Why IACUCs Need Ethicists.

Some animal research is arguably morally wrong, and some animal research is morally bad but could be improved. Who is most likely to be able to identify wrong or bad animal research and advocate for improvements? I argue that philosophical ethicists have the expertise that makes them the likely best candidates for these tasks. I review the skills, knowledge, and perspectives that philosophical ethicists tend to have that makes them ethical experts. I argue that, insofar as Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees are expected to ensure that research is ethical, they must have philosophical ethicists as members.

Expectations for the methodology and translation of animal research: a survey of the general public, medical students and animal researchers in North America.

To determine what are considered acceptable standards for animal research (AR) methodology and translation rate to humans, a validated survey was sent to: a) a sample of the general public, via Sampling Survey International (SSI; Canada), Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; USA), a Canadian city festival (CF) and a Canadian children's hospital (CH); b) a sample of medical students (two first-year classes); and c) a sample of scientists (corresponding authors and academic paediatricians). There were 1379 responses from the general public sample (SSI, n = 557; AMT, n = 590; CF, n = 195; CH, n = 102), 205/330 (62%) medical student responses, and 23/323 (7%, too few to report) scientist responses. Asked about methodological quality, most of the general public and medical student respondents expect that: AR is of high quality (e.g. anaesthesia and analgesia are monitored, even overnight, and 'humane' euthanasia, optimal statistical design, comprehensive literature review, randomisation and blinding, are performed), and costs and difficulty are not acceptable justifications for lower quality (e.g. costs of expert consultation, or more laboratory staff). Asked about their expectations of translation to humans (of toxicity, carcinogenicity, teratogenicity and treatment findings), most expect translation more than 60% of the time. If translation occurred less than 20% of the time, a minority disagreed that this would "significantly reduce your support for AR". Medical students were more supportive of AR, even if translation occurred less than 20% of the time. Expectations for AR are much higher than empirical data show to have been achieved.

The ethics of animal research: a survey of the public and scientists in North America.

BACKGROUND: To determine whether the public and scientists consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of animal research (AR) convincing. METHODS: After validation, the survey was sent to samples of public (Sampling Survey International (SSI; Canadian), Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; US), a Canadian city festival and children's hospital), medical students (two second-year classes), and scientists (corresponding authors, and academic pediatricians). We presented questions about common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses were compared using Chi-square with Bonferonni correction. RESULTS: There were 1220 public [SSI, n = 586; AMT, n = 439; Festival, n = 195; Hospital n = 107], 194/331 (59%) medical student, and 19/319 (6%) scientist [too few to report] responses. Most public respondents were <45 years (65%), had some College/University education (83%), and had never done AR (92%). Most public and medical student respondents considered 'benefits arguments' sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same 'benefits arguments' do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened 'benefits arguments'. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by 'characteristics of non-human-animals arguments', including that non-human-animals are not sentient, or are property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by 'human exceptionalism' arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special 'kind', can enter social contracts, or face a 'lifeboat situation'. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities ['argument from species overlap'], and that the notion of 'kind' is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the 'kind' 'sentient-animal' or 'subject-of-a-life'?]. Medical students were more supportive (80%) of AR at the end of the survey (p < 0.05). CONCLUSIONS: Responses suggest that support for AR may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales, and more open debate is warranted.

Expectations for methodology and translation of animal research: a survey of health care workers.

BACKGROUND: Health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR); therefore, an awareness of the empirical costs and benefits of animal research is an important issue for HCW. We aim to determine what health-care-workers consider should be acceptable standards of AR methodology and translation rate to humans. METHODS: After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory-therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, methodology of AR, and expectations from AR. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P < .05 considered significant. RESULTS: Response rate was 44/114(39%) (pediatricians), and 69/120 (58%) (nurses/RTs). Asked about methodological quality, most respondents expect that: AR is done to high quality; costs and difficulty are not acceptable justifications for low quality; findings should be reproducible between laboratories and strains of the same species; and guidelines for AR funded with public money should be consistent with these expectations. Asked about benefits of AR, most thought that there are sometimes/often large benefits to humans from AR, and disagreed that "AR rarely produces benefit to humans." Asked about expectations of translation to humans (of toxicity, carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, and treatment findings), most: expect translation >40% of the time; thought that misleading AR results should occur <21% of the time; and that if translation was to occur <20% of the time, they would be less supportive of AR. There were few differences between pediatricians and nurses/RTs. CONCLUSIONS: HCW have high expectations for the methodological quality of, and the translation rate to humans of findings from AR. These expectations are higher than the empirical data show having been achieved. Unless these areas of AR significantly improve, HCW support of AR may be tenuous.

The ethics of animal research: a survey of pediatric health care workers.

