Learning from errors versus explicit instruction in preparation for a test that counts.

BACKGROUND: Although the generation of errors has been thought, traditionally, to impair learning, recent studies indicate that, under particular feedback conditions, the commission of errors may have a beneficial effect. AIMS: This study investigates the teaching strategies that facilitate learning from errors. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This 2-year study, involving two cohorts of ~88 students each, contrasted a learning-from-errors (LFE) with an explicit instruction (EI) teaching strategy in a multi-session implementation directed at improving student performance on the high-stakes New York State Algebra 1 Regents examination. In the LFE condition, instead of receiving instruction on 4 sessions, students took mini-tests. Their errors were isolated to become the focus of 4 teacher-guided feedback sessions. In the EI condition, teachers explicitly taught the mathematical material for all 8 sessions. RESULTS: Teacher time-on in the LFE condition produced a higher rate of learning than did teacher time-on in the EI condition. The learning benefit in the LFE condition was, however, inconsistent across teachers. Second-by-second analyses of classroom activities, directed at isolating learning-relevant differences in teaching style revealed that a highly interactive mode of engaging the students in understanding their errors was more conducive to learning than was teaching directed at getting to the correct solution, either by lecturing about corrections or by interaction focused on corrections. CONCLUSION: These results indicate that engaging the students interactively to focus on errors, and the reasons for them, facilitates productive failure and learning from errors.

Curiosity: The effects of feedback and confidence on the desire to know.

In 10 experiments, we investigated the relations among curiosity and people's confidence in their answers to general information questions after receiving different kinds of feedback: yes/no feedback, true or false informational feedback under uncertainty, or no feedback. The results showed that when people had given a correct answer, yes/no feedback resulted in a near complete loss of curiosity. Upon learning they had made an error via yes/no feedback, curiosity increased, especially for high-confidence errors. When people were given true feedback under uncertainty (they were given the correct answer but were not told that it was correct), curiosity increased for high-confidence errors but was unchanged for correct responses. In contrast, when people were given false feedback under uncertainty, curiosity increased for high-confidence correct responses but was unchanged for errors. These results, taken as a whole, are consistent with the region of proximal learning model which proposes that while curiosity is minimal when people are completely certain that they know the answer, it is maximal when people believe that they almost know. Manipulations that drew participants toward this region of "almost knowing" resulted in increased curiosity. A serendipitous result was the finding (replicated four times in this study) that when no feedback was given, people were more curious about high-confidence errors than they were about equally high-confidence correct answers. It was as if they had some knowledge, tapped selectively by their feelings of curiosity, that there was something special (and possibly amiss) about high-confidence errors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Alpha Suppression Is Associated with the Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT) State Whereas Alpha Expression Is Associated with Knowing That One Does Not Know.

The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state is a spontaneously occurring metacognitive state that indicates that the answer to a query is almost, but not quite, at hand, i.e., that resolution is imminent. Since the time of William James, a distinctive feeling of nagging frustration has been observed to be associated with TOT states. On a more positive note, TOT states are also associated with intense goal-directed curiosity and with a strong desire to know that translates into successful mental action. The present study showed that prior to the presentation of resolving feedback to verbal queries-if the individual was in a TOT state-alpha suppression was in evidence in the EEG. This alpha suppression appears to be a marker of a spontaneously occurring, conscious, and highly motivating goal-directed internal metacognitive state. At the same time, alpha expression in the same time period was associated with the feeling of not knowing, indicating a more discursive state. Both alpha and alpha suppression were observed broadly across centro-parietal scalp electrodes and disappeared immediately upon presentation of the resolving feedback. Analyses indicated that the occurrence of alpha suppression was associated with participants' verbal affirmations of being in a TOT state, which is also related to subsequent expression of a late positivity when feedback is provided, and to enhanced memory.

Curiosity and the desire for agency: wait, wait don't tell me!

