Do conspiracy beliefs fuel support for reactionary social movements? Effects of misbeliefs on actions to oppose lockdown and to "stop the steal".

Pundits have speculated that the spread of conspiracies and misinformation (termed "misbeliefs") is leading to a resurgence of right-wing, reactionary movements. However, the current empirical picture regarding the relationship between misbeliefs and collective action is mixed. We help clarify these associations by using two waves of data collected during the COVID-19 Pandemic (in Australia, N = 519, and the United States, N = 510) and democratic elections (in New Zealand N = 603, and the United States N = 609) to examine the effects of misbeliefs on support for reactionary movements (e.g., anti-lockdown protests, Study 1; anti-election protests, Study 2). Results reveal that within-person changes in misbeliefs correlate positively with support for reactionary collective action both directly (Studies 1-2) and indirectly by shaping the legitimacy of the authority (Study 1b). The relationship between misbelief and legitimacy is, however, conditioned by the stance of the authority in question: the association is positive when authorities endorse misbeliefs (Study 1a) and negative when they do not (Study 1b). Thus, the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and action hinges upon the alignment of the content of the conspiracy and the goals of the collective action.

The association between political orientation and political knowledge in 45 nations.

Political knowledge is crucial for well-functioning democracies, with most scholars assuming that people at the political extremes are more knowledgeable than those at the center. Here, we adopt a data-driven approach to examine the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge by testing a series of polynomial curves in 45 countries (N = 63,544), spread over 6 continents. Contrary to the dominant perspective, we found no evidence that people at the political extremes are the most knowledgeable about politics. Rather, the most common pattern was a fourth-degree polynomial association in which those who are moderately left-wing and right-wing are more knowledgeable than people at the extremes and center of the political spectrum. This pattern was especially, though not exclusively, prevalent in Western countries. We conclude that the relationship between political orientation and political knowledge is more context-dependent and complex than assumed, and caution against (implicit) universal conclusions in social sciences.

Barriers to Biculturalism: Historical Negation and Symbolic Exclusion Predict Longitudinal Increases in Bicultural Policy Opposition.

The colonial ideologies of historical negation and symbolic exclusion (i.e., the "Dark Duo") promote inequality between settler colonizers and Indigenous peoples by denying the contemporary relevance of past injustices and excluding Indigenous culture from the nation's identity, respectively. Although their correlates are established, the temporal ordering of the relationship between the Dark Duo and bicultural policy opposition is unclear. We address this oversight by utilizing nine annual waves of panel data from a nationwide random sample of New Zealand adults (N = 31,104) to estimate two multigroup RI-CLPMs using the Dark Duo to predict symbolic and resource-based policy opposition (and vice versa). Results revealed that within-person increases in historical negation and symbolic exclusion predicted subsequent increases in symbolic and resource-based bicultural policy opposition for both majority and minority ethnic groups. These relationships were, however, bidirectional, demonstrating a self-perpetuating cycle, whereby the Dark Duo undermines biculturalism and antibiculturalism strengthens the Dark Duo.

Examining the indirect effect of income on well-being via individual-based relative deprivation: Longitudinal mediation with a random intercept cross-lagged panel model.

Although the positive relationship between income and well-being is well established, the psychological mechanisms underlying this process are less understood. One underexplored explanation is that objective wealth (or lack thereof) fosters relative comparisons, which, in turn, predicts well-being. Extant work has, however, mostly focused on objective indicators of relative deprivation rather than on how people perceive their societal status. We address this oversight by examining the longitudinal indirect effects of income on well-being via perceived individual-based relative deprivation (IRD) using traditional and random intercept cross-lagged panel models. Averaged across 10 annual assessments in a nationwide longitudinal panel sample of adults (N = 66,560), our results revealed reliable indirect effects of income on well-being via IRD. Specifically, within-person increases in income predicted within-person decreases in IRD, which then predicted within-person increases in personal well-being over time. Our results replicated across robustness checks, including one using a general life satisfaction measure. We thus extend previous work by highlighting the need to consider one's perceptions of their relative societal position as a mechanism underlying the effects of income on well-being over time.

