Implementing FCTC Article 17 Through Participatory Research With Bidi Workers in Tamil Nadu, India.

INTRODUCTION: The exploitation, poor conditions, and precarity in the bidi (hand-rolled leaf cigarette) industry in India make it ripe for the application of the FCTC's Article 17, "Provision of support for economically viable alternative activities". "Bottom-up", participatory approaches give scope to explore bidi rollers' own circumstances, experiences, and aspirations. METHODS: A team of six community health volunteers using a participatory research orientation developed a questionnaire-based semi-structured interview tool. Forty-six bidi rolling women were interviewed by pairs of volunteers in two northern Tamil Nadu cities. Two follow-up focus groups were also held. A panel of 11 bidi rollers attended a workshop at which the findings from the interviews and focus groups were presented, further significant points were made and possible alternatives to bidi rolling were discussed. RESULTS: Bidi workers are aware of the adverse impact of their occupation on them and their families, as well as the major risks posed by the product itself for the health of consumers. However, they need alternative livelihoods that offer equivalent remuneration, convenience, and (in some cases) dignity. Alternative livelihoods, and campaigns for better rights for bidi workers while they remain in the industry, serve to undercut industry arguments against tobacco control. Responses need to be diverse and specific to local situations, i.e. "bottom-up" as much as "top-down", which can make the issue of scaling up problematic. CONCLUSION: Participatory approaches involving bidi workers themselves in discussions about their circumstances and aspirations have opened up new possibilities for alternative livelihoods to tobacco. IMPLICATIONS: Progress with the FCTC's Article 17 has generally been slow and has focussed on tobacco cultivation rather than later stages in the production process. The bidi industry in India is ripe for the application of an alternative livelihoods approach. This study is one of the first to use participatory methods to investigate the circumstances, experiences, and aspirations of bidi workers themselves.

Health and Safety in the Legal Cannabis Industry Before and During COVID-19.

In 2020, medical cannabis is legal in thirty-six states and adult use ("recreational") cannabis is legal in fifteen, despite cannabis remaining illegal at the federal level. Up to 250,000 individuals work as full-time employees in cannabis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, California, Colorado, and other states deemed medical cannabis business as essential, raising occupational challenges and safety issues for cannabis employees. In 2020, interviews were conducted with Ethan, an extraction lab assistant in Las Vegas; Haylee, a trainer with a cannabis company in Sacramento; and Belinda, a Wisconsin-based occupational health and safety trainer, to showcase concerns and experiences in cannabis workplaces and training programs. Findings from interviews reveal pro-worker activities to promote workplace safety and labor unionism while large multistate operators seek to optimize profits and obstruct workers' rights. Knowledge gained through the interviews contributes to discussions to lessen the potential exposure of the cannabis workforce to COVID 19.

Social responsibility in tobacco production? Tobacco companies' use of green supply chains to obscure the real costs of tobacco farming.

BACKGROUND: Tobacco companies have come under increased criticism because of environmental and labour practices related to growing tobacco in developing countries. METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents, industry websites and interviews with tobacco farmers in Tanzania and tobacco farm workers, farm authorities, trade unionists, government officials and corporate executives from global tobacco leaf companies in Malawi. RESULTS: British American Tobacco and Philip Morris created supply chains in the 1990 s to improve production efficiency, control, access to markets and profits. In the 2000s, the companies used their supply chains in an attempt to legitimise their portrayals of tobacco farming as socially and environmentally friendly, rather than take meaningful steps to eliminate child labour and reduce deforestation in developing countries. The tobacco companies used nominal self-evaluation (not truly independent evaluators) and public relations to create the impression of social responsibility. The companies benefit from $1.2 billion in unpaid labour costs because of child labour and more than $64 million annually in costs that would have been made to avoid tobacco-related deforestation in the top 12 tobacco growing developing countries, far exceeding the money they spend nominally working to change these practices. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco industry uses green supply chains to make tobacco farming in developing countries appear sustainable while continuing to purchase leaf produced with child labour and high rates of deforestation. Strategies to counter green supply chain schemes include securing implementing protocols for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to regulate the companies' practices at the farm level.

Global leaf companies control the tobacco market in Malawi.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the influence of US-based tobacco leaf-buying companies, Universal Corporation and Alliance One International, on Malawi's economy and trade policy in 2000-6. DESIGN: Analyses of ethnographic data and tobacco industry documents. RESULTS: Universal Corporation and Alliance One International, through their subsidiary companies Limbe Leaf and Alliance One, respectively, in Malawi, control policy-making advisory groups and operate a tobacco cartel to influence Malawi's economic and trade sectors. Limbe Leaf's corporate secretary and lawyer is a member of several policy-making committees that advise the Malawi government on tobacco-related trade policy. The corporate representative's presence prevents other committee members from taking positions against the tobacco industry and ensures government policy that advances industry interests to obtain low-cost tobacco. The World Bank and Malawi's Anti-corruption Bureau report allegations of collusion between Limbe Leaf and Alliance One over prices at tobacco markets. Allegations of collusion between Limbe Leaf and Alliance One prompted Malawi President Bingu Mutharika in 2006 to warn the companies to end non-competitive practices or leave the country, but there was no meaningful follow-up action. Findings from interviews with small-scale tobacco traders in Malawi suggest that Universal and Alliance One International purchase smuggled raw tobacco from the neighbouring countries, Zambia and Mozambique, undermining growers' efforts to benefit from tobacco farming in Malawi. CONCLUSION: These actions restrict competition, depress tobacco prices for Malawi's farmers and contribute to poverty in Malawi, while keeping the country dependent on tobacco growing.