Past research has shown that when people are curious they are willing to wait to get an answer if the alternative is to not get the answer at all-a result that has been taken to mean that people valued the answers, and interpreted as supporting a reinforcement-learning (RL) view of curiosity. An alternative 'need for agency' view is forwarded that proposes that when curious, people are intrinsically motivated to actively seek the answer themselves rather than having it given to them. If answers can be freely obtained at any time, the RL view holds that, because time delay depreciates value, people will not wait to receive the answer. Because they value items that they are curious about more than those about which they are not curious they should seek the former more quickly. In contrast, the need for agency view holds that in order to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain the answer by their own efforts, when curious, people may wait. Consistent with this latter view, three experiments showed that even when the answer could be obtained at any time, people spontaneously waited longer to request the answer when they were curious. Furthermore, rather than requesting the answer itself-a response that would have maximally reduced informational uncertainty-in all three experiments, people asked for partial information in the form of hints, when curious. Such active hint seeking predicted later recall. The 'need for agency' view of curiosity, then, was supported by all three experiments.

Stress and imagining future selves: resolve in the hot/cool framework.

Although Ainslie dismisses the hot/cool framework as pertaining only to suppression, it actually also has interesting implications for resolve. Resolve focally involves access to our future selves. This access is a cool system function linked to episodic memory. Thus, factors negatively affecting the cool system, such as stress, are predicted to impact two seemingly unrelated capabilities: willpower and episodic memory.

Feelings of Culpability: Just Following Orders Versus Making the Decision Oneself.

In five experiments (N = 1,490), participants were asked to imagine themselves as programmers of self-driving cars who had to decide how to program the car to respond in a potential accident: spare the driver or spare pedestrians. Alternatively, participants imagined that they were a mayor grappling with difficult moral dilemmas concerning COVID-19. Either they, themselves, had to decide how to program the car or which COVID-19 policy to implement (high-agency condition) or they were told by their superior how to act (low-agency condition). After learning that a tragic outcome occurred because of their action, participants reported their felt culpability. Although we expected people to feel less culpable about the outcome if they acted in accordance with their superior's injunction than if they made the decision themselves, participants actually felt more culpable when they followed their superior's order. Some possible reasons for this counterintuitive finding are discussed.

The MAPS model of self-regulation: Integrating metacognition, agency, and possible selves.

Self-regulation, a social-cognitive process at the intersection of metacognition, motivation, and behavior, encompasses how people conceptualize, strive for, and accomplish their goals. Self-regulation is critical for behavioral change regardless of the context. Research indicates that self-regulation is learned. Integral to successful self-regulation of behavior are: (a) an articulated concept of one's possible selves, (b) metacognitive knowledge and effective strategies, and (c) a sense of one's own agency. We present the theoretical linkages, research evidence, and applied utility for these three components in promoting self-regulation of behavior, specifically in the domain of learning. We propose the MAPS model to account for the pathways of influence that lead to behavioral change. This model illustrates the dynamic and feed-forward processes that derive from the interactions among possible selves, metacognition, and agency to provide the context for developing self-regulated and effective learning that promotes student success, the transfer of knowledge, and the foundation for life-long learning.

Epistemic Curiosity and the Region of Proximal Learning.

We propose a framework for understanding epistemic curiosity as a metacognitive feeling state that is related to the individual's Region of Proximal Learning (RPL), an adaptive mental space where we feel we are on the verge of knowing or understanding. First, we review several historical views, contrasting the RPL perspective with alternative views of curiosity. Second, we detail the processes, conditions, and outcomes within the RPL framework which are proposed to be related to curiosity. Finally, we review several lines of evidence relevant to the relation between RPL and curiosity. These include (1) differences in the conditions under which experts and novices mind wander, (2) experiments investigating people's choices of whether to study materials for which they have high versus low feelings of knowing, (3) results related to people's engagement with corrections to errors made with high confidence, and (4) curiosity, attention, and learning data related to the tip-of-the-tongue state.

Learning from errors is attributable to episodic recollection rather than semantic mediation.