Perceived Relative Deprivation Across the Adult Lifespan: An Examination of Aging and Cohort Effects.

Despite being a core psychological construct for over 70 years, research has yet to examine how perceptions of deprivation relative to other individuals and/or groups develop across adulthood. As such, this preregistered study uses cohort-sequential latent growth modeling to examine changes in individual- and group-based relative deprivation (IRD and GRD, respectively) across the adult lifespan. Across 10 annual assessments of a nationwide random sample of adults (Ntotal = 58,878; ethnic minority n = 11,927; 62.7% women; ages 21-80), mean levels of IRD trended downward across the lifespan, whereas mean levels of GRD generally increased from young-to-middle adulthood before declining across late adulthood. Subtle cohort effects emerged for both constructs, although both IRD and GRD largely followed a normative aging process. Critically, the development of GRD-but not IRD-differed between ethnic groups, providing insights into how one's objective status may shape subjective (dis)advantage over time.

The socialization of perceived discrimination in ethnic minority groups.

Contact with members of one's own group (ingroup) and other groups (outgroups) shapes individuals' beliefs about the world, including perceptions of discrimination against one's ingroup. Research to date indicates that, among members of disadvantaged groups, contact with an advantaged outgroup is associated with less perceived discrimination, while contact with the disadvantaged ingroup is associated with more perceived discrimination. Past studies, however, considered ingroup and outgroup contact in isolation and overlooked the various processes that could explain these associations. We addressed these issues by examining whether disadvantaged-group members' perceptions of discrimination are shaped by how much contact they have with ingroup and outgroup members (contact effects) or by those ingroup and outgroup members' perceptions of discrimination (socialization effects) while controlling for their tendency to affiliate with similar others (selection effects). Three studies (total N = 5,866 ethnic minority group members) assessed participants' positive contact, friendships, and perceived discrimination and applied longitudinal and social network analyses to separate and simultaneously test contact, socialization, and selection processes. In contrast to previous studies, we found no evidence that contact with members of the advantaged outgroup precedes perceived discrimination. Instead, we found that friendships with members of the disadvantaged ingroup longitudinally predict perceived discrimination through the process of socialization-disadvantaged-group members' perceptions of discrimination became more similar to their ingroup friends' perceptions of discrimination over time. We conclude that perceptions of discrimination should be partly understood as a socialized belief about a shared reality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The psychological causes and societal consequences of authoritarianism.

Over the past two decades, citizens' political rights and civil liberties have declined globally. Psychological science can play an instrumental role in both explaining and combating the authoritarian impulses that underlie these attacks on personal autonomy. In this Review, we describe the psychological processes and situational factors that foster authoritarianism, as well as the societal consequences of its apparent resurgence within the general population. First, we summarize the dual process motivational model of ideology and prejudice, which suggests that viewing the world as a dangerous, but not necessarily competitive, place plants the psychological seeds of authoritarianism. Next, we discuss the evolutionary, genetic, personality and developmental antecedents to authoritarianism and explain how contextual threats to safety and security activate authoritarian predispositions. After examining the harmful consequences of authoritarianism for intergroup relations and broader societal attitudes, we discuss the need to expand the ideological boundaries of authoritarianism and encourage future research to investigate both right-wing and left-wing variants of authoritarianism.

Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism across the adult lifespan: An examination of aging and cohort effects.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) are foundational constructs in intergroup relations, yet their development across the lifespan is poorly understood. The few studies on the topic demonstrate that age positively correlates with both SDO and RWA. However, it is unclear whether this association is due to (a) normative aging, (b) generational differences associated with the period in which one was born and raised, or (c) a combination of these processes. This study estimates a series of cohort-sequential latent growth models to examine change due to both aging and cohort effects using 11 annual waves of longitudinal panel data collected from a nationwide random sample of adults (Ns = 61,858-61,862). Mean levels of SDO and RWA both trended upward across the adult lifespan, although this pattern was more marked for RWA. Cohort effects also emerged for both constructs and were again more pronounced for RWA. Contextual factors thus appear to influence authoritarianism more than they impact the preference for intergroup hierarchy. Similar trends emerged when differentiating birth cohorts by gender and ethnic majority status. Age and cohort effects for generalized prejudice among an ethnic majority group were also assessed (N = 47,955), revealing that prejudice declined in early adulthood but began to stabilize in middle age. This is the first large-scale study to document how SDO, RWA, and generalized prejudice change over the adult lifespan while also examining trends associated with the period in which a person was born and socialized. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The political system through a partisan lens: Within-person changes in support for political parties precede political system attitudes.

Although political party support and attitudes towards the political system are closely related, the temporal ordering of these associations is unclear. Indeed, prior research identifies both partisan-led change in system attitudes and system attitude-led change in party support. Using a ten-year (2010-2020) national probability sample of New Zealand adults (N = 66,359), we test these associations by modelling the within-person cross-lagged effects between conservative and liberal party support, and political system justification. During conservative-led governments, increases in conservative party support predicted increases in political system justification more strongly than vice versa. The 2017 shift to a liberal-led government was met with an immediate reversal of the effects of party support on system justification, but the effect of system justification on party support took a full year to reverse. These results demonstrate people's perceptions of the fairness of the political system depend on their support for the party in power.

The sanctity of life: The role of purity in attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia.

Although abortion and euthanasia are highly contested issues at the heart of the culture war, the moral foundations underlying ideological differences on these issues are mostly unknown. Given that much of the extant debate is framed around the sanctity of life, we argued that the moral foundation of purity/sanctity-a core moral belief that emphasises adherence to the "natural order"-would mediate the negative relationship between conservatism and support for abortion and euthanasia. As hypothesised, results from a nation-wide random sample of adults in New Zealand (N = 3360) revealed that purity/sanctity mediated the relationship between conservatism and opposition to both policies. These results demonstrate that, rather than being motivated by a desire to reduce harm, conservative opposition to pro-choice and end-of-life decisions is (partly) based on the view that ending a life, even if it is one's own, violates God's natural design and, thus, stains one's spiritual purity.

Socio-political efficacy explains increase in New Zealanders' pro-environmental attitudes due to COVID-19.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic claimed millions of lives and caused unprecedented disruptions. Despite these negative impacts, there is optimism the pandemic may shift public opinion on other global crises by fostering a sense of collective efficacy. Using propensity score matching to compare New Zealanders assessed before (n =12,304) and after (n = 12,370) nationwide lockdowns in 2020, we tested a preregistered mediation model with COVID-19 lockdown experience predicting increases in pro-environmental attitudes via enhanced socio-political efficacy. As hypothesized, socio-political efficacy increased after the successful nationwide lockdowns. In turn, socio-political efficacy amplified respondents' pro-environmental attitudes including climate beliefs and concern, as well as support for a government subsidy for public transport and opposition to government spending on new motorways. The pandemic also enhanced respondents' satisfaction with the quality of the natural environment, which was unmediated by socio-political efficacy. The crisis might offer an opportunity to foster collective pro-environmental actions.

System Justification or Social Dominance? A Multilevel Test of the Ideological Motivators of Perceived Discrimination.

Although system-justifying beliefs often mitigate perceptions of discrimination, status-based asymmetries in the ideological motivators of perceived discrimination are unknown. Because the content and societal implications of discrimination claims are status-dependant, social dominance orientation (SDO) should motivate perceptions of (reverse) discrimination among members of high-status groups, whereas system justification should motivate the minimization of perceived discrimination among the disadvantaged. We tested these hypotheses using multilevel regressions among a nationwide random sample of New Zealand Europeans (n = 29,169) and ethnic minorities (n = 5,118). As hypothesized, group-based dominance correlated positively with perceived (reverse) discrimination among ethnic-majority group members, whereas system justification correlated negatively with perceived discrimination among the disadvantaged. Furthermore, the proportion of minorities within the region strengthened the victimizing effects of SDO-Dominance, but not SDO-Egalitarianism, among the advantaged. Together, these results reveal status-based asymmetries in the motives underlying perceptions of discrimination and identify a key contextual moderator of this association.

Political attitude change over time following COVID-19 lockdown: Rallying effects and differences between left and right voters.

Restrictions to curb the spread of COVID-19 have required widespread compliance over long periods, but citizens' attitudes to these often change over time. Here, we examine the time course of political attitudes in New Zealand over the months before and after the announcement of the country's first nationwide COVID-19 lockdown in 2020 using a large-scale national survey (Ns = 41,831-42,663). Government satisfaction increased immediately following the lockdown announcement and remained elevated 5 months later. Trust in institutions and political efficacy also increased gradually over the same period. However, these trends varied by political party vote: Compared to center-left voters who supported the largest governing party, center-right voters who supported the opposition party returned to baseline levels of government satisfaction quicker and showed more pronounced dips in their satisfaction with the economy. These same attitudes also predicted compliance with COVID-19 guidelines. Results illustrate a rally-around-the-flag effect during the pandemic and suggest that support wanes faster among center-right (opposition party) voters.

To meat, or not to meat: A longitudinal investigation of transitioning to and from plant-based diets.

Concerns over potential negative effects of excessive meat consumption on both the environment and personal health, coupled with long-standing debates over animal rights, have motivated research on the prevalence and predictors of plant-based versus meat-based diets. Yet few studies have examined longitudinal trends in dietary behaviours using large national samples. We address this gap by examining the prevalence, predictors, and annual change in the self-reported dietary behaviour of a large national probability sample of New Zealand adults (categorised as omnivore, vegetarian, or vegan; Ns = 12,259-50,964). Consistent with our pre-registered hypotheses, omnivore was the most prevalent dietary category (94.1%). Moreover, higher levels of conservative ideologies (i.e., political conservatism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Social Dominance Orientation), lower subjective health, lower environmental efficacy, and lower disgust sensitivity predicted having an omnivore (vs. vegetarian or vegan) diet. Longitudinal analyses further revealed that the probability of shifting from an omnivore diet to a vegetarian or vegan diet over a one-year period was low, and that veganism was the least stable dietary category. Both gender (men) and political conservatism predicted lower probabilities of transitioning from meat to no-meat diets over time.

Examining the relational underpinnings and consequences of system-justifying beliefs: Explaining the palliative effects of system justification.

People often perceive social systems as fair and legitimate in order to satisfy existential, epistemic, and relational needs. Although much work has examined the existential and epistemic roots to system justification, the relational motives underlying the tendency to justify the system have received comparatively less attention. We addressed this oversight by examining the associations approach and avoidance relational goals have with system justification in a national probability sample (N = 21,938). Consistent with the thesis that the need to belong motivates system justification, avoidance goals (i.e., the desire to avoid social conflict) correlated positively with system justification (approach goals also unexpectedly correlated positively with system justification). Also as hypothesized, system justification mediated the relationship between avoidance goals and belongingness. Moreover, system justification mediated the relationship between avoidance goals and belongingness. Finally, sequential mediation analyses revealed that avoidance goals predicted higher well-being via system justification and belongingness. This study is the first to demonstrate that system justification confers palliative benefits by satisfying two different relational goals.

Ideology before party: Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism temporally precede political party support.

Although an extensive literature on political ideology and party support has developed, studies examining the temporal ordering of these variables remain lacking. We address this oversight and argue that because ideologies provide a framework for understanding the world, they should forecast changes in party support over time. Accordingly, a random intercepts cross-lagged panel model estimated the annual within-person associations between social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and party support in nine waves of a New Zealand representative longitudinal panel sample from 2009 to 2017 (N = 31,537). As hypothesized, SDO and RWA predicted within-person increases in support for the centre-right National Party, but decreases in support for the centre-left Labour Party. Reciprocal associations from party support to ideology were approximately half the magnitude. These results provide some of the most robust evidence to date of the oft-assumed, but largely untested, premise that SDO and RWA predict change in party support.

Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and nationwide lockdown on trust, attitudes toward government, and well-being.

The contagiousness and deadliness of COVID-19 have necessitated drastic social management to halt transmission. The immediate effects of a nationwide lockdown were investigated by comparing matched samples of New Zealanders assessed before (Nprelockdown = 1,003) and during the first 18 days of lockdown (Nlockdown = 1,003). Two categories of outcomes were examined: (a) institutional trust and attitudes toward the nation and government and (b) health and well-being. Applying propensity score matching to approximate the conditions of a randomized controlled experiment, the study found that people in the pandemic/lockdown group reported higher trust in science, politicians, and police, higher levels of patriotism, and higher rates of mental distress compared to people in the prelockdown prepandemic group. Results were confirmed in within-subjects analyses. The study highlights social connectedness, resilience, and vulnerability in the face of adversity and has applied implications for how countries face this global challenge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate (or Both)? Mapping Distinct Bias Profiles in the Population.

Researchers have long argued that ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are separable phenomena that occur in different, meaningful combinations. Statistical methods for testing this thesis, however, have been underutilized. We address this oversight by using latent profile analysis (LPA) to investigate distinct profiles of group bias derived from ingroup and outgroup warmth ratings. Using a national probability sample of Maori (the indigenous people of New Zealand; N = 2,289) and Europeans (N = 13,647), we identify a distinct profile reflecting ingroup favoritism/outgroup derogation (Type III in Brewer's typology of ingroup bias) in both groups (6.7% of Maori, 10.3% of Europeans). The factors associated with this type, however, differed between groups. Whereas ethnic identity centrality predicted membership for Type III for Maori, social dominance orientation predicted this type for Europeans. Thus, although both groups may express the same kind of bias pattern, the motivation underlying this bias varies by status.

Attitudes towards redistribution and the interplay between perceptions and beliefs about inequality.

Although economic inequality has increased over the last few decades, support for redistributive policies is not widely accepted by the public. In this paper, we examine whether attitudes towards redistribution are a product of both perceptions of, and beliefs about, inequality. Specifically, we argue that the association between perceived inequality and support for redistribution varies by beliefs that justify inequality. We investigated this hypothesis in a cross-cultural/country sample (N = 56,021 from 41 countries) using two different operationalizations of support for redistribution and two distinct beliefs that justify inequality. As hypothesized, the perceived size of the income gap correlated positively with believing that it is the government's responsibility to reduce inequality among those who rejected beliefs that justify inequality, whereas there was no association for those who endorsed these beliefs. Similarly, perceived economic inequality correlated positively with support for progressive taxation, but this association was weaker among those who endorsed meritocratic and equal opportunity beliefs. Together, these results demonstrate that ideologies influence the relationship between perceived inequality and attitudes towards redistribution, and that support for redistribution varies by how the policy is framed.

Testing the Social Identity Model of Collective Action Longitudinally and Across Structurally Disadvantaged and Advantaged Groups.

Although the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) demonstrates that identity, efficacy, and injustice are key correlates of collective action, longitudinal tests of these causal assumptions are absent from the literature. Moreover, most collective action research focuses on disadvantaged groups' responses to injustice, with few studies examining what motivates advantaged groups to protest. We address these oversights using nationally representative longitudinal panel data to investigate SIMCA among members of disadvantaged (N = 2,574) and advantaged (N = 13,367) groups. As hypothesized, identity predicted increases in injustice, efficacy, and collective action support over time. In turn, injustice (but not efficacy) mediated the longitudinal association between identity and collective action support. Notably, results were largely consistent across disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Thus, we provide the first demonstration that identity temporally precedes collective action across objectively disadvantaged and advantaged groups, but identify complexities regarding the role of efficacy in protest.