2). Four-year-olds (but not three-year-olds) performed better in response to the free recall source memory question (but not the forced-choice question) when their interlocutor had disagreed with them compared to when it had agreed with them. Children were also better at recalling 'having been told' than 'having seen'. These results demonstrate that by four years of age, source memory capacities are sensitive to the communicative context of assertions and serve social functions.

COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy: Shortening the Last Mile.

We offer three recommendations to increase coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccination rates. First, use communication campaigns leveraging evidence-based levers and argumentation tools with experts. Second, use behavioral insights to make vaccination more accessible. Third, help early adopters communicate about their decision to be vaccinated to accelerate the emergence of pro-vaccination norms.

The neural bases of argumentative reasoning.

Most reasoning tasks used in behavioral and neuroimaging studies are abstract, triggering slow, effortful processes. By contrast, most of everyday life reasoning is fast and effortless, as when we exchange arguments in conversation. Recent behavioral studies have shown that reasoning tasks with the same underlying logic can be solved much more easily if they are embedded in an argumentative context. In the present article, we study the neural bases of this type of everyday, argumentative reasoning. Such reasoning is both a social and a metarepresentational process, suggesting it should share some mechanisms, and thus some neural bases, with other social, metarepresentational process such as pragmatics, metacognition, or theory of mind. To isolate the neural bases of argumentative reasoning, we measured fMRI activity of participants who read the same statement presented either as the conclusion of an argument, or as an assertion. We found that conclusions of arguments, compared to assertions, were associated with greater activity in a region of the medial prefrontal cortex that was identified in quantitative meta-analyses of studies on theory of mind. This study shows that it is possible to use more ecologically valid tasks to study the neural bases of reasoning, and that using such tasks might point to different neural bases than those observed with the more abstract and artificial tasks typically used in the neuroscience of reasoning. Specifically, we speculate that reasoning in an argumentative context might rely on mechanisms supporting metarepresentational processes in the medial prefrontal cortex.

Rationalizations primarily serve reputation management, not decision making.

We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.

Framing messages for vaccination supporters.

Efficiently communicating information on vaccination is crucial to maintaining a high level of immunization coverage, but it implies finding the right content for the right audience. Provaccination individuals, who represent the majority of the population, and who have been neglected in the literature, could play an important role relaying provaccination messages through informal discussions, if only these messages are (a) found plausible, (b) remembered, and (c) shared. We conducted 7 experiments on 2,761 provaccination online participants (United States and United Kingdom), testing whether the valence of a statement (positive or negative) and its rhetorical orientation (pro- or antivaccine) affected these 3 steps. Participants deemed more plausible, were more willing to transmit (and actually transmitted more), but did not remember positively framed statements better. Provaccination rhetorical orientation had little or no effect. Overall, the framing effects observed were dramatic: one framing made participants very eager to transmit a statement, while another made them reluctant to transmit it at all. The framing effects also influenced vaccination attitudes, with participants exposed to positively framed statements reporting more positive attitudes toward vaccination. Since messages have to be framed one way or the other, the framing effects demonstrated here should be considered when designing public health messages. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Relevance Is Socially Rewarded, But Not at the Price of Accuracy.

Selecting good sources of information is a critical skill to navigate our highly social world. To evaluate the epistemic reputation of potential sources, the main criterion should be the relevance of the information they provide us. In two online experiments (N = 801), we found that receivers are more thankful toward, deem more competent, and are more likely to request information in the future from sources of more relevant messages-if they know the message to be accurate or deem it plausible. To prevent sources from presenting information as more relevant than it is in order to improve their reputation, receivers lower the reputation of sources sending messages that are more relevant-if-true, if they know the message to be inaccurate. Our research sheds light on the reputational trade-offs involved in choosing what information to communicate and helps explain transmission patterns such as rumors diffusion.

It happened to a friend of a friend: inaccurate source reporting in rumour diffusion.