Many recent studies have shown that memory for correct answers is enhanced when an error is committed and then corrected, as compared to when the correct answer is provided without intervening error commission. The fact that the kind of errors that produced such a benefit, in past research, were those that were semantically related to the correct answer suggested that the effect may occur because the error provides a semantic stepping stone to the correct answer: the Semantic Mediation hypothesis. This hypothesis seems at odds with the finding that amnesicsgenerate answers, again including those studied by Tulving and his colleagues-who purportedly have spared semantic/implicit memory-experience enormous difficulties when they commit errors. Accordingly, the present experiments investigated whether the error-generation benefit seen in typicals was attributable Semantic Mediation or to Episodic Recollection. In Experiment 1, we used polysemous materials to create Congruent (e.g., wrist-palm) and Incongruent (e.g., tree-palm) cues for target words (e.g., HAND). In the Congruent condition, participants generated errors that were semantically related to the target (e.g., finger), and which could have provided a semantic mediator. In the Incongruent condition they generated errors that were unrelated to the target (e.g., coconut), and which, therefore, should not have provided a semantic mediator. The Congruent and Incongruent conditions both produced an error-generation benefit-contradicting the Semantic Mediation hypothesis. Experiment 2 showed that the error-generation benefit only occurred when the original error was also recollected on the final memory test. Indeed, in the Incongruent condition, when the error was not, itself, recalled, error generation resulted in a deficit in memory for the correct response. These results point to episodic/explicit, rather than semantic/implicit memory, as the locus of the 'learning from errors' benefits.

Memory, stress, and the hippocampal hypothesis: Firefighters' recollections of the fireground.

Nadel, Jacobs, and colleagues have postulated that human memory under conditions of extremely high stress is "special." In particular, episodic memories are thought to be susceptible to impairment, and possibly fragmentation, attributable to hormonally based dysfunction occurring selectively in the hippocampal system. While memory for highly salient and self-relevant events should be better than the memory for less central events, an overall nonmonotonic decrease in spatio/temporal episodic memory as stress approaches traumatic levels is posited. Testing human memory at extremely high levels of stress, however, is difficult and reports are rare. Firefighting is the most stressful civilian occupation in our society. In the present study, we asked New York City firefighters to recall everything that they could upon returning from fires they had just fought. Communications during all fires were recorded, allowing verification of actual events. Our results confirmed that recall was, indeed, impaired with increasing stress. A nonmonotonic relation was observed consistent with the posited inverted u-shaped memory-stress function. Central details about emergency situations were better recalled than were more schematic events, but both kinds of events showed the memory decrement with high stress. There was no evidence of fragmentation. Self-relevant events were recalled nearly five times better than events that were not self-relevant. These results provide confirmation that memories encoded under conditions of extremely high stress are, indeed, special and are impaired in a manner that is consistent with the Nadel/Jacobs hippocampal hypothesis.

Memory and truth: correcting errors with true feedback versus overwriting correct answers with errors.

In five experiments, we examined the conditions under which participants remembered true and false information given as feedback. Participants answered general information questions, expressed their confidence in the correctness of their answers, and were given true or false feedback. In all five experiments, participants hypercorrected when they had made a mistake; that is, they remembered better the correct feedback to errors made with high compared to low confidence. However, in none of the experiments did participants hyper'correct' when false feedback followed an initially correct response. Telling people whether the feedback was right or wrong made little difference, suggesting that people already knew whether the feedback was true or false and differentially encoded the true feedback compared to the false feedback. An exception occurred when false feedback followed an error: participants hyper'corrected' to this false feedback, suggesting that when people are wrong initially, they are susceptible to further incorrect information. These results indicate that people have some kind of privileged access to whether their answers are right or wrong, above and beyond their confidence ratings, and that they behave differently when trying to remember new "corrective" information depending upon whether they, themselves, were right or wrong initially. The likely source of this additional information is knowledge about the truth of the feedback, which they rapidly process and use to modulate memory encoding.

Tip-of-the-tongue states predict enhanced feedback processing and subsequent memory.

