A Useful and Sustainable Role for N-of-1 Trials in the Healthcare Ecosystem.

Clinicians and patients often try a treatment for an initial period to inform longer-term therapeutic decisions. A more rigorous approach involves N-of-1 trials. In these single-patient crossover trials, typically conducted in patients with chronic conditions, individual patients are given candidate treatments in a double-blinded, random sequence of alternating periods to determine the most effective treatment for that patient. However, to date, these trials are rarely done outside of research settings and have not been integrated into general care where they could offer substantial benefit. Designating this classical, N-of-1 trial design as type 1, there also are new and evolving uses of N-of-1 trials that we designate as type 2. In these, rather than focusing on optimizing treatment for chronic diseases when multiple approved choices are available, as is typical of type 1, a type 2 N-of-1 trial tests treatments designed specifically for a patient with a rare disease, to facilitate personalized medicine. While the aims differ, both types face the challenge of collecting individual-patient evidence using standard, trusted, widely accepted methods. To fulfill their potential for producing both clinical and research benefits, and to be available for wide use, N-of-1 trials will have to fit into the current healthcare ecosystem. This will require generalizable and accepted processes, platforms, methods, and standards. This also will require sustainable value-based arrangements among key stakeholders. In this article, we review opportunities, stakeholders, issues, and possible approaches that could support general use of N-of-1 trials and deliver benefit to patients and the healthcare enterprise. To assess and expand the benefits of N-of-1 trials, we propose multistakeholder meetings, workshops, and the generation of methods, standards, and platforms that would support wider availability and the value of N-of-1 trials.

Efficacy and Effectiveness Too Trials: Clinical Trial Designs to Generate Evidence on Efficacy and on Effectiveness in Wide Practice.

Efficacy trials, designed to gain regulatory marketing approval, evaluate drugs in optimally selected patients under advantageous conditions for relatively short time periods. Effectiveness trials, designed to evaluate use in usual practice, assess treatments among more typical patients in real-world conditions with longer follow-up periods. In "efficacy-to-effectiveness (E2E) trials," if the initial efficacy trial component is positive, the trial seamlessly transitions to an effectiveness trial component to efficiently yield both types of evidence. Yet more time could be saved by simultaneously addressing efficacy and effectiveness in an "efficacy and effectiveness too (EE2) trial." Additionally, hybrids of the E2E and EE2 approaches with differing degrees of overlap of the two components could allow flexibility for specific drug development needs. In planning EE2 trials, each stakeholder's current and future needs, incentives, and perspective must be considered. Although challenging, the ultimate benefits to stakeholders, the health system, and the public should justify this effort.

What rough beast?

Synthetic biology seeks to create modular biological parts that can be assembled into useful devices, allowing the modification of biological systems with greater reliability, at lower cost, with greater speed, and by a larger pool of people than has been the case with traditional genetic engineering. We assess the offensive and defensive security implications of synthetic biology based on the insights of leading synthetic biologists into how the technology may develop, the projections of practicing biosecurity authorities on changes in the security context and potential security applications of synthetic biology, and joint appraisals of policy relevant sources of uncertainty. Synthetic biology appears to have minimal security implications in the near term, create modest offensive advantages in the medium term, and strengthen defensive capabilities against natural and engineered biological threats and enable novel potential offensive uses in the long term. To maximize defensive and minimize offensive effects of synthetic biology despite uncertainty, this essay suggests a combination of policy approaches, including community-based efforts, regulation and surveillance, further research, and the deliberate design of security and safety features into the technology.