People often attribute rumours to an individual in a knowledgeable position two steps removed from them (a credible friend of a friend), such as 'my friend's father, who's a cop, told me about a serial killer in town'. Little is known about the influence of such attributions on rumour propagation, or how they are maintained when the rumour is transmitted. In four studies (N = 1824) participants exposed to a rumour and asked to transmit it overwhelmingly attributed it either to a credible friend of a friend, or to a generic friend (e.g. 'a friend told me about a serial killer in town'). In both cases, participants engaged in source shortening: e.g. when told by a friend that 'a friend told me …' they shared the rumour as coming from 'a friend' instead of 'a friend of friend'. Source shortening and reliance on credible sources boosted rumour propagation by increasing the rumours' perceived plausibility and participants' willingness to share them. Models show that, in linear transmission chains, the generic friend attribution dominates, but that allowing each individual to be exposed to the rumour from several sources enables the maintenance of the credible friend of a friend attribution.

Nonverbal rhetoric: 2- to 4-year-old children select relevant evidence when trying to influence others.

This article investigates the early emergence of reason-giving. Toddlers are sensitive to disagreements, and they can track several kinds of informational access, such as visual perception. We investigated whether young children use these skills (a) when assessing whether providing reasons is needed and (b) when selecting appropriate behaviors to support their claims. An experimenter disagreed with 2- to 4-year-old children (N = 71) about the location of a toy placed in 1 of 4 boxes. In the fully transparent condition, the boxes were transparent, and the toy was visible to the experimenter and to the participant. In the window condition, the boxes were partially opaque, and the toy was initially hidden from the experimenter but visible to the participant through a transparent window. In this condition, toddlers could make the toy visible to the experimenter by rotating the baited box. Participants in the window condition were more likely to rotate the baited box than those in the transparent condition. Thus, children were more likely to rotate the box when this action was an efficient way of supporting their claims by revealing new and relevant information to the experimenter. These results demonstrate the presence of precursors of crucial skills required for reason-giving and reveal that from 2 years of age, children do not use fixed persuasion strategies. Instead, they select relevant evidence when attempting to influence others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Majority rules: how good are we at aggregating convergent opinions?

Mathematical models and simulations demonstrate the power of majority rules, i.e. following an opinion shared by a majority of group members. Majority opinion should be followed more when (a) the relative and absolute size of the majority grow, the members of the majority are (b) competent, and (c) benevolent, (d) the majority opinion conflicts less with our prior beliefs and (e) the members of the majority formed their opinions independently. We review the experimental literature bearing on these points. The few experiments bearing on (b) and (c) suggest that both factors are adequately taken into account. Many experiments show that (d) is also followed, with participants usually putting too much weight on their own opinion relative to that of the majority. Regarding factors (a) and (e), in contrast, the evidence is mixed: participants sometimes take into account optimally the absolute and relative size of the majority, as well as the presence of informational dependencies. In other circumstances, these factors are ignored. We suggest that an evolutionary framework can help make sense of these conflicting results by distinguishing between evolutionarily valid cues - that are readily taken into account - and non-evolutionarily valid cues - that are ignored by default.

Obstacles to the spread of unintuitive beliefs.

Many socially significant beliefs are unintuitive, from the harmlessness of GMOs to the efficacy of vaccination, and they are acquired via deference toward individuals who are more confident, more competent or a majority. In the two-step flow model of communication, a first group of individuals acquires some beliefs through deference and then spreads these beliefs more broadly. Ideally, these individuals should be able to explain why they deferred to a given source - to provide arguments from expertise - and others should find these arguments convincing. We test these requirements using a perceptual task with participants from the US and Japan. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with first-hand evidence that they should defer to an expert, leading a majority of participants to adopt the expert's answer. However, when attempting to pass on this answer, only a minority of those participants used arguments from expertise. In Experiment 2, participants receive an argument from expertise describing the expert's competence, instead of witnessing it first-hand. This leads to a significant drop in deference compared with Experiment 1. These experiments highlight significant obstacles to the transmission of unintuitive beliefs.

Believing What You're Told: Politeness and Scalar Inferences.

The experimental pragmatics literature has extensively investigated the ways in which distinct contextual factors affect the computation of scalar inferences, whose most studied example is the one that allows "Some X-ed" to mean Not all X-ed. Recent studies from Bonnefon et al. (2009, 2011) investigate the effect of politeness on the interpretation of scalar utterances. They argue that when the scalar utterance is face-threatening ("Some people hated your speech") (i) the scalar inference is less likely to be derived, and (ii) the semantic interpretation of "some" (at least some) is arrived at slowly and effortfully. This paper re-evaluates the role of politeness in the computation of scalar inferences by drawing on the distinction between "comprehension" and "epistemic assessment" of communicated information. In two experiments, we test the hypothesis that, in these face-threatening contexts, scalar inferences are largely derived but are less likely to be accepted as true. In line with our predictions, we find that slowdowns in the face-threatening condition are attributable to longer reaction times at the (latter) epistemic assessment stage, but not at the comprehension stage.

Vigilant conservatism in evaluating communicated information.

In the absence of other information, people put more weight on their own opinion than on the opinion of others: they are conservative. Several proximal mechanisms have been suggested to account for this finding. One of these mechanisms is that people cannot access reasons for other people's opinions, but they can access the reasons for their own opinions-whether they are the actual reasons that led them to hold the opinions (rational access to reasons), or post-hoc constructions (biased access to reasons). In four experiments, participants were asked to provide an opinion, and then faced with another participant's opinion and asked if they wanted to revise their initial opinion. Some questions were manipulated so that the advice participants were receiving was in fact their own opinion, while what they thought was their own opinion was in fact not. In all experiments, the participants were consistently biased towards what they thought was their own opinion, showing that conservativeness cannot be explained by rational access to reasons, which should have favored the advice. One experiment revealed that conservativeness was not decreased under time pressure, suggesting that biased access to reasons is an unlikely explanation for conservativeness. The experiments also suggest that repetition plays a role in advice taking, with repeated opinions being granted more weight than non-fluent opinions. Our results are not consistent with any of the established proximal explanations for conservatism. Instead, we suggest an ultimate explanation-vigilant conservatism-that sees conservatism as adaptive since receivers should be wary of senders' interests, as they rarely perfectly converge with theirs.

A related proposal: An interactionist perspective on reason.

This comment introduces the interactionist perspective on reason that Dan Sperber and I developed. In this perspective, reason is a specific cognitive mechanism that evolved so that humans can exchange justifications and arguments with each other. The interactionist perspective significantly aligns with Doris's views in rejecting reflectivism and individualism. Indeed, I suggest that it offers different, and maybe stronger arguments to reject these views.

Argumentation and the diffusion of counter-intuitive beliefs.

Research in cultural evolution has focused on the spread of intuitive or minimally counterintuitive beliefs. However, some very counterintuitive beliefs can also spread successfully, at least in some communities-scientific theories being the most prominent example. We suggest that argumentation could be an important factor in the spread of some very counterintuitive beliefs. A first experiment demonstrates that argumentation enables the spread of the counterintuitive answer to a reasoning problem in large discussion groups, whereas this spread is limited or absent when participants can show their answers to each other but cannot discuss. A series of experiments using the technique of repeated transmission show that, in the case of the counterintuitive belief studied: (a) arguments can help spread this belief without loss; (b) conformist bias does not help spread this belief; and (c) authority or prestige bias play a minimal role in helping spread this belief. Thus, argumentation seems to be necessary and sufficient for the spread of some counterintuitive beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record

Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking.

Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g., "If it hadn't rained, we would have won the game")? According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., "If the rules of the game were different, I would have won it"), generating counterfactuals that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of their ensuing behavior (e.g., "If I concentrate more, I will win the next game"). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfactuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory function.

Children's allocation of resources in social dominance situations.

Two experiments with preschoolers (36 to 78 months) and 8-year-old children (Experiment 1, N = 173; Experiment 2, N = 132) investigated the development of children's resource distribution in dominance contexts. On the basis of the distributive justice literature, 2 opposite predictions were tested. Children could match resource allocation with the unequal social setting they observe and thus favor a dominant individual over a subordinate 1. Alternatively, children could choose to compensate the subordinate if they consider that the dominance asymmetry should be counteracted. Two experiments using a giving task (Experiment 1) and a taking task (Experiment 2) led to the same results. In both experiments, children took dominance into account when allocating resources. Moreover, their distributive decisions were similarly affected by age: Although 3- and 4-year-old children favored the dominant individual, 5-year-old children showed no preference and 8-year-old children strongly favored the subordinate. Several mechanisms accounting for this developmental pattern are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record