This article investigates the relations among the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state, event related potentials (ERPs) to correct feedback to questions, and subsequent memory. ERPs were used to investigate neurocognitive responses to feedback to general information questions for which participants had expressed either being or not being in a TOT state. For questions in which participants were unable to answer within 3 s, they indicated whether they were experiencing a TOT state and then were immediately provided with the correct answer. Feedback during a TOT state, as opposed to not knowing the answer, was associated with enhanced positivity over centro-parietal electrodes 250-700 ms post-feedback, and this enhanced positivity mediated a positive relationship between TOTs and later recall. Although effects of increased semantic access during TOT states cannot be ruled out, these results suggest that information received during TOT states elicits enhanced processing-suggestive of curiosity-leading to enhanced learning of studied material.

Attenuation of deep semantic processing during mind wandering: an event-related potential study.

Although much research shows that early sensory and attentional processing is affected by mind wandering, the effect of mind wandering on deep (i.e. semantic) processing is relatively unexplored. To investigate this relation, we recorded event-related potentials as participants studied English-Spanish word pairs, one at a time, while being intermittently probed for whether they were 'on task' or 'mind wandering'. Both perceptual processing, indexed by the P2 component, and deep processing, indexed by a late, sustained slow wave maximal at parietal electrodes, was attenuated during periods preceding participants' mind wandering reports. The pattern when participants were on task, rather than mind wandering, is similar to the subsequent memory or difference in memory effect. These results support previous findings of sensory attenuation during mind wandering, and extend them to a long-duration slow wave by suggesting that the deeper and more sustained levels of processing are also disrupted.

Cross domain self-monitoring in anosognosia for memory loss in Alzheimer's disease.

Anosognosia for memory loss is a common feature of Alzheimer's disease (AD). Recent theories have proposed that anosognosia, a disruption in awareness at a global level, may reflect specific deficits in self-monitoring, or local awareness. Though anosognosia for memory loss has been shown to relate to memory self-monitoring, it is not clear if it relates to self-monitoring deficits in other domains (i.e., motor). The current study examined this question by analyzing the relationship between anosognosia for memory loss, memory monitoring, and motor monitoring in 35 individuals with mild to moderate AD. Anosognosia was assessed via clinical interview before participants completed a metamemory task to measure memory monitoring, and a computerized agency task to measure motor monitoring. Cognitive and psychological measures included memory, executive functions, and mood. Memory monitoring was associated with motor monitoring; however, anosognosia was associated only with memory monitoring, and not motor monitoring. Cognition and mood related differently to each measure of self-awareness. Results are interpreted within a hierarchical model of awareness in which local self-monitoring processes are associated across domain, but appear to only contribute to a global level awareness in a domain-specific fashion.

Learning from one's own errors and those of others.

Three experiments investigated the effects of making errors oneself, as compared to just hearing the correct answer without error generation, hearing another person make an error, or being "on-the-hook," that is, possibly but not necessarily being the person who would be "called-on" to give a response. In all three experiments, generating either an error of commission or generating the correct response, oneself, out loud, compared to being a person who heard another's commission errors (or correct responses), was beneficial for later recall of the correct answer. Experiment 1 suggested that the decrement in recall from self- to other-generation could be partially offset by being "on-the-hook." However, this benefit was fragile and did not hold up either at a delay or when the presence of the other participants was downplayed. The beneficial effect of self-generation, both of correct responses and of errors of commission is consistent with reconsolidation theory. That theory holds that retrieval has a special status as a memory process that renders the retrieved traces labile. If the person was correct, reconsolidating the correct trace results in strengthening. If wrong, the malleability of the retrieved trace implied by reconsolidation theory makes it open to enhanced modification and correction. If the person was not the agent who retrieved, though, such as when someone else retrieves information, or when nothing is retrieved as is the case with omission errors (which we argue is truly how the term "unsuccessful retrieval" should be used), the benefit conferred by the special malleability entailed by the postulated reconsolidation process does not obtain.