INTRODUCTION: Pediatric health care workers (HCW) often perform, promote, and advocate use of public funds for animal research (AR). We aim to determine whether HCW consider common arguments (and counterarguments) in support (or not) of AR convincing. DESIGN: After development and validation, an e-mail survey was sent to all pediatricians and pediatric intensive care unit nurses and respiratory therapists (RTs) affiliated with a Canadian University. We presented questions about demographics, support for AR, and common arguments (with their counterarguments) to justify the moral permissibility (or not) of AR. Responses are reported using standard tabulations. Responses of pediatricians and nurses/RTs were compared using Chi-square, with P < .05 considered significant. RESULTS: Response rate was 53/115(46%) (pediatricians), and 73/120(61%) (nurses/RTs). Pediatricians and nurses/RTs are supportive of AR. Most considered 'benefits arguments' sufficient to justify AR; however, most acknowledged that counterarguments suggesting alternative research methods may be available, or that it is unclear why the same 'benefits arguments' do not apply to using humans in research, significantly weakened 'benefits arguments'. Almost all were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by 'characteristics of non-human-animals arguments', including that non-human-animals may not be sentient, or are simply property. Most were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR by 'human exceptionalism' arguments, including that humans have more advanced mental abilities, are of a special 'kind', can enter into social contracts, or face a 'lifeboat situation'. Counterarguments explained much of this, including that not all humans have these more advanced abilities [the argument from species overlap], and that the notion of 'kind' is arbitrary [e.g., why are we not of the kind 'sentient animal' or 'subject-of-a-life']. Pediatrician and nurse/RT responses were similar. CONCLUSIONS: Most respondents were not convinced of the moral permissibility of AR when given common arguments and counterarguments from the literature. HCW should seriously consider arguments on both sides of the AR debate.

The harmful, nontherapeutic use of animals in research is morally wrong.

It is argued that using animals in research is morally wrong when the research is nontherapeutic and harmful to the animals. This article discusses methods of moral reasoning and discusses how arguments on this and other bioethical issues might be defended and critiqued. A basic method of moral argument analysis is presented and used to show that common objections to the view that "animal research is morally wrong" fail: ie, common arguments for the view that "animal research is morally permissible" are demonstrably unsound or in need of defense. It is argued that the best explanations why harmful, nontherapeutic research on human beings is wrong, ie, what it is about humans that makes such experimentation wrong, apply to many animals as well. Thus, harmful and nontherapeutic animal experimentation is wrong for reasons similar to the reasons that harmful and nontherapeutic human experimentation is wrong.

Abortion, metaphysics and morality: a review of Francis Beckwith's defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice.

In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, "Defending Abortion Philosophically"(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to kill. His arguments are based on what he calls a "metaphysics of the human person" known as "The Substance View." I argue that Beckwith's metaphysics does not support his abortion ethic: Moral, not metaphysical, claims that are part of this Substance View are the foundation of the argument, and Beckwith inadequately defends these moral claims. Thus, Beckwith's arguments do not provide strong support for what he calls the "pro-life" view of abortion.

Carl Cohen's 'kind' arguments for animal rights and against human rights.

Carl Cohen's arguments against animal rights are shown to be unsound. His strategy entails that animals have rights, that humans do not, the negations of those conclusions, and other false and inconsistent implications. His main premise seems to imply that one can fail all tests and assignments in a class and yet easily pass if one's peers are passing and that one can become a convicted criminal merely by setting foot in a prison. However, since his moral principles imply that nearly all exploitive uses of animals are wrong anyway, foes of animal rights are advised to seek philosophical consolations elsewhere. I note that some other philosophers' arguments are subject to similar objections.

Animal dissection and evidence-based life-science and health-professions education.

Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford (1879/1999) con-cluded his famous essay, "The Ethics of Belief" with the bold claim that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (p.77). Clifford's enthusiasm for evidentialism-the principle that one should proportion one's belief to the strength of the evidence-may have been overzealous, but a plausible interpretation of his view is this: Because beliefs of-ten have serious moral consequences, one should base one's beliefs on the evi-dence, and it is intellectually and morally irresponsible not to do so. This per-spective motivates recent so-called "evidence-based" methods in the fields of medicine and education. Balcombe's (2000, 2001) case for replacing learning methods that require pain, suffering, and death for animals with methods that do not (computer-assisted learning, three-dimensional models, videotapes, and other alternatives) can be seen as motivated by this evidentialist perspective. Balcombe provided a wealth of empirical evidence from educational studies to show that in most contexts animal dissection is not necessary-and even counterproductive-to achieve valid educa-tional goals, especially higher order goals (concept learning and problem solving). He demonstrated that no sound defense of dissection has been given. Can we learn as effectively without hurting or killing another being? If so, why do we not try? Many of the studies Balcombe cites have supported sufficiently the adequacy and, often, superiority of learning methods that do not harm animals or students. The first of the aforementioned questions is being answered; we can learn effectively with these non-detrimental methods. Those who seek to educate (and accept the prin-ciple of "do no harm") must seize the second question because they see, in the big pic-ture, the benefit for themselves, their students, their society, and other sentient beings. (p. 132)