Analogical inferences mediated by relational categories.

The standard approach posits that analogical inferences are generated by copying unmapped base relations, substituting mapped target entities for source entities, and generating slots for base entities that have not found a correspondence in the target. In the present study we argue that this mechanism does not adequately explain the generation of inferences mediated by relational categories. Experiment 1 revealed that for analogies in which the gist of the information to be transferred is better captured by relational categories than by explicit relations, inferences are more concerned with reinstantiating the base relational category than with ensuring that the relation of the inference resembles that of the base. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with analogies between situations maintaining a higher degree of semantic and contextual distance. The following experiments addressed whether there are further restrictions that guide a more fine-grained selection of exemplars. Experiment 3 revealed that when no relevant differences exist between compared situations, the exemplars included in analogical inferences tend to match the base exemplars along salient dimensions of the relational category to which both exemplars belong. In turn, Experiment 4 replicated this finding with analogies between situations maintaining some degree of semantic and contextual distance. The study adds to a growing literature recognizing the role of categorization in analogical reasoning. The challenges posed by the present results to the traditional view of analogical inference are discussed, as well as the prospects of the categorial mechanism for explaining other types of analogies not included in the present study.

The effect of surface similarities on the retrieval of analogous daily-life events.

Against the typical results of laboratory studies, it has been suggested that retrieving distant analogs from autobiographical memory would be relatively easy, since we frequently encode daily-life events in terms of overlearned relational categories that allow for a uniform abstract encoding. In each of two experiments, we formed two groups of participants who, as determined by a questionnaire presented during a first session, had experienced an event corresponding to a schema-governed category (Experiment 1) or to a system of schema-governed categories (Experiment 2). While the episodes reported by one of the groups belonged to the same domain as the target analog to be presented during the second session, those of the other group belonged to a different domain. During a temporally and contextually separated session, the experimenters presented both groups with a target analog belonging to the schema-governed category for which participants had reported a base analog. Participants had to retrieve an autobiographical episode that they considered analogous to the situation presented by the experimenter. From those analogs reported in the first phase, those pertaining to the same domain of the target were more retrieved than those pertaining to a different domain. Results showed that analogical retrieval is driven largely by surface similarities, even when base and target analogs have been encoded in terms of the same schema-governed category.

Analogies Without Commonalities? Evidence of Re-representation via Relational Category Activation.

Analogies between cases with matching sets of connected relational structure is well-explained by existing theory. Re-representation is posited as an important mechanism to increase the flexibility of analogical processing by allowing the alignment of non-identical predicates across compared cases. It has been proposed that certain kind of categories can be characterized in terms of the relational structure that its exemplars tend to satisfy. Such relational categories have the property that all members of the category are analogous to one another. We ask whether a process of re-representation can alter the construal of a case and bring two evidently non-analogous cases into analogical alignment if they are both seen as members of the same relational category. We examine analogies between pairs of cases where the base is a canonical example of a relational category and the target would not be considered a member of the category on its own - critically, the cases themselves share no evident relational identities or similarities. In Experiment 1, we ask whether presenting a target case as part of an analogical pairing alters its construal. In Experiment 2, the pairs are presented for judgment as potential analogies. In both studies, participants interpret the target cases differently (consistent with the relational category) as a result of processing the analogy. There are two main implications: (1) a form of re-representation is at work in which the activation of a relational category triggers an alternate construal of the target case; and (2) this suggests a path to analogical status for cases that lack relational identities or similarities if the cases can both be fit to the same relational category.

The Understanding of Visual Metaphors by the Congenitally Blind.

Results from a narrow set of empirical studies suggest that blind individuals' comprehension of metaphorical expressions does not differ from that of sighted participants. However, prominent accounts of metaphor comprehension yield different predictions about the blind's ability to comprehend visual metaphors. While conceptual metaphor theory leads to predicting that blind individuals should lag behind their sighted peers in making sense of this particular kind of utterances, from traditional accounts of analogical reasoning it follows that blind individuals' ability to comprehend the literal meaning of visual concepts might be sufficient to support their metaphorical application. In Experiment 1, 20 sighted and 20 congenitally blind participants were asked to select the most appropriate meaning for visual, grasping and filler metaphorical expressions. Results failed to reveal group differences for any type of metaphorical expressions. In order to implement a more stringent test of blind individuals' ability to understand visual metaphors, in Experiment 2 blind and sighted participants were presented with very novel figurative expressions, as indicated by low or no occurrence in the "Google" corpus. In line with the results of Experiment 1, blind participants' comprehension of visual metaphors was both high in absolute terms and comparable to that of sighted participants. We advance some speculations about the mechanisms by which blind individuals comprehend visual metaphors and we discuss the implications of these results for current theories of metaphor.

Promoting interdomain analogical transfer: When creating a problem helps to solve a problem.

Research on analogical thinking has devised several ways of promoting an abstract encoding of base analogs, thus rendering them more retrievable during later encounters with similar situations lacking surface similarities. Recent studies have begun to explore ways of facilitating transfer at retrieval time, which could facilitate the retrieval of distant analogs learned within contexts that were not specially directed to emphasize their abstract structure. Such studies demonstrate that comparing a target problem to an analogous problem helps students retrieve base analogs that lack surface similarities. To devise more portable ways of enhancing analogical transfer, Experiment 1 replicated Kurtz and Loewenstein's (Memory & Cognition, 35, 334-341, 2007) target-comparison procedure with an additional condition in which participants compared the target to a nonanalogous problem before attempting to reach its solution. Although comparing two analogous targets outperformed the standard transfer condition in promoting analogical transfer, comparing nonanalogous problems did not yield a transfer advantage. Based on prior studies that showed that the activity of creating analogous problems during their initial encoding elicits a more abstract representation of base analogs, in Experiment 2 we assessed whether constructing a second analogous target problem at retrieval time helps participants retrieve superficially dissimilar base analogs. As predicted, target invention increased the retrieval of distant sources. In both experiments we found an association between the quality of the generated schemas and the probability of retrieving a distant base analog from memory.

The Role of Surface Similarity in Analogical Retrieval: Bridging the Gap Between the Naturalistic and the Experimental Traditions.

Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) have claimed that when participants are allowed to draw on their own source analogs in the service of analogical argumentation, retrieval is less constrained by surface similarity than traditional experiments suggest. In two studies, we adapted this production paradigm to control for the potentially distorting effects of analogy fabrication and uneven availability of close and distant sources in memory. Experiment 1 assessed whether participants were reminded of central episodes from popular movies while generating analogies for superficially similar versus superficially dissimilar target situations. In Experiment 2, we modified this procedure to assess the retrieval of autobiographic memories, more familiar to participants than fictional episodes. Both studies revealed a strong effect of surface similarity on the retrieval of participants' own sources, thus suggesting that the superficial bias typically observed in experimental studies--and simulated by most computational models--does not originate in a lack of ecological validity.

La comprensión de metáforas no requiere realizar simulaciones sensorio-motoras del dominio base / Comprehending a metaphor does not require sensory-motor simulations of the base domain

Existe evidencia de que las personas empleamos metáforas conceptuales (MCs) para interpretar expresiones metafóricas (EMs), aunque los datos disponibles con respecto a si la comprensión de éstas EMs requiere simulaciones sensorio-motoras de los dominios base de esas MCs es escasa y equívoca. Se llevó a cabo un experimento para determinar si dichas simulaciones sensorio-motoras son necesarias o enriquecen al menos la comprensión de EMs. Videntes y no videntes de nacimiento parafrasearon EMs novedosas derivadas de la MC ver-comprender. El nivel de comprensión alcanzado fue evaluado por jueces independientes. Los no videntes de nacimiento mostraron una muy buena comprensión de estas EMs y su rendimiento en esta tarea no fue inferior a la de los videntes. Se concluye que las simulaciones sensorio-motoras no son necesarias ni enriquecen la comprensión de EMs y que las MCs amodales resultan suficientes para la tarea. Se discuten las implicaciones de los resultados obtenidos para el enfoque corporeizado de la teoría de metáfora conceptual de Lakoff y Johnson.

There is evidence for the idea that people employ conceptual metaphors (CMs) to interpret metaphorical expressions (MEs), although the available data regarding the thesis that comprehending MEs requires sensory-motor simulations of the base domains of such CMs is scarce and ambiguous. An experiment was carried out to determine whether such sensory-motor simulations are necessary or at least enrich the comprehension of MEs. Sighted and congenitally blind subjects paraphrased novel MEs derived from the seeing-understanding CM. The congenitally blind showed very good comprehension of these MEs, and their performance on this task was not inferior compared to the sighted. It is concluded that sensory-motor simulations are not necessary nor do they enrich the comprehension of MEs, and that amodal CMs are enough for this task. Implications of the obtained results for the embodied view of Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory are discussed.

La capacidad de la teoría de proyección de la estructura y la teoría de la metáfora conceptual para explicar la generación y el uso de metáforas conceptuales: una comparación crítica / The capacity of the projection of the structure theory and the conceptual metaphor theory in order to explain the generation and the use of conceptual metaphors: a critical comparison

Se comparan las capacidades del modelo proposicional de Gentner (1983, 1989) acerca del pensamiento analógico y de la teoría experiencial de la metáfora conceptual de Lakoff y Johnson (1980, 1999) para explicar el origen y el uso de metáforas conceptuales. Se postula que los mecanismos propuestos por la primera teoría no son suficientes para explicar el desarrollo de analogías que se apoyan en metáforas conceptuales preexistentes, y que el formato proposicional que emplea no logra captar las bases experienciales de las metáforas conceptuales. Se señala que, si bien el énfasis experiencial de la teoría de la metáfora conceptual es acertado, esta teoría no ha logrado proponer constructos representacionales adecuados para desarrollar su teoría en un nivel informal y formal, algo que sí ha hecho la teoría de proyección de la estructura. Se indica que, irónicamente, la teoría recurre a constructos proposicionales contrarios a su tendencia experiencialista.

La capacidad de la teoría de proyección de la estructura y la teoría de la metáfora conceptual para explicar la generación y el uso de metáforas conceptuales: una comparación crítica / The capacity of the projection of the structure theory and the conceptual metaphor theory in order to explain the generation and the use of conceptual metaphors: a critical comparison

Se comparan las capacidades del modelo proposicional de Gentner (1983, 1989) acerca del pensamiento analógico y de la teoría experiencial de la metáfora conceptual de Lakoff y Johnson (1980, 1999) para explicar el origen y el uso de metáforas conceptuales. Se postula que los mecanismos propuestos por la primera teoría no son suficientes para explicar el desarrollo de analogías que se apoyan en metáforas conceptuales preexistentes, y que el formato proposicional que emplea no logra captar las bases experienciales de las metáforas conceptuales. Se señala que, si bien el énfasis experiencial de la teoría de la metáfora conceptual es acertado, esta teoría no ha logrado proponer constructos representacionales adecuados para desarrollar su teoría en un nivel informal y formal, algo que sí ha hecho la teoría de proyección de la estructura. Se indica que, irónicamente, la teoría recurre a constructos proposicionales contrarios a su tendencia experiencialista. (AU)

Los límites del modelo estándar acerca del componente semántico en el establecimiento de correspondencias analógicas / The limits of the standard model about the semantic factor in analogical mapping

Se postula que el tratamiento dado al componente semántico en los programas dominantes del establecimiento de correspondencias analógico (e.g., SME) reduce la semántica a la influencia de similitudes pre-establecidas sobre el emparejamiento de elementos proposicionales, y que la concepción teórica que subyace a este tratamiento supone importantes limitaciones. Se sostiene, junto a la teoría de percepción de alto nivel (TPAN), que los intentos de simulación computacional del establecimiento de correspondencias deberían proponerse incorporar en los programas habilidades semánticas tales como el establecimiento de similitudes contextuales y la construcción de representaciones de los análogos según las exigencias que plantea el establecimiento de correspondencias. Se apoya la idea de la TPAN de que programas como SME carecen de comprensión de las analogías que realizan y suponen un modo falaz de simulación computacional. Se postula que las respuestas dadas a las críticas formuladas por la TPAN no son adecuadas y que estas críticas deberían recibir mayor atención en el área del pensamiento por analogía

We argue that the treatment given to semantics by the standard programs of analogical mapping (e.g., SME) reduces semantics to the influence of pre-established similarities between propositional elements on the mapping of these elements, and that the theoretical conception under this treatment supposes serious limits. We claim, in accordance with the High Level Perception Theory, that attempts to simulate analogical mapping should aim to equip programs with semantic abilities such as the detection of contextual similarities and the construction of analogue representations in response to mapping demands. We agree with the High Level Perception Theory in that programs like SME do not understand the analogies they produce, and in that they suppose a fallacious way of computational modeling. We argue that the responses given to the criticisms formulated by the High Level Perception Theory are not adequate, and that these criticisms deserve more attention in the field of analogical thinking

The role of extra-contextual and contextual similarities in analogical mapping

Se llevó a cabo un experimento para determinar la validez psicológica del tratamiento que recibe el componente semántico en el establecimiento de correspondencias analógico por parte de la Teoría de Proyección de la Estructura de Gentner (1983, 1989; Gentner & Markman, 1997) y la Teoría de las Múltiples Restricciones de Holyoak y Thagard (1989a, 1995). Los participantes del grupo experimental recibieron un texto fuente en el que se narraba que un hecho (causa) había provocado un segundo hecho (efecto). Siendo enfrentados después a un texto objetivo en el que se describía un hecho objetivo (similar al hecho efecto fuente) de causa desconocida, se les pidió que, basándose en la narración fuente, hipotetizaran cuál, entre dos hechos candidatos a causa, podía haber provocado el hecho objetivo. La analogía era ambigua si se seguían criterios semánticos y no podía desambiguarse a partir de criterios sintácticos o pragmáticos. Los participantes de este grupo decidieron sus correspondencias siguiendo similitudes semánticas contextuales y no en cambio el tipo de similitudes semánticas extra-contextuales incorporadas por las teorías nombradas en sus modelos computacionales. Los participantes del grupo control debían realizar la misma tarea que el grupo experimental (hipotetizar cuál podía haber sido la causa del hecho objetivo), pero no recibían ningún análogo previo. Estos participantes eligieron como causa el hecho alternativo al elegido por el grupo experimental, lo que indicó que la elección de este grupo no estuvo determinada por la plausibilidad intrínseca, en el dominio objetivo, del hecho elegido. Los resultados son discutidos considerando la crítica de Hofstadter y el Grupo FARG (1995) a la forma en que la semántica es tratada por el modelo estándar del establecimiento de correspondencias analógico