The tip-of-the-tongue state and curiosity.

Theories of study time allocation and of curiosity suggest that people are most engaged with and want to devote their time to materials that are not completely mastered but also are not so difficult that they might be impossible. Their curiosity is thought to be triggered by items that are almost known, or are in what is sometimes called the region of proximal learning. Answers that are on the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT)-not immediately recallable but nevertheless evoking a feeling of imminent recall-seem, intuitively, to be materials that have this characteristic of being almost, but not quite, fully known. We therefore, hypothesized that people would be particularly curious to see the answers to questions for which the answers were on the tips of their tongues. To test the TOT curiosity hypothesis, we gave participants 82 general information questions and quickly asked whether the answers were or were not on the tips of their tongues and whether they wanted to see the answers later. Overwhelmingly, items that were accompanied by a TOT feeling were those which evoked participants' curiosity, regardless of whether the feeling occurred in conjunction with an error of commission, an error of omission, or even with the correct answer.

Investigating the Prospective Sense of Agency: Effects of Processing Fluency, Stimulus Ambiguity, and Response Conflict.

How do we know how much control we have over our environment? The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions, and that, through them, we can control our external environment. Thus, agency clearly involves matching intentions, actions, and outcomes. The present studies investigated the possibility that processes of action selection, i.e., choosing what action to make, contribute to the sense of agency. Since selection of action necessarily precedes execution of action, such effects must be prospective. In contrast, most literature on sense of agency has focussed on the retrospective computation whether an outcome fits the action performed or intended. This hypothesis was tested in an ecologically rich, dynamic task based on a computer game. Across three experiments, we manipulated three different aspects of action selection processing: visual processing fluency, categorization ambiguity, and response conflict. Additionally, we measured the relative contributions of prospective, action selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to the sense of agency. Manipulations of action selection were orthogonally combined with discrepancy of visual feedback of action. Fluency of action selection had a small but reliable effect on the sense of agency. Additionally, as expected, sense of agency was strongly reduced when visual feedback was discrepant with the action performed. The effects of discrepant feedback were larger than the effects of action selection fluency, and sometimes suppressed them. The sense of agency is highly sensitive to disruptions of action-outcome relations. However, when motor control is successful, and action-outcome relations are as predicted, fluency or dysfluency of action selection provides an important prospective cue to the sense of agency.

Voluntary action alters the perception of visual illusions.

"Intentional binding" refers to the finding that people judge voluntary actions and their effects as having occurred closer together in time than two passively observed events. If this effect reflects subjectively compressed time, then time-dependent visual illusions should be altered by voluntary initiation. To test this hypothesis, we showed participants displays that result in particular motion illusions when presented at short interstimulus intervals (ISIs). In Experiment 1 we used apparent motion, which is perceived only at very short ISIs; Experiments 2a and 2b used the Ternus display, which results in different motion illusions depending on the ISI. In support of the time compression hypothesis, when they voluntarily initiated the displays, people persisted in seeing the motion illusions associated with short ISIs at longer ISIs than had been the case during passive viewing. A control experiment indicated that this effect was not due to predictability or increased attention. Instead, voluntary action altered motion illusions, despite their purported cognitive impenetrability.

Learning from Errors.

Although error avoidance during learning appears to be the rule in American classrooms, laboratory studies suggest that it may be a counterproductive strategy, at least for neurologically typical students. Experimental investigations indicate that errorful learning followed by corrective feedback is beneficial to learning. Interestingly, the beneficial effects are particularly salient when individuals strongly believe that their error is correct: Errors committed with high confidence are corrected more readily than low-confidence errors. Corrective feedback, including analysis of the reasoning leading up to the mistake, is crucial. Aside from the direct benefit to learners, teachers gain valuable information from errors, and error tolerance encourages students' active, exploratory, generative engagement. If the goal is optimal performance in high-stakes situations, it may be worthwhile to allow and even encourage students to commit and correct errors while they are in low-stakes learning situations rather than to assiduously avoid errors at